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PART ONE: TABLES
(a) Summary
One of the prominent features of the legislation concerned 
with the use or misuse of dangerous or otherwise harmful 
drugs, also known as controlled drugs, is the close connection 
between international agreements entered into by the British 
government and subsequent domestic regulations. This was 
undoubtedly the case with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, a 
statute which is a consolidating Act and which sought to 
legislate for modern conditions most noted for their rapid 
change in the demand for and supply of particular drugs and 
in the habits of addiction. The 1971 Act is related to the 
international obligations as the successor in a line of 
domestic statutes, beginning with the Pharmacy Act 1868.
The 1971 Act contains some twenty crimes and offences in 
relation to controlled drugs and in this respect the Act is 
noted for the increasingly complex and detailed offences when 
compared with earlier Acts. This work is concerned only with 
the criminal aspects of the law relating to the misuse of 
drugs. There has been in recent years a great increase in the 
literature concerning the sociological, psychological and 
medical aspects of drugs and the conditions of and encouraging 
their misuse. This work is concerned with criminal responsibility 
and the misuse of drugs. In the light of the general principles 
of criminal law this work attempts to analyse the criminal 
offences in terms of the statutory provisions and the subsequent 
case law. Each offence in the Act is considered separately 
and its development since the passing of the 1971 Act is seen
(iv)
through the particular reported cases and in relation to the 
general changes in the criminal law. The actus reus and the 
mens rea of the offences are considered, as are the defences 
contained in the Act. In particular the fundamental 
principles such as the burden of proof are discussed and the 
recent changes in the law in relation to the burden of 
proof on the accused is seen to be set to follow Australian 
precedents although such changes in United Kingdom 
jurisdictions are seen also to be gradual, hesitant and 
without any great display of enthusiasm on the part of the 
judiciary. The nature of mens rea is analysed and the 
recommendation in the recent reports by the Law Commission 
is compared to the law relating to the misuse of drugs.
This work concludes that the increasing importance of 
statutory offences, as reflected in some of the very 
heavy sentences possible in terms of the 1971 Act, 
requires that the law in relation to mens rea should be 
more settled and that although legislation is unlikely 
in the near future, commentators should seek to find 
answers to the complex questions in order to give suitable 
advice to Parliament when called upon to do so. The law 
is stated as at 26th August 1981.
(v)
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PART TWO: BACKGROUND
Chapter 1 LEGAL HISTORY
1.01 The antecedents of the statutory provisions relating to
controlled drugs are considered in this section. It has to 
be said immediately, by way of exclusion, that the reasons 
for or causes of the use or misuse of stimulants or 
depressants are not a matter for our present concern (1): 
the fact is that these substances are used and that their 
precise use has varied in accordance with, or because of, 
changing social moifes. Nor are we concerned with whether the 
law in relation to any particular drug should be changed (2) 
nor the effects of drugs (3). Nor either are we here 
concerned with a study of what has come to be known as 
"the British system", the general approach to the matter of 
drugs as a medical problem rather than simply a matter for 
the criminal courts to deal with (4). What is a matter for 
our concern now is the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 in its 
relationship to earlier statutes and also, and this is a 
peculiarity of drug control, to international obligations. 
This work is essentially a study of criminal liability and 
drug control in the United Kingdom.
(1) see for example Brian Wells Psychedelic Drugs: 
Psychological, Medical and Social Issues (1973) and 
Peter Laurie Drugs: Medical, Psychological and Social 
Facts (1974) for further discussion.
(2) a recent viewpoint is Frank Logan. Should the law on 
cannabis be changed? Political Quarterly 1980:
2L (3) p331-340.
(3) for an extremely helpful article see D J Power 
Illicit drug taking 14 Med, Sci & Law 258
(4) see Teff pl6 et seq
—  2 —
1.02 The domestic legislation of Great Britain is now considered 
under a variety of headings and these follow the general 
chronological theme for in the progress of Acts certain 
specific events mark different periods in the development.
1.03 (a) Early domestic. The Pharmacy Act 1868 provided for a
moderate measure of control over opium and its preparations 
and this Act contained in Schedule A part III "opium or any 
preparation of opium or of poppies". The Act prohibited any 
person from selling or offering to sell, dispense or compound 
poisons unless that person was a chemist or "druggist" or 
from selling any poison unless the container was distinctly 
labelled. This is the earliest indication of a policy of
restriction and owed its origins to the international and Far
Eastern ramifications of opium use and to the domestic
opium movement known as the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade founded in 1874. There was also concern about the 
domestic use of opium and recent research has suggested that 
many working people used opiates and were unconsciously 
addicted until supplies failed. (5) This Act was amended by 
the Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1908 and there the new Schedule 
included "Opium and all preparations or admixtures containing 
1% or more of morphine". The Act also restricted for the first
time sales of cocaine by the inclusion of "coca, any
preparations or admixtures of, containing 1% or more of coca 
alkaloids".
(5) Virginia Benidge "Working-class Opium Eating in the
Nineteenth Century: Establishing the Facts "British
Jor. of Addiction (1978) 73 p363-374
1.04 (b) Drug control before the League of Nations. The use of
drugs and the trade in them continued to increase throughout 
the Nineteenth century and the early part of the Twentieth 
and the matter came increasingly to the attention of 
government. In 1893 British concern about drug-taking in 
India was reflected in the appointment by the Indian 
government of a Royal Commission to review the position of 
opium and cannabis smoking on the sub-continent. The House 
of Commons passed a resolution in 1906 without division 
reaffirming its belief that "the opium trade between India and 
China is morally indefensible". (6) Externally it was 
American pressure on the international scene that pushed 
Britain, albeit unwillingly, into a system, of control that 
began with the Shanghai Conference of 1909. Although 
delegates had no power to sign a diplomatic Act the 
resolution adopted succeeded in arousing strong international 
opinion and thereby led to the Hague Convention of 1912 which 
did result in an international treaty. The Convention dealt 
with generally, raw opium, prepared opium, manufactured 
drugs and China, and with respect to the fjr^fc, production 
and distribution were regulated. The manufacture and use 
of morphine, cocaine and their respective salts was to be 
limited to legitimate medicinal purposes. China and its long 
tradition of opium use meant that efforts to control drug 
abuse could only be directed to the long term although vested 
trade interests ensured that opium-smoking was allowed or at 
least unhindered in the Far-East territories. Article 20 of 
the Hague Convention required:
(6) Resolution 30th May 1906: 158 Pari. Dels. HC (4th ser.)
494 , 516
- 4
"the contracting powers to examine the possibility of 
enacting laws or regulations making it a penal offence to 
be in illegal possession of raw opium, prepared opium, 
morphine, cocaine and their respective salts."
This formed the basis of Britain's first domestic statute 
of a penal nature but the advent of the First World War 
meant that implementation of our obligation was postponed.
1.05 (c) Drug control after the League of Nations. The Dangerous
Drugs Act 1920 came into operation on 1st September 1920 (7) 
and it sought to establish a system of control in accordance 
with our internal:i’onaLobligations. The Act was divided into 
four categories: Part I contained certain restrictions in 
relation to the importation and exportation of raw opium and 
also made provision for regulations for the production of 
and dealing in raw opium: Part II contained certain
restrictions in relation to the importation and exportation 
of prepared opium and made provision for offences concerning 
importation and exportation of cocaine, morphine, ecgomine 
and diamorphine (commonly known as heroin) and their 
respective salts and medicinal opium and made provision for 
regulations to control the manufacture and sale of these 
drugs and also for the granting and the withdrawal of 
authority to manufacture, retail, dispense or compound any 
such drug. Part IV contained inter alia powers of inspection 
by constables or other authorised persons and the granting of 
licences. More particularly the offences in the Act were 
punishable (8) on summary conviction b ^ a  fine not exceeding 
£200 or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a
(7) by Section 17(2)
(8) by Section 13(2)
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term not exceeding six months or ^  both; and for second 
or subsequent convictions to a fine not exceeding £500 or to 
imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding 
two years or to both; and, in addition, the court could 
order forfeiture of goods in respect of which the offence was 
committed to be forfeited.
1.06 The 1920 Act may appear to be the foundation of British 
drug legislation and the first Act of domestic and social 
legislation to be passed as a result of international 
agreement. But it is now seen to be the extension of 
certain domestic legislation which filled the apparently 
fallow years of 1912-1920. The Defence of the Realm Act 
1916 provided by Regulation 4 OB that the sale or supply of 
cocaine and other drugs to any member of the armed forces 
was forbidden unless ordered by a doctor on a written 
prescription, dated and signed by him and marked "not to be 
repeated". The perceived needs of the war effort allowed 
the passage of this measure of formal restriction virtually 
without opposition. It has been said recently (9)
"As in other areas of national life - licensing, rent 
and price-control and direction of labour - war conditions 
encouraged the establishment of significant incursions into
the liberty of the individual."
1.07 Be that as it may, the Regulation represents the link 
between pre- and post-war legislation. The League of Nations 
Covenant provided by Article 23 that the League should have
general supervision over agreements with regard to the traffic
in opium and other dangerous drugs. Before this role could
(9) Virginia Benidge War Conditions and Narcotic Control 
Jol. Soc. Pol. 7 3, p285-364 at p286
- 6 —
be demonstrated a further outbreak of the misuse of 
cocaine in Britain led to the Dangerous Drugs and Poisons 
Amendment Act 1923 which amended the 1920 Act in providing 
in certain circumstances for search warrants and in extending 
the range of offenders to include false declarations to 
obtain licences to distribute drugs. It was also made an 
offence to "aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of 
an offence" and, generally, penalties were increased. The 
League of Nations did have the opportunity to demonstrate its 
role with the General Convention of 1925. This required 
governments to submit to the newly-created Permanent Control 
Opium Board annual statistics concerned the production of 
opium and coca leaves; the manufacture, consumption and 
stocks of narcotic drugs and quarterly reports on import 
certificates and export authorisation requiring government 
approval of each import and export. The link between 
international obligations and British domestic legislation 
was illustrated most clearly by the resulting Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1925, the long title of which is:
"An Act to amend the Dangerous Drugs Acts 1920 and 1923, 
so far as is necessary to enable effect to be given to a 
Convention signed at Geneva on behalf of His Majesty on 
the Nineteenth day of February, Nineteen hundred and Twenty 
five".
1,08 Section 1 of the 1925 Act increased the number of substances 
subject to control by extending Part I of the 1920 Act to 
include coca leaves Indian hemp and resin obtained from 
Indian hemp and all preparations of which such resins form 
the base, as it applies to raw opium. Section 3 of the 1925
— 7 —
Act likewise extended Part III of the 1920 Act to include 
morphine, cocaine, heroin and their respective salts, 
medicinal opium and any extract or tincture of Indian hemp. 
Although the 1925 Act proceeded through Parliament extremely 
fast, the Treaty of 1925 was not ratified generally until 
1928 and in some cases 1930. (10)
1.09 International concern about drug traffic, licit or otherwise, 
continued and the convention for limiting the manufacture 
and regulation of the distribution of drugs took place in 
1931. This, the largest of all the conferences, was attended 
by 54 states while several others sent observers. The aim of 
the convention was agreed and signed on 13th July 1931. The 
main resolution was that under Article 2, by which each 
contracting party was to provide estimates of the amount of 
manufacture^ drugs needed for any one year. The signatories 
bound themselves not to exceed in their manufacture and 
imports certain maximum levels computed on the basis of 
estimates of their particular requirements. To examine and 
endorse these figures a Drugs Supervisory Board was created 
which would publish the parties annual estimates. The 1931 
Convention (known as the Limitation Convention) sought to 
close the channels through which drugs escaped into the 
illicit traffic and to this end the estimates established 
were to be binding. Following on from this convention, the 
United Kingdom introduced the Dangerous Drugs Act 1932 which, 
like the earlier Acts, increased the number of substances to 
be controlled by the legislation but also, in the first 
section, introduced more complex chemical descriptions of 
these substances, otherwise the Act was very short. The
(10) see Bean p40
final pre-1939 war treaty was the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs which 
was signed at Geneva on 26th June 1936 and came into force 
in October 1939 (11). This was essentially another attempt 
to suppress the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs and the 
signatories undertook to enact measures to prevent offenders 
from escaping prosecution for technical reasons and to 
facilitate extradition for drug offences. The United Kingdom 
did not ratify the Treaty on the ground that it interfered 
with our right to decide our own penalties.
1.10 (d) Drug control under the United Nations. The degree to
which drugs became the subject of control was well 
illustrated recently when one writer said (12)
"By the time the war ended in 1945, only 21 drugs 
were controlled; by 1970 this number had increased 
to well over 100. The control system which had begun 
so quietly at the Shanghai Conference, has developed 
under the League of Nations to become a sophisticated 
system which had already been responsible for 3 out of 
the 4 Dangerous Drugs Acts in Britain. After 1945 this 
control system continued to develop .. "
The initiative taken by the League of Nations in the matter 
of controlling drugs was continued by the United Nations 
and indeed, the Geneva Protocol of 1946 signed on the 11th 
December 1946 transferred the League’s functions to the United 
Nations. The Paris Protocol of 1948 was the immediate result 
of the United Nations’ work and this Protocol was signed on
(11) see J G Starke The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression 
of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 31 AJIL 31 (1937)
(12) Bean p44
y -
19th November 1948 to come into force on 1st December 1949.
This was concerned with bringing new synthetic drugs into the 
control system. It authorised the World Health Organisation 
to place under full international control any new drug which 
could not be placed under such control by application of the 
relevant provisions of the 1931 Convention and which it found 
either to be addict-producing or convertible into an 
addiction-producing drug. This protocol was one of three 
changes in international control which impinged upon British 
post-war legislation. The result of The Paris Protocol of 
1948 was the Dangerous Drug (Amendment) Act 1951 which 
reflected the change from the League to the United Nations 
as well as clearing certain anomolies in the law of 
dangerous drugs in relation to Northern Ireland. Another 
change was the protocol for limiting and regulating the 
cultivation of the poppy plant and the production of, and 
international and wholesale trade in, and use of. Opium of 
1953. This sought to establish an international opium 
monopoly governed by the Permanent Central Opium Board in 
order to limit the use of opium. A monopoly of the use was 
to be established by means of various quotas allocated to the 
various opium-producing countries, limited to seven in number, 
along with a system of international inspection. This, 
however, coincided with the beginning of the cold war and the 
entire matter was riddled with political considerations and 
consequently ten years was to elapse before the protocol came 
into force. The protocol required three of the seven producing 
countries to ratify it before it could be brought into force 
and that was not achieved until 8th March 1963.
- 10 -
1.1 I Undoubtedly a major international agreement came into force 
on 13th December 1964. This was the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and it, along with the 1953 protocol 
to a lesser extent, has been responsible for recent 
legislation in the United Kingdom to control drugs. The 
convention has been described as a "milestone" in the history 
of international drug control (13), Further, the agreement 
was described in this manner by a contemporary commentator (14) 
"Although the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the 
product of compromise and is not as ambitious a document 
as it was in its draft form when the UN conference began, 
it is nevertheless a substantial new document and a 
prospectively important contribution to the field of 
international relations."
The new treaty simplified the international control 
machinery and changed the Permanent Central Opium Board 
and the Drug Supervisory Body into a single unit, the 
International Narcotics Control Board. The central feature 
of the Single Convention was the system of estimates 
developed in the earlier treaties and this matter was given 
to the INCB to administer. A total of 71 governments signed 
the protocol (15): the United Kingdom signed on 30th March
1961. The general theme of this section of this work is the 
extraordinary connection between the United Kingdom’s 
international obligations relating to drugs and subsequent
(13) Bassiouni and Nanda p541
(14) R W Gregg The Single Convention for Narcotic Drugs 
16 Food, Drug and Cosm. LJ 187 (1961) at pi88
(15) for a complete list see Lydiate: Appendix 2: pl37
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domestic legislation. This is continued with the Drugs 
(Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964 and the Dangerous Drugs Act 
1965. The 1964 Act developed the offence of possession of 
dangerous drugs and sought to tighten the regulations 
concerning the unauthorised or unlicensed importation of 
various substances, including amphetamines. It has to be 
conceded, however, that the Act was also passed as a 
response to the then increasing attractions of "pep" pills 
for teenagers, especially Drinamyl, but it was also aimed at 
curbing the irresponsible use of substances such as Dexedrine, 
which had been much used as an appetite suppresant. The 
1965 Act consolidated earlier domestic legislation and 
introduced greater subtleties into the law with an increased 
number of dangerous drugs, including opiates and synthetic 
drugs and an increasing number of offences concerned with 
restrictions on importation and exportation. The rapidly 
changing social conditions in the United Kingdom and the 
changing nature of use of dangerous drugs indicated that 
even the existing and very modern legislation was insufficient 
and Parliament responded with the Dangerous Drugs Act 1967. 
This Act introduced powers for the Secretary of State 
allowing him to make Regulations concerned with the safe 
custody of dangerous drugs and the control of addicts and 
certain powers in relation to arrest and search. There were 
two further important developments in 1971: internationally,
a United Nations Conference in Vienna adopted an agreement 
known as the Convention of Psychotropic Substances of 197 1. 
This introduced strict international controls of LSD, 
mescaline and related substances, indeed a total of thirty two
—  i /. "
substances having hallucinogenic effects on the human 
organism. Domestically, Parliament passed the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 which was required as the then law was 
unsatisfactory, fragmentary and divided throughout many 
Acts and it was felt that they should be brought into one 
Statute. The law was thought to be inadequate for the 
problems arising out of drug abuse. The law was also 
inflexible because it did not permit the Home Secretary to 
move as quickly as he would want to in order to deal with 
the rapidly changing picture both of drug availability and 
habits of addiction (16). And, finally, the international 
aspect of drug control was expanded with the 1972 General 
Protocol, amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, which attempted to increase governmental co-operation.
1.12 The general trend of the development of the law in the United 
Kingdom shows a very close connection between international 
agreements entered into by the British government and 
subsequent domestic regulation. This was undoubtedly the 
case with the Single Convention of 1961 and the 1964 Act, 
However, the escalation of the misuse of drugs and the 
resulting complexities revealed legislation that was 
increasingly unsuited; accordingly, the consolidating 
Act of 1971 resulted (17).
(16) see the speech of the Home Secretary at the Second 
Reading HC vol 803 col 1749 (16th July 1970)
(17) further on this point see Teff at p2 1
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Chapter 2 THE OFFENCES AND DEFENCES
Section 3: Restriction of importation and exportation of 
controlled drugs.
2.01 The 1971 Act provides by Section 3 -
(1) Subject to Sub-section (2) below -
(a) the importation of a controlled drug; and
(b) the exportation of a controlled drug;
are hereby prohibited.
(2) Sub-section (1) above does not apply -
(a) to the importation or exportation of a controlled 
drug which is for the time being excepted from 
paragraph (a) or, as the case may be, paragraph (b) 
of Sub-section (1) above by regulations under Section 
7 of this Act; or
(b) to the importation or exportation of a controlled 
drug under and in accordance with the terms of a
licence issued by the Secretary of State and in
compliance with any conditions attached thereto.
It is curious that although the 1971 Act creates the prohibition 
nowhere does it provide any sanction for the contravention 
thereof. The sanction is now contained in various provisions
of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, (1) Section 3
of the 1971 Act provides that the importation and exportation 
of a controlled drug is prohibited unless it falls within 
the excepting provisions of Sub-section 2. The prohibitions 
contained in the 1979 Act are Section 50 (penalty for improper 
importation of goods). Section 68 (offences in relation to
(1) replacing the Customs and Excise Act 1952
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exportation of prohibited or restricted goods) and Section 
170 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc.) It is 
proposed to consider each of these offences in turn 
although it will be seen that the analysis of certain 
offences overlaps with others.
2.02 Section 50: 1979 Act
"(2) If any person with intent to defraud Her Majesty of any 
such drug 5r to evade any such prohibition or restriction as 
mentioned in Sub-section (1) above -
(a) unships or lands in any port or unloads from any 
aircraft in the United Kingdom or from any vehicle 
in Northern Ireland any goods to which this Sub­
section applies, or assists or is otherwise concerned 
in such unshipping landing or unloading; or
(b) removes from their place of importation or from any
approved wharf, examination station, transit shed or 
pOSiC
customs and excise any goods to which this Sub­
section applies or assists or is otherwise concerned 
in such removal 
he shall be guilty of an offence under this Sub-section and 
may be detained."
"(3) If any person imports or i^ concerned in importing any 
goods contrary to any prohibition or restriction for the time 
being in force under or by virtue of any enactment with 
respect to those goods, whether or not the goods are unloaded, 
and does so with intent to evade the prohibition or 
restriction, he shall be guilty of an offence under this 
Sub-section and may be detained."
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In Section 50(5) the penalties contained in Schedule 1 of 
the same Act are applied specifically to those offences.
2.03 The 1979 Act also provides by Section 5 -
"(2) - the time of importation of any goods shall be deemed 
to be -
(a) where the goods are brought by sea, the time when 
the ships carrying them comes within the limits of 
a port ;
(b) where the goods are brought by air, the time when the 
aircraft carrying them lands in the United Kingdom or 
the time when the goods are unloaded in the United 
Kingdom whichever is the earlier;
(c) where the goods are brought by land, the time when 
the goods are brought across the boundary into 
Northern Ireland."
This Sub-section then sets out the time at which importation 
occurs and it is submitted that the inference from this 
Sub-section is that the meaning of "importation" is simply 
"brings in" and that this meaning extends to the use of the 
word in both Sub-sections.
2.04 The actus reus of each of the two offences is undoubtedly 
different in that the fbns± is or appears to be concerned with 
the mechanics of importation and the second is more concerned 
with the overall plan or scheme. The mens rea of each offence 
is also different in that the first offence is wider and 
concerns intentions to defraud Her Majesty of each such duty 
or to evade a prohibition or restriction whereas the second is 
concerned with importing goods contrary to any prohibition or
— 16 —
restriction. Both Section 50 and Section 170 provide 
penalties for the importation of controlled drugs but it is 
understood that Customs practice is to charge offences 
generally in terms of Section 170. (2)
2.05 Section 68; 1979 Act
"(1) If any goods are -
(a) exported or shipped as stores; or
(b) brought to any place in the United Kingdom for the 
purpose of being exported or shipped as stores
and the exportation or shipment is or would be contrary to 
any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force 
with respect to those goods under or by virtue of any 
enactment, the goods shall be liable to forfeiture and the 
exporter or intending exporter of the goods and any agent 
of his concerned with the exportation or shipment or intended 
exportation or shipment shall each be liable on summary 
conviction to a penalty of three times the value of the goods 
or £100 whichever is the greater.
(2) Any person knowingly concerned in the exportation or 
shipment as stores, or in the attempted exportation or 
shipment as stores, of any goods with intent to evade any 
such prohibition or restriction as is mentioned in Sub-section
(1) above shall be guilty of an offence under this Sub-section 
and may be detained".
In Section 68(4) the penalties contained in Schedule 1 of 
the same Act are applied specifically to these offences.
(2) private information
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2.06 The 1979 Act provides by Section 5 -
"(4) - the time of exportation of any goods from the United 
Kingdom shall be deemed to be -
(a) where the goods are exported by sea or air, the time 
when the goods are shipped for exportation;
(b) where the goods are exported by land, the time when 
they are cleared by the proper officer at the last 
customs and excise station on their way to the 
boundary.
(5) In the case of goods of a class or description with 
respect to the exportation of which any prohibition or 
restriction is for the time being in force under or by virtue 
of any enactment which are exported by sea or air the time of 
exportation shall be deemed to be the time when the exporting 
ship or aircraft departs from the last port or customs and 
excise airport at which it is cleared before departing for a 
destination outside the United Kingdom."
2.07 In considering the constituent elements of these offences 
some help is gained from Garrett v Arthur Churchill (Glass)
Ltd. (3) where A, a company director, handed over an antique 
goblet to B knowing that B intended to export it without 
obtaining the requisite export licence. Both A and his 
company where charged with being knowingly concerned in the 
exportation of the goblet with intent to evade the prohibition 
on exportation, contrary to Section 56(2) of the Customs and 
Excise Act 1952 (4). The Justices considered that in the whole
(3) [19703 IQB92
(4) now Section 68(2) of the 1979 Act
- 18 -
circumstances it was A ’s legal duty to hand over the goblet, 
even though he knew that doing so might result in an illegal 
exportation and that once the goblet had been handed over he 
had lost all control over it and was not concerned in its 
exportation thereafter, and accordingly they dismissed the 
charge. But, on appeal by the prosecution to the Divisional 
Court, the Lord Chief Justice said (5)
"In confirming the activities which can amount to being 
concerned in exportation to that limited time when the 
aircraft leaves, the Justices were wrong. A man can be 
concerned with the exportation of goods by 4oing things 
in advance of the time when the aircraft leaves, and
certainly handing over goods for export the night before
the aircraft leaves seems to me quite clearly to amount 
to "being concerned with the export of goods". "
The prosecution is required therefore to prove that the 
accused were "knowingly concerned in the exportation with 
intent to evade the prohibition."
2.08 In Rose v. Hemming (6) there is authority that in this
context "place" need not be port or airport. The question 
there was whether coffee had been brought to "any quay or 
other place" for the purposes of being exported (7) and it 
was held that the delivery of the coffee to an island staging 
post from where it was sold to persons who subsequently
exported it was to bring it to a "place" for the purposes of
exportation.
(5) ibidat p94
(6) [l95[] IKB676; ^ 9 5 ^  lAIIER 389
(7) in terms of Section 31(1) of the Import, Export and 
Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939
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2.09 It is submitted then that the mens rea of the offence in 
Section 68(2) is the intention to do the forbidden act or 
knowledge that the forbidden act is being done. Although the 
offences may concern actual knowledge it is submitted 
further that wilful blindness would nevertheless be 
sufficient in certain circumstances.
2.10 Section 170: 1979 Act 
"(1) - if any person -
(a) knowingly acquires possession of any of the following 
goods, that is to say -
(i) goods which have been unlawfully removed from a 
warehouse or Queen's warehouse,
(ii) goods with respect to the importation or 
exportation of which any prohibition or 
restriction is for the time being in force 
under or by Virtue of any enactment; or
fv\
(b) isjj^ any way knowingly concerned in Carrying, 
removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping or 
concealing or in any manner dealing with such goods,
and does so with intent to defraud Her Majesty of any duty 
payable on the goods or to evade any such prohibition or 
restriction with respect to the goods he shall be guilty of 
an offence under this Section and may be detained.
(2) - if any person is, in relation to any goods, in any way 
knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at 
evasion -
(a) of any duty chargeable on the goods;
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(b) of any prohibition or restriction for the time being 
in force with respect to the goods under or by virtue 
of any enactment; or
(c) of any provision of the Customs and Excise Management 
Act 1979 applicable to the goods;
he shall be guilty of an offence under this Section and may be 
detained".
2.11 The question of the time and meaning of the term importation 
has been discussed. The question of duration/importation was 
considered in R v Green (8) where Green was convicted of being 
knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition 
on the importation of cannabis contrary to Section 304(b) of 
the Customs and Excise Act 1952 (9). On 6th August a crate 
arrived at Southampton by ship. Green completed customs forms 
to obtain its clearance. On 20th August the customs officers 
opened the crate and found it contained cannabis and replaced 
the cannabis with peat. Thereafter Green rented a garage and 
in September the crate was delivered to it by a haulage 
contractor. Green had supplied the contractor's name and 
address to others involved and was also alleged to have 
admitted assisting to unload the crate at the garage. The 
defence submitted (10) that the prosecution must establish 
that Green had become involved prior to 20th August. The 
judge adopted the prosecution submission that the offences 
were continuing and involveiænt after 20th August sufficient.
(8) [j97^ 3AIIER 1101 CA; [l97^ Grim LR 47; [l97^ 2 WLR57
(9) now Section 170: 1979 Act
(10) relying on Haughton v Smith (1974) 58 Cr App R198
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And, on appeal by the accused, it was held, dismissing the 
appeal, that the actus reus of the offence under Section 
304(b) was being concerned in the evasion or attempted 
evasion o-^  the prohibition, not the successful evasion.
Evasion was a continuing offence and did not cease when the 
goods were seized. Once imported the evasion continued 
until the goods ceased to be prohibited or, possibly, were 
re-exported. And, it is submitted, that the mens rea is to 
be "knowingly" concerned.
2.12 The case law also shows the development of the question
of proof of knowledge in relation to the requirement of being 
"knowingly" concerned in a contravention of Section 170- 
In R V Hussain (11) the accused was on a ship that came into 
Liverpool and a search by a customs officer of the cabin 
occupied by the accused and two others revealed ten packages 
containing about 20 lbs of cannabis resin in the bulkhead of 
the cabin. The accused said it had nothing to do with him, 
but that he would take the blame, as the packages had been 
placed there by a ship's officer and another member of the 
crew and that he had been threatened by them to remain silent, 
though he would be rewarded if he did so. The accused was 
convicted and appealed and there Lord Widgery said (12):
"It seems perfectly clear that the word "knowingly" 
in Section 304 is concerned with knowing that a 
fraudulent evasion of a prohibition in respect of goods 
is taking place. If, therefore, the accused knows that
(11) [l96^ ZAllER 1117; [969] 3WLR 134; [1969] 53
Cr App R 254 ; [96^ 2QB567 and considered in R v Kelly
(1975) 12 SASR 389 (Australian Supreme Court)
(12) ibid at pi 119
- 22 -
what is on foot is the evasion of a prohibition against 
importation and he knowingly takes part in that operation, 
it is sufficient to justify his conviction, even if he 
does not know precisely what kind of goods are being 
imported. It is, of course, essential that he should 
know that the goods which are being imported are goods 
subject to prohibition. It is essential he should know 
that the operation with which he is concerning himself is 
an operation designed to evade that prohibition and evade 
it fraudulently. But it is not necessary that he should 
know the precise category of the goods the importation 
of which has been prohibited."
The last point raised by his Lordship had been considered in 
R V Fernandez (13) where Fernandez was convicted of possessing 
cannabis. He was a merchant seaman and was given a package 
to take to England where he was to hand it to a man who would 
pay him for his trouble. He was told that the package 
contained sticks for smoking and he had an idea that this 
referred to marijuana cigarettes. He saw the contents 
because the package broke open when he had it and he 
appreciated that if the package was discovered he might get 
into trouble with the customs authorities. However, he 
claimed that he did not know the package contained drugs and 
that there was nothing that aroused his suspicion. The judge 
directed the jury that, in effect, where a person receives a 
package under circumstances where an individual of ordinary
(13) jl97i^ Grim LR 277: this case is discussed exhaustively
in relation to the concept of possession: see Section 5(1)
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common sense ought to know that it may contain drugs then 
even if \t could not be shown that the accused knew the exact 
contents/would not prevent him from being guilty. Fernandez 
was convicted and appealed but there it was held that the 
case against him was overwhelming and on the facts the 
direction was adequate and appeal dismissed. (14) In 1965 
the question of being knowingly concerned in the carrying of 
drugs with intent to evade restrictions against importation 
was considered in R v Irala-Prevost (15) where the accused 
was convicted of unauthorised possession and being knowingly 
concerned as stated. The accused was a passenger in a motor 
car in which there was concealed a large quantity of drugs 
on a journey from North Africa to England. His defence was 
that he was unaware of the presence of the drugs and the judge 
concentrated on the issue of knowledge saying:
"if two people start off a journey together, one 
actually is the owner and driver of the car, and 
something is in the back of the car and they are both 
intending that it should be taken along in the car and 
the passenger who is there knows about it, then he 
would be in joint possession along with the person who 
is driving the car and whose car it is."
The accused appealed on the ground of non-direction as to 
possession and it was held that the directions were sufficient 
so far as the counts of carrying drugs were concerned and 
the appeals on those counts would be dismissed. So far as the
(14) as to the question of a person lying about goods in his 
possession: see Dixon v McAllister jj94^ NIR 48
(15) |]96^ Grim LR 606
- 24 -
counts of possessing drugs were concerned it was incumbent 
on the judge to say something to the jury to make them 
realise that some degree of control must be established: 
considering R v Rutter and White (16). The convictions on 
the count of possession would be quashed. And importation 
was considered in relation to knowledge in R v Williams (17) 
where Williams pleaded guilty to being knowingly concerned in 
a fraudulent evasion of the restriction on the importation 
of cannabis contrary to Section 304(b) of the Customs and 
Excise Act 1952. Williams had agreed with another man to sell 
cannabis which that man would send from India. Subsequently, 
that man sent cannabis to Williams by post from India. He 
appealed inter alia on the grounds that on the facts the 
offence had not been made out but it was held in dismissing 
the appeal that it might well be that there was a joint 
enterprise to import, but even if it was looked upon as an 
agreement on one side to import and on the other to sell, 
what Williams did was sufficient to make him knowingly 
concerned in the importation.
2.13 In R V Borrodale and Abdullah (18) the term "fraudulent
evasion" was considered in the Court of Appeal where it was 
held that a trial judge had correctly directed the jury that 
"fraudulently" involved acting or telling lies with intent 
to cause customs officers to act contrary to what would 
otherwise be their duty. The conduct of Borrodate and 
Abdullah in pretending that the particular suitcases and 
contents involved were other passengers’ baggage was 
fraudulent within the Act.
(16) [19593 Grim LR 288
( 17) ]197TJ Grim LR 356
(18) [197^  Crim LR 513
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2.14 But a fraudulent evasion is not necessarily restricted to the 
port of entry. In Beck v Binks (19) the accused was charged 
with knowingly carrying uncustomed goods, namely 208 watches, 
with intent to defraud His Majesty of the duties of them and 
one of two points at issue was whether there could be an 
intention to defraud or evade customs duty when, as here, the 
goods were away from the port of entry. The Lord Chief 
Justice said (20):
"If a person is knowingly carrying uncustomed goods he 
is assisting in the smuggling of the goods .... as much 
as anyone else. The intent is there; it is all part 
of one operation. When, as here, it is found that a man 
is dealing with 208 watches which are uncustomed, I 
myself think, it is beyond question that he was carrying 
goods with intent to defraud His Majesty of the custom. 
Otherwise a most extraordinary lacuna is left in the Act 
because it can be said that once a man has got away from 
the place where the goods were actually landed no one 
ever dealing with the smuggled goods could ever be guilty 
of an offence. I do not think that has ever yet been 
held to be the law, and I am certainly not prepared to 
hold it now. I think it is clear that the appellant was 
carrying uncustomed goods with intent to defraud His 
Majesty of the duties thereon."
(19) [l9 4 ^  1'KB 250
(20) ibid at p252
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2.15 And, in R v Cohen (2 1) where the accused was found guilty
of knowingly harbouring certain uncustomed goods, namely 352 
Swiss watches and certain other goods and convicted, he 
appealled against conviction and sentence of 12 months 
imprisonment. In dismissing the appeal on both points the 
Lord Chief Justice said (22):
"A simple way of proving lack of knowledge is to prove 
that the goods were bought in the ordinary course of 
trade. "If a man buys from a trader in the ordinary 
way (it does not matter whether it is wholesale or retail) 
yould presume that he had bought it honestly and that 
the duty upon it has been paid." "
2.16 And, later (23)
"This class of case is closely analogous to those of 
receiving stolen goods when the evidence relied on for 
the prosecution is merely possession of goods recently 
stolen. That has always been held to be prima facie 
evidence of guilty knowledge, or, in other words, to 
raise the presumption of guilt so that, it no 
explanation is given by the receiver, the jury are 
entitled, but not compelled, to convict .... So in the 
present class of case, once it is proved that the accused 
was knowingly in possession of dutiable goods which he 
had not proved had paid duty, if he gives no explanation 
he may be convicted of harbouring....... Another ingredient
(21) jj95l] 1KB 505
(22) ibid at p508 quoting R v Fitzpatrick 2KB 203 at
p 211
(23) ibid at p508
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of the offence is the intent to defraud - but, as in 
any case where an intent to defraud is a necessary 
ingredient, the intent must usually be inferred from 
the surrounding circumstances. If a jury is satisfied 
that the man knew - which of course would include a case 
in which he had wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious - 
that the goods were uncustomed and he had them in his 
possession for use or sale, it would follow, in the 
absence of any other circumstances, that he had intended 
to defraud the Revenue. Certainly that applies in such 
a case as the present where the appellant not only had 
the goods in his possession for the purpose of selling 
but told lies to the officers when challenged on the 
matter".
2.17 What constitutes importation arose in R v Watt and Stack (24) 
where the accused were charged with evading the prohibition 
against importation with intent, the drug concerned being 
cocaine. At their trial there was evidence to show that they 
had been dealing in cocaine but no evidence to show that they 
or anyone else had imported it. The jury were directed that 
there was no need for the prosecution to adduce evidence of 
actual importation. The accused were convicted and appealed 
on the ground of misdirection and it was held, allowing the 
appeal, that firstly, the Crown must prove an importation 
and, secondly, that the onus on the Crown is to prove that the
(24) (1979) 70 Cr App R 187 CA
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intent must involve establishing a link or nexus between the
actus reus of the offence and some prohibited importation.
As Lord Justice Bridge said (25)
"Merely to establish that there has been a dealing with 
the prohibited goods, and that by virtue of the 
presumptions they are presumed at some time in the 
indefinite past to have been unlawfully imported, would 
not, in our judgment, ever justify, without anything 
further, inviting a jury to conclude that the evidence 
established an intent to evade the prohibition on 
importation."
Section 4 : Restriction of production and supply of controlled
drugs
2.18 The 1971 Act provides by Section 4 that -
"(1) Subject to any regulation under Section 7 of this 
Act for the time being in force, it shall not be 
lawful for a person -
(a) to produce a controlled drug; or
(b) to supply or offer to supply a controlled drug
to another.
(2) Subject to Section 28 of this Act, it is an offence 
for a person -
(a) to produce a controlled drug in contravention of 
Sub-section (1) above, or
(b) to be concerned in the production of such a drug
in contravention of that Sub-section by another.
(25) ibid at pl92
- 29 -
(3) Subject to Section 28 of this Act, it is an offence 
for a person -
(a) to supply or offer to supply a controlled drug to 
another in contravention of Sub-section (1) abov^ 
or
(b) to be concerned in the supplying of such a drug 
to another in contravention of that Sub-section; 
or
(c) to be concerned in the making to another in 
contravention of that Sub-section of an offer to 
supply such a drug.
Similar provisions were contained in earlier legislation (1) 
but the effect of, this section is that the production and 
supply of controlled drugs is rendered unlawful unless it is 
authorised by regulations made under Section 7 of the same Act 
The statutory defence of proof of lack of knowledge etc. 
contained in Section 28 applies to offences in this section.
In considering these offences it has to be said that the Act 
in this section follows its peculiar pattern of making it 
unlawful to do a certain action by one Sub-section and then 
making it an offence to do that action in the following 
Sub-section: the result is that in this section there are 
two main unlawful activities and arising from these are 
five offences.
2.19 (a) "PRODUCE": Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(2). In terms of
Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act there is a statutory definition 
of produce; "produce" where the reference is to producing
(1) Sections 4, 8 and 11 of the 1965 Act
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a controlled drug means producing it by manufacture, 
cultivation or any other method and "production" has a 
corresponding meaning. This has resulted in some ambiguity 
as cultivation forms the basis of a separate offence in 
Section 6. It may well be that the term "or any other method" 
may include "compound" (2). Section 37(1) also provides 
that "contravention" includes a failure to comply with any 
requirement under the relevant regulation. The two offences 
concerned with producing are those in Section 4(2)(a) which 
makes it an offence to produce a controlled drug and Section 
4(2)(b) which makes it an offence to be concerned in the 
production of a controlled drug. It has to be said that the 
phrase to be "concerned in" is wider in meaning than 
"assistance" and that provided a person has some interest in 
the prohibited activity he will be concerned in it (3).
The words "anywise concerned in the sale or letting of 
steerage passengers" in Section 314 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894 were considered by the Divisional Court in Morris v 
Howden (4) and Bruce J. in giving the rese;rved judgment of 
the court said (5):
"To be concerned in a sale or letting means, I think, 
to have a part or share in the sale or letting - to have 
something to do with the sale or letting - to have some 
interest in the transaction, or in some way to deprive 
some profit or advantage from it."
(2) See Section 7(3)
(3) See Attorney-General v Robson (1850) 5 Ex 790
(4) [l89^ IQB 378
(5) ibid p 380
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Accordingly, it is submitted, an individual could 
contravene Section 4(2)(b) even though he does not participate 
in any way in the production of a controlled drug provided it 
could be shown that he has an interest in its production.
It may be, therefore, that the financial backers of an 
illegal scheme would be "concerned in" the production, or 
supply, of a controlled drug even though they only provided 
money for the scheme to be put into effect. The issue of 
production has arisen in two cases: Firstly R v Nock (6) 
where the accused were tried on an indictment charging them 
with conspiracy to contravene Section 4 of the 1971 Act by 
entering an agreement to produce cocaine. The evidence 
established that they had agreed to separate elements of 
a powder that they had obtained on the assumption that one 
of the elements would be cocaine. In fact they had the 
wrong powder which contained no cocaine. The accused were 
convicted and the Court of Appeal upheld their conviction 
and they appealed to the House of Lords. There, it was held 
that (7) the limited agreement entered into by the accused 
could not in any circumstances have involved the commission 
of the offence created by the Act of 1^ Î71 and appeal allowed. 
In R V Harris (8) the accused was similarly tried and 
convicted on an indictment charging them with conspiracy to 
contravene Section 4 of the 1971 Act by entering an agreement 
to produce amphetamines. In the Court of Appeal the accused
(6) [ i97b31 Crim LR 483
(7) on the authority of Haughton v Smith [Î9753 476;
[l974J 2WLR1 on appeal from R v Smith (Roger) [973]
2 WLR 942 and [l974] Crim BR 305
(8) (1979) 69 Cr App R 122 CA
was held to have been rightly convicted as he and his 
fellow conspirators had acquainted themselves with the 
proper process and had entered into an agreement to produce 
the class B drug. The accused and the others had lacked the 
requisite knowledge to produce the controlled drug but their 
process was inherently possible of fulfilment and for that 
reason the instant case is distinguished from R v Nock supra. 
It has to be said that both these cases are more properly the 
concern of the law of conspiracy, especially the statutory 
conspiracy (9) of agreeing to produce a controlled drug. 
Nevertheless, in their way they begin to set limits to 
productions.
2.20 (b) "SUPPLY": Sections 4(1)(b) and 4(3). The 1971 Act
contains certain statutory definitions of this term: 
"supplying" includes "distributing" by Section 37(1) and,
applying the ejusdem generis (10), by Section 7(3)
"supply" includes "administer" and "prescribed", "Supply" 
denotes also the parting of possession of one person to 
another (11) and this meaning was considered in R v Harris 
(12) where the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) had to 
consider the conviction of supplying (13) where the accused 
had administered another person's own heroin to him by 
assisting in the process of injecting the drug and the court 
held that these circumstances did not amount to supplying 
and the conviction was quashed. It is to be noted that the
phrase "to another" is used throughout the section thus
(9) see Section 1: Criminal Law Act 1977
(10) see Cross p 114
(11) R V Mills [l963 1AIIER 202; [l963| IQB522
(12) fl968j 2AIIER50; [l968] 1WLR769
(13) contrary to reg. 8 of Dangerous Drugs (No. 2) Regs. 1964
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clearly excluding the argument that for a person to 
administer heroin or similar controlled drug to himself 
amounts to supplying. In Mieras v Rees (14) the accused 
was charged with unlawfully supplying a substance believing 
it to be a controlled drug contrary to Sections 19 and 4(3) 
of the 1971 Act. The accused admitted that on three 
occasions he supplied a substance in the belief that it was 
STP or a derivative, but he said that he had subsequently 
learned that the substance was neither. The prosecution 
were unable to prove that the substance was the proscribed 
drug but, relying on the accused's belief at the relevant 
times, the justices convicted him. The accused appealed by 
case stated to the Queen's Bench Divisional Court and there 
it was held, allowing the appeal, that the prosecutor had 
failed to discharge the burden of showing that the substance 
supplied was a controlled drug and that in the circumstances 
there was no actus reus and therefore, notwithstanding the 
presence of mens rea, it was impossible to establish 
attempt. Thus, the accused's objective of supplying or 
distributing the substance was achieved though in the event 
the act was not criminal by reason of a mistake of fact.
In R V Willis (15) the accused supplied controlled drugs 
to an individual after the latter persistently requested 
them and it so happened that the instigator of the deal was 
a policeman. It was held on appeal after conviction that 
evidence of supply was correctly admitted and the court
(14) [l97^ Crim.LR224
(15) [}976j Crim.LR127
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founded on earlier authorities that the defence of 
entrapment does not exist in English law. In Holmes v 
Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (16) the High Court 
had to consider an appeal against conviction of a 
contravention of Section 5(3) of possessing a controlled 
drug with intent to supply it unlawfully to another. The 
accused had been asked at the end of the prosecution as 
to the proposition of law to be relied on for the defence 
and it was stated that it would be this: where a person had 
drugs on behalf of himself and others and the whole group 
were in joint possession of the drugs then a division of 
the drugs within the group could not be a supply of drugs 
within the section. The judge ruled this defence invalid 
and the defence led no evidence and the accused was 
convicted. On appeal, it was held, that the court must 
give the word "supply" its ordinary everyday meaning, so 
that a person who purchased drugs for himself and others 
could supply the drugs to the others. But the court 
allowed the appeal in that the judges ruling had prevented 
the defence from leading evidence and the case was remitted 
to another judge for a rehearing. It is conceded that this 
concerned an offence in Section 5(3) and we are presently 
concerned with Section 4(1)(b) and 4(3) but the dicta that 
"supply" must be given its ordinary everyday meaning is of 
some importance in settling the limits of meaning.
Parliament doubtless intended different objectives by 
Section 5 and Section 4 of the 1971 Act but in the
(16) [j97^ Crim.LR125
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circumstances the meaning of "supply" must remain 
constant in the interests of justice, including fairness 
to the accused. Further, the Act itself fails to indicate 
an intention on the part of Parliament to distinguish 
between the word "supply" in each of the sections and also 
the penalties in Schedule 2, the maximum of which remain 
the same for each offence. The decision in Holmes supra 
was applied in R v King (17) where the accused gave 
evidence to the effect that in a social setting he might 
make a "reefer" cigarette from his own supply of cannabis, 
smoke it and pass it to his friends who would take a puff 
and pass it back and this process would be repeated. It 
was held inter alia that "supply" in Section 5(3) must be 
given its ordinary everyday meaning following Holmes supra 
and that it appears to mean the passing of possession from 
one person to another following R v Mills supra. Where,
as here, a person passes round a cigarette among several
people in circumstances where some or all of them contemplate 
only taking a puff and passing it on, that does not 
constitute supplying the material in the cigarette as it 
exists. This case suggests that it is only a "supply" if 
at the beginning the accused has the material in his 
possession and at the end it has come into the possession
of another in the sense that the other can do with it as he
wishes. The control over a cigarette exercised by an 
individual within a circle of smokers as described is not 
such a degree of control as to make it a "supply" by the
(17) [l978j Crim.LR228
Jb -
accused, or so it would seem from King's acquittal. But 
in R V Moore (18) the accused was charged with possession 
of a quantity of cannabis resin with intent to supply 
unlawfully to another contrary to Section 5(3) and in the 
alternative with offering to supply the same drug to 
another contrary to Section 4(3)(a), indicating, it is 
submitted, the closeness of the offences and the terminology, 
The essential facts were that Moore had persuaded two girls 
who had never smoked cannabis before to leave a public house 
with him and "go for a smoke". Moore was arrested as he was 
rolling a reefer which by his own admission he intended 
sharing with the two girls. At the close of the prosecution 
case the defence contended that in view of R v King supra 
Moore could not be convicted on either count. It was 
further contended that there was here nothing more than an 
offer to supply "smoke" rather than the material in the 
cigarette; in short that the control of the cigarette 
that Moore intended to pass to the girls was not sufficient 
to make it a "supply" within the meaning of the Acts. It 
was held, declining to follow R v King supra that "supply" 
should not be given too narrow a definition and that here 
there was an offer of consumption and therefore an offer to 
supply. There is nothing in the report of the case in the 
Criminal Law Review to suggest that the two girls ^  facto 
took hold of the cigarette and smoked or puffed at it or, 
presumably, the charge would be one of supplying. Indeed 
it may be that the learned judge in R v Moore supra failed 
so to distinguish the earlier case on that basis. No one.
8) [1979J(1 ) 1  Crim.LR789
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either seems to have argued that in this context "supplying" 
included "distributing" in terms of Section 37(1) and the 
point was not brought out in R v King supra. The suggestion 
in the dicta that it is only a supply if at the beginning 
the accused has the material in his possession and at the end 
it has come into the possession of another in the sense 
that he can do with it as he wishes is, it is submitted, 
too narrow a construction to be the true intention of 
Parliament. In seeking to find this intention we are not 
as restricted as the Courts (19) and it is therefore 
interesting to note what a Member of Parliament said when 
the Bill was being considered (20)
"The main object of this Bill is to restrict the 
circulation of drugs for misuse".
It is submitted, then, that the correct meaning of "supply" 
as including distribution in terms of Section 37(1) is a 
means of reconciling two otherwise inconsistent cases.
The commoner aspect of drug use, implied in the preceding 
cases, was emphasised in R v Buckley (21) as was this 
element of distribution. Buckley posted his money with 
another person and purchased cannabis resin in bulk and 
returned to split the bulk, keeping his own share and 
giving a share to the other person. On appeal against 
a conviction for a contravention of Section 4(3)(a) by 
supplying a controlled drug the accused argued that at the 
time he gave the cannabis resin to the other man the latter
(19) Cross at pl34: "Generally it has been assumed that 
Parliamentary materials are inadmissable on 
interpretation for any purposes whatsoever".
(20) Mr. Deedes: Standing Committee A: 10th November 1970
(21) [1979}  Crim.LR664
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had already notional possession so that there could be no 
supplying. The appeal was dismissed, the short answer being 
to "the somewhat recondite submission" that by Section 37(1) 
"supplying" included distribution, and whatever else the 
accused might have been doing when he divided the cannabis 
resin, he was without doubt distributing it.
2.21 (c) "Offer to supply": Section 4(l)(b) and 4(3). It has
been submitted that the distinction between a supply and 
an offer to supply has at times become blurred but the 
latter has been considered by itself in Haggard v Mason (22) 
the accused purchased a quantity of what he then believed 
to be a controlled drug for the purpose of reselling and he 
was introduced to a third party to whom he offered to sell 
the substance. The offer was accepted, the buyer also 
believing the substance to be a controlled drug. It 
subsequently transpired that the substance was not in fact 
a controlled drug but the justices nevertheless convicted 
the accused of offering to supply a controlled drug to 
another contrary to Section 4(3)(a). On appeal to the 
Queens Bench Divisional Court, it was held inter alia that 
the appeal would be dismissed on this point as the offence 
was complete at the moment when the accused met the third 
party and offered to supply him with the substance. It 
was immaterial that what was in fact supplied was not a 
controlled drug. . In the course of the judgment the very 
important distinction between supplying and offering to 
supply was made out by Lawson J (as he then was) (23):
(22) [l97^ 1AIIER337-, |~1976] Crim.LR5l
(23) ibid at p340
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"It matters not in relation to the offence of 
offering to supply that what is in fact supplied 
pursuant to that offer, the offer having been 
accepted, is not in fact a controlled drug. Of 
course, if the charge had been supplying a controlled 
drug, it is clear that the fact that a controlled drug 
was not in fact supplied would mean that that offence 
could not have been established".
Certainly the last point was raised in Mieras v Rees supra 
and affirmed but Haggard v Mason supra is authority it is 
submitted for the proposition that the actus reus of 
supplying differs from that of offering to supply: in the 
former the accused must supply to another a substance that 
is in fact a controlled drug but in the latter an offer 
must be made and accepted and any substance supplied on 
the strength of that offer need not necessarily be such 
a controlled drug. There is nothing inherently unfair or 
unjust in having such an actus reus for the latter offence 
as the trading in drugs of that nature is notoriously 
lacking in trust and goodwill and the circulation of 
adulterated drugs abounds. It would be invidious not to 
say unjust to have accused persons entitled to an 
acquittal simply because a chemical impurity renders the 
substance offered for supply not a controlled drug. On 
the question of impossibility of performance in offering 
to supply such a drug see R v Bennett, Wilfred and West (24) 
where the fact that controlled drugs were involved appears 
to have been a side-issue.
(24) (1979) 68 Cr App R168CA
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2.22 The offences in Section. 4 include particular offences of 
"being concerned in" and in R v Blake and Connor (25) police 
officers saw O'Connor approach a group of young people in 
Piccadilly Circus in London and heard him ask them if they 
liked cannabis. When asked where they could get some of the 
drug, he replied that he had a friend who lived in a flat 
nearby who could "fix them". When they arrived at Blake's 
flat, Blake pretended not to know O'Connor and left the 
premises. Both Black and O'Connor were charged with being 
concerned in the making of an offer to supply a controlled 
drug. Neither Blake nor O'Connor gave evidence at their 
trial and the jury were directed that before Blake could be 
guilty there would have to be some previous arrangement between 
him and O'Connor. Both were convicted and on appeal on the 
basis that as there was no evidence that Blake knew of the 
offer made by O'Connor at Picadilly Circus, he could not be 
guilty of the offence charged, it was held that Section 
4(3)(c) of the 1971 Act had been particularly widely drawn
so as to involve persons who might be at some distance from 
the making of the offer to supply a controlled drug, and in 
the present case on the evidence before the jury, the latter 
were perfectly justified in coming to the verdict they did, 
especially as no other explanation was given for the conduct 
of Blake and O ’Connor at the relevant time : appeals dismissed.
2.23 The punishment for a conviction of an offence under Section 
4 is :
(25) (1979) 68 CR.AppRl.CA
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Section 4(2): production or being concerned in production 
of a controlled drug.
(a) Summary
Class A Class B
12 months or 12 months or 
£400 or both £400 or both
(b) Indictment
Class C 
3 months or 
£500 or both
(26)
14 years or a 14 years or 5 years or 
fine or both a fine or both a fine or
both
Section 4(3): supplying or offering to supply a controlled 
drug or being concerned in the doing of either activity by 
another.
(a) Summary
(b) Indictment
Class A 
12 months or 
£400 or both
14 years or 
a fine or 
both
Class B 
12 months or 
£400 or both
14 years or 
a fine or 
both
Class C 
3 months or 
£500 or 
both (27)
5 years or 
a fine or 
both
(26) 1977 Act Schd. 5 paral(l)(6) and 1979 Act Schd.7B 
para.1(1)(6)
(27) ibid
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Section 5: Restriction of possession of controlled drug.
2.24 Section 5 of the 1971 Act contains two offences of
possessing controlled drugs; namely unlawful possession 
and possession with intent to supply unlawfully. The 
section also contains specific defences in relating to the 
former of these offences. This part of the work is a long 
one because of certain technical difficulties arising out 
of the concept of possession but also as the offence of 
possession is the commonest of all offences in the Act that 
are prosecuted in the Courts (1). Section 5 is based on the 
provisions in Section 1 of the 1964 Act and Sections 4, 8 
and 11 of the 1965 Act and various regulations made under 
these sections. In general terms Section 5 provides by 
Sub-section (1) that it shall not be lawful for a person 
to have a controlled drug in his possession, although this 
is subject to any regulations made under Section 7 of the 
same Act. Sub-section (2) provides that it is an offence 
for a person to have a controlled drug in his possession and 
Sub-section (3) provides that possession with intent to 
supply unlawfully to another is an offence. Both the offences 
in this section are subject to the specific defences 
provided for in Section 28 of the 1971 Act and Section 5 
contains two specific defences which are also discussed.
(1) For example, in 1978 the number of persons found guilty 
of drug offences in the UK amounted to 13,394 of which 
11,579 were convicted for unlawful possession and 495 
were for possession with intent to supply unlawfully to 
another; UK Official Statistics Relating to Drug Abuse: 
Supplement to Druglink No. 13 (Spring 1980). "Druglink" 
is a publication of the Institute for the Study of Drug 
Dependence, London.
—  43 —
Part One: The Offences,
2.25 (a) Section 5(1)
"Subject to any regulation under Section 7 of 
this Act for the time being in force, it shall 
not be lawful for a person to have a controlled 
drug in his possession."
It is certain that the concept of possession in relation 
to this sub-section is one of the most difficult aspects 
of the 1971 Act. More generally it is a concept that 
has a variety of uses and a variety of meanings and 
much is ascribed to the term "possession" in accordance 
with context and use. It is almost certain that a 
detailed search for a "proper" meaning is most likely 
to be a fruitless one. As Lord Parker CJ said (2)
"The term "possession" is always giving rise to 
trouble. The meaning of possession depends on the 
context in which it is being used."
One reason advanced as to why such a notion as possession 
is surrounded with complexity is that there is an 
inevitable and continuing conflict between the logic of 
the law and the demands of convenience in particular 
cases (3). But it is also asserted (4) that in one 
sense possession began as a fact - the fact of physical 
control and it is not doubted by the same learned 
commentator that most legal systems have built upon the 
notion of physical control in developing rules which
(2) Towers & Co.Ltd. v Gray |^96^ 2WLR553 at p557~8
(3) G W Paton Jurisprudence (1972) Chapter 22 at p557
(4) ibid at p558
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have the term "possession" as a necessary part of 
their expression. The concept of possession is one 
in which Roman law has had considerable influence.
Indeed according to Lord Stair, possession is the 
holding or detaining of anything by ourselves or others 
for our use. And further (5)
"To possession there must be an act of the body 
which is detention and holding: and an act of the 
mind which is the inclination or affection to make 
use of the thing detained."
This shows clearly the necessity in possession of the 
requirement of a mental element, an act of the mind, 
which is the intention to hold the thing for one's own 
benefit. This is presumed from the fact of detention 
unless the holding of the thing as his own would infer 
a crime on the part of the holder (6). The intention 
to so hold the thing for one's own benefit is the 
animus possidendi and the absence of this is the 
distinction between possession and custody,
2.26 It is submitted then that the limits of the concept
of possession are essentially a matter of jurisprudential 
inquiry but the all too brief discussion above does 
indicate the broad lines of inquiry to be taken in 
seeking to make out the limits and it will be shown 
that the courts, in considering offences of possession, 
concern themselves with evidence of knowledge and control
(5) Stair II, 1, 17 quoted in Gloag and Henderson p564
(6) Erskine Inst, II, 1, 20 quoted ibid
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Some assistance in this matter is given by the 
legislature: Section 37(3) of the 1971 Act provides (7) 
"For the purposes of this Act the things which a 
person has in his possession shall be taken to 
include any thing subject to his conVrol which is 
in the custody of another."
It is submitted that this part-definition suggests 
clearly that control is indeed an essential element 
in possession. It will be shown from the case law 
that control is an important element but the problem 
of the nature and degree of knowledge required by the 
accused has probably raised far more problems and 
necessitated greater attention by the courts.
2.27 (a) case law prior to the 1971 Act. In considering the
case law the principle established in Barras v Aberdeen 
Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. (8) has been applied: 
"Where the language of a statute has received 
judicial interpretation, and Parliament again 
employs the same language in a subsequent statute 
dealing with the same matter, there is a presumption 
that Parliament intended that the language so used 
by it in the subsequent statute should be given the 
meaning which meantime has been judicially 
attributed to it."
(7) this is based on a wider definition provided for by 
regulation 20: Dangerous Drugs (No. 2) Regulations 
1964 (SI1964NO. 1811) : and see R v Smith The Times 
Law Report 16th August 1966
(8) 1933 SC(HL)21; 1933 SLT 338 per Lord Macmillan at 
p50 but see Farrell v Alexander ^97^| AC59 per 
Lord Wilberforce at p74
— 4b —
Thus.!, although the cases in this section involve 
offences in terms of the 1964 and 1965 Acts the context 
is the same and the case law is equally applicable to 
the offences in terms of the 1971 Act. In R v Irala 
- Prévost (9) the accused was charged inter alia with 
unauthorised possession of dangerous drugs where he 
had been a passenger in a car in which was concealed a 
large quantity of drugs on a journey from North Africa 
to England* His defence was that he was unaware of the 
presence of the drugs and in charging the jury the judge 
concentrated on the issue of knowledge. Following 
conviction, the accused appealed on the ground of non­
direction as to possession and the Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that it was incumbent on the judge to say 
something to the jury to make them realise that some 
degree of control must be established and as that had 
not been done in the present case the conviction would 
be quashed. It is submitted then that this decision 
is the authority for the proposition that mere proximity 
to a dangerous or controlled drug is not enough: for
conviction there must be evidence that the accused had 
control over those drugs, a requirement of the common 
law which is now, partially at least, acknowledged by 
the legislature in the definition in Section 37(3) of 
the 1971 Act.
(9) |j965] Crim.LR606: in America drugs and cars is 
virtually a specialist subject! see E F Short 
Illicit drugs - possession by car occupant:
57ALR3d.1319
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2.28 In the mid 1960's there was a series of decisions
that gave rise to considerable discussion firstly for 
their importance in relation to drug legislation and 
secondly for their influence in a more general respect 
in relation to central questions of criminal responsibility 
In Lockyer v Gibb (10) the accused was charged with 
having in her possession 83 tablets of morphine sulphate 
without authority. When she was stopped by the police 
she had in her possession a hold-all and in it were 
many items, including a paper bag which contained a 
brown- glass bottle in which were visible some small 
white tablets. The accused was aware that she was in 
possession of the bottle, and that it contained tablets, 
but there was a possibility that she did not know that 
the tablets contained morphine sulphate. The accused 
was convicted and she appealed on the ground that the 
prosecution had failed to establish that the accused 
knew that she was in possession of some drug. In 
dismissing the appeal and applying Yeander v Fisher (11) 
the Divisional Court held that in order for the offence 
to be established, while it was necessary for the 
prosecution to prove that the accused knew that she 
had in her possession the articles which transpired to 
be drugs, it was not essential that she should know that 
they were drugs, or indeed drugs of a particular 
character. Lord Parker CJ, in giving judgment, looked 
at the mischief aimed at by this legislation and concluded
(10) jj96^2AIIER 653; [j96j 2QB243
(11) |^96^3AIIER 158 discussed infra in relation to 
Section 8 of the 1971 Act, Lord Parker CJ gave
judgment in both cases.
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that, as drugs were then a matter of grave concern, 
it was the intention of Parliament, as evinced by the 
legislation, in this case Section 13 of the 1965 Act, 
to tighten up more and more the control of drugs and 
that this alone would justify a provision imposing 
absolute liability. But in looking at the language of 
the provision itself his Lordship could not 
consideration the fact that the word "knowingly" does 
not appear before "possession" although this in itself, 
he conceded, was not conclusive. It was for these 
reasons that his Lordship held that (12)
"While it is necessary to show that the defendant
knew that she had the articles which turned out
to be a drug, it is not necessary that she should 
know that in fact it was a drug or a drug of a 
particular character."
Thus knowledge as an element of possession was required, 
knowledge as to the nature of the articles was not; a 
requirement that certainly made prosecutions easier.
The matter of absolute offences arose again in Warner v 
Metropolitan Police Commission (13) when the accused 
was charged with having drugs in his possession without 
being duly authorised, the evidence being that a police 
officer had stopped the accused who was driving a van
in the back of which were found two cases, one
containing scent bottles and another containing 20,000 
amphetamine sulphate tablets. The accused said that he
(12) ibid at p249
(13) [l96^ 2WLR1303
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had been to a cafe where he had been accustomed to 
collect scent from another and was told by the 
proprietor that a parcel from that other person had 
been left under a counter and when the accused had 
looked there he had seen two parcels, namely the one 
containing scent and the other which was found to 
contain the drugs. He said that he had assumed that 
both contained scent. As to the question of possession, 
the chairman directed the jury that if he had control 
of the box which turned out to be full of amphetamine 
sulphate tablets, the offence was committed and it was 
only mitigation that he did not know the contents. On 
appeal against conviction on the grounds that the 
chairman misdirected the jury as to "possession" the 
House of Lords reaffirmed on a majority that the offence 
in Section 1(1) of the 1964 Act came within a class of 
Acts in which the offence proscribed was absolute and 
therefore the Act forbadtpossession of certain scheduled 
drugs, and whether an accused possessed them with an 
innocent or guilty mind or for a laudable or improper 
purpose was immaterial since he was not allowed to 
possess them and if he did possess them without lawful 
authority he was guilty of an offence under the Act,
But that while, therefore, there was a very strong 
prima facie inference of fact that the accused was in 
possession of the drugs when, as here, the prohibited 
drugs were contained in a parcel the prosecution had to 
prove not only that the accused possessed the parcel but
also that he possessed its contents, for a person 
did not (within the meaning of the Act) possess 
things of whose existence he was unaware.
2.29 But Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner supra 
is a complex case, of which a close reading reveals 
wide variance in judicial reasoning. Lord Reid was 
in a minority of one in holding that this statutory 
offence was not an absolute one. Although, as he 
said, no one doubted that Parliament had the power to 
create absolute offences, no common law offence had 
ever been held to be absolute, and until recently 
absolute statutory offences were only of a quasi­
criminal nature. They did not therefore offend the 
ordinary man’s sense of justice based on the view 
that moral guilt is the essence of an offence (14). 
Lord Reid agreed with Devlin J's conclusions in 
Reynolds v Arshin (GH) and Sons Ltd. (15) that it 
would be useless and unjust to inflict a penalty on 
aperson who could not reasonably know what the 
relevant circumstances were. Such a penalty could 
have no effect on other persons in the future, which 
is one of the main purposes of the criminal law, 
because if they did not know what the facts were when 
they acted, then there could be no mens rea on their 
part. A person who has not in the past been 
thoughtless and inefficient cannot be forced in the 
future to take greater care than he has already. As 
to the words "have in his possession". Lord Reid
(14) ibid at pl308
(15) [l95l] 2KB135 at pl44
thought, as did the other Law Lords at this point, 
that these words meant more than mere physical 
control so that some mental element was required (16).
2.30 The majority decisions themselves display this
variance: Lord Morris of Bort^-y-Gest agreed with 
Lord Reid that there should be no conviction if there 
is no mens rea but he found this in the words of the 
section concerned because the notion of having 
something in one's possession in itself involes a 
mental element (17). Lord Morris thought therefore 
that before the prosecution could succeed they must 
prove that a person knowingly had in his possession 
something which in fact was a prohibited substance 
although it need not prove that the accused knew the 
nature and substance of the thing he possessed. Lord 
Guest adopted the view that wording of the section 
"it shall not be lawful for a person to have in his 
possession" made it clear that the offence was 
absolute. He held that if the prosecution was 
required to prove that the accused knew of the nature 
of the substance there would be wide-scale evasion of 
the Act. He concluded (18)
"I would go further and say that to require 
mens reawould very largely defeat the purpose 
and object of the Act."
But his Lordship was less clear on the meaning of the 
word "possession" but, after reviewing case law, he
(16) (j96^ 2WLR at pl319
(17) ibid at p 1334 
( 18) ibid at p 1340
did say that there is no possession by a man until 
he knows what he has got although this left the 
question of what was meant by "what". Lord Pearce 
thought that an accused should have an opportunity 
to show that there was no moral guilt attached to 
his control of unauthorised drugs when he said (19)
"It would, I think, be an improvement of a 
difficult position if Parliament were to enact 
that when a person has ownership or physical 
possession of drugs he shall be guilty unless 
he proves on a balance of probabilities that he 
was unaware of their nature or had reasonable 
excuse for their possession."
He continued later (20) to interpret the words 
"have in his possession"
"If a man has physical control or possession of 
a thing that is sufficient possession under the 
Act provided that he knows that he has the thing. 
But you do not (within the meaning of the Act) 
possess things of whose existence you are unaware" 
Lord Wilberforce said (21):
"I can say at once that I am strongly disinclined, 
unless compelled to do so, to place a meaning 
upon this Act which would involve the conviction 
of a person consequent upon mere physical control, 
without consideration, or the opportunity for
(19) ibid at pl345
(20) ibid at pi347
(21) ibid at p 1349
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consideration, of any mental element."
Thus it was that the House of Lords held that the 
Court of Appeal in hearing Warner's first appeal from 
the magistrates had erred in equating control with 
possession. It has to be said, however, that the view 
of the Court of Appeal did commend itself to some 
commentators for Dr. Goodhart has agreed (22) that the 
law would be both simpler and more certain if we talked 
of control rather than possession. He argued that as 
de facto control was the basis on which the English 
law of possession was founded then knowledge on the 
part of the possessor was immaterial.. He did not 
think that it would be difficult in a statute to 
distinguish between intentional control and uninten: 
:tional control and that such a test would be an 
objective rather than a subjective one. Dr. Goodhart 
also proposed altering the strict rules of evidence 
where an act, such as tempting young persons to buy 
drugs, is "peculiarly" harmful, and where it may be 
difficult to prove the existence of mens rea, although 
"it is almost certain that it does exist" (23). By 
this means he hoped that all the technical distinctions 
between the various cases which now "clutter the books" 
will be swept away by the simple provision that a 
person who has control of a thing is deemed to have 
possession of it. In reply, Mr. Miers said that (24)
(22) A L Goodhart Possession of Drugs and absolute 
liability [l968] 84LQR382
(23) ibid at p385
(24) D R Miers The Mental Element in Drug Offences
(1969) NILQ 370 at p376
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Dr. Goodhart's proposition was "surely a travesty 
of the criminal process" but describes the idea as 
being a variation of the necessity argument. Warner 
supra therefore raised some very profound questions 
of criminal responsibility which neither the judges 
nor the commentators found themselves united in 
answering. But the result in law of the case was that 
in relation to the concept of "possession" of a 
dangerous drug in a container, mere proof by the 
prosecution of physical control or custody of that 
container was not enough and that proof that an 
accused had knowledge of the contents of what was 
alleged to have been in his possession was equally 
necessary to secure a conviction. In short, no mental 
element beyond that required to constitute possession 
need be proved: there was no requirement that the 
accused knew that the "thing" was a drug or a 
dangerous drug only that there was something in the 
container.
2.31 In R V. Fernandez (25) the accused was convicted
of possessing cannabis. He was a merchant seaman and 
had been given a package to take to England where he 
was to hand it to a man who would pay him for his 
trouble. He was told the package contained sticks 
for smoking and had an idea this referred to marijuana 
cigarettes and he saw the contents because the package 
broke open while he had it. He understood that if the 
package was discovered he might get into trouble with
[.976](25) 1  Crim.LR277
the customs authorities. However, he claimed he did 
not know the package contained drugs and that nothing 
aroused his suspicions. The judge directed on the 
issue of possession or control: "if the person were 
to receive the package under circumstances whereby 
it would be clear to any person of ordinary common 
sense that it might well contain either drugs or some 
other article which ought not to be in distribution 
the mere fact that it could not be shown that the 
carrier knew the exact contents would not prevent him 
from being guilty ... the mere fact that the 
prosecution cannot show that he knew the exact nature 
of the drug would not matter if he did know the package 
might well contain some prohibited article and if in 
fact it did contain a prohibited drug." Following 
conviction, the accused appealed on the ground that the 
direction was wrong, relying on Warner supra and 
Sweet V Parsley (26). The Court of Appeal held that 
it could find in Sweet v Parsley supra no indication 
of a change in the views expressed in Warner supra, 
and it was in Warner that the answer to the appeal 
was to be found. The majority view in Warner was 
that one could not safely regard the offence as 
absolute: some mental element, or subjective test,
might have to be applied. In "package" cases the 
position could be summarised as follows: prima facie 
the prosecution satisfy the onus on them by proving 
that the accused was in physical control of articles
(26) ^ WLR 470 and discussed infra in relation
to Section 8.
which were dangerous drugs. But, if the suggestion 
is made that the accused was mistaken as to the nature 
of the goods then it may be necessary to counsider 
what his mental state was. For example, if it is 
clear that he did not know precisely what the 
contents of the package were but nevertheless his 
conduct indicated that he was prepared to take it 
into his possession whatever it was then no 
difficulty arose in regard to proving that he was 
in possession of the contents for all purposes. 
Similarly, if the accused took the package into his 
possession in a situation in which he should 
certainly have been put on inquiry as to the nature 
of what he was carrying and yet he deliberately 
failed to pursue an inquiry and accepted the goods 
in circumstances which must have pointed the finger 
of suspicion at their nature and at the propriety 
of his carrying them, then it was a proper inference 
that he accepted them whatever they were and it was 
not open to him to say that he was not in possession 
of the goods because he did not know what they were. 
The case against the accused in this case was 
overwhelming and on the facts the direction was 
adequate and the appeal was dismissed. Thus it 
would appear to be the ratio decidendi of 
R V Fernandez supra that in the prosecution of 
offences of possessing dangerous drugs an intent on 
the part of the accused to possess a package 
irrespective of what that might contain is enough to
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convict him. That intent may be inferred in 
circumstances where the accused ought to have made 
inquiry as to the nature of the contents because of 
suspicions surrounding the contents. But such a 
rule does not apply in English law of aiding and 
abetting for there it is well-established that it 
must be proved that the accused knew the essential 
facts which constitute the offence, and this is so 
even where the offence is one of strict liability: 
in R V Patel (27) the accused knew he was assisting 
others but he did not know that a particular bag 
carried by one of the others contained cannabis 
and an appeal was allowed on this ground. It was 
held that in these circumstances the prosecution 
had to prove that Patel knew the bag carried by the 
other man contained a dangerous drug.
2.32 In Lustman v Stewart (28) the accused and two others 
were charged inter alia with possession of cannabis 
resin and were convicted. They appealed to the 
High Court of Justiciary by way of stated case and 
the findings-in-fact set forth that the accused 
were attempting to set up a self-sufficient community 
and were at the relevant time living in an experiment 
of communal living. The police on information 
received obtained a search warrant and went to the 
accused’s farm which was described as "dirty, untidy, 
sparsely furnished and decorated in parts in a 
psychedelic fashion". The police officers noted that
(27) ^97oj Crim.LR274
(28) 1971 SLT (Notes) 58
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all the rooms had a peculiar odour which they took 
to be incense. In a room were several ashtrays with 
handrolled cigarettes and in certain of these were 
found small fragments of cannabis. The accused were 
cautioned and Lustman replied "There are things which 
happen here which I can't control." The remaining 
accused made non-incriminating replies. The court 
held that the findings-in-fact fell just short of what 
was sufficient for conviction and, without issuing 
opinions, quashed convictions. Without opinion it is 
difficult to assess the view of the Court but counsel 
had argued for the accused that there was no finding- 
in-fact that the drug was actually in the custody of 
anyone of the inhabitants and accused, nor evidence 
allowing this inference to be drawn. Mere presence 
was insufficient. Certainly, given that this was a 
commune if one had been found to be in the custody 
of one then the others might well have been correctly 
convicted for the offence was Section 4(1) of the 
Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 and therefore subject to the 
statutory definition of possession in regulation 20 
of the Dangerous Drugs (No. 2) Regulations 1964.
But if knowledge and control are both considered to 
be essential pre-requisites for proof of possession 
there have been circumstances in reported cases in 
which both have been held to have been proved but 
nevertheless the court has quashed a conviction. In 
Mackay v Hogg (29) the Sheriff in a stated case found
(29) unreported 18th February 1975 but see COCN :
A12/75
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the following facts admitted or proved: police
officers searched with a warrant a house occupied by 
a woman and there searched her bedroom in her presence. 
Two other officers entered the living room and found 
the accused Mackay asleep on a couch there. He 
was naked and his clothes were on a chair by the 
couch. He awoke and his clothes and the chair were 
searched. He cushion of the chair was removed in 
the course of the search and left on end to indicate 
that the chair had been searched. Shortly after 
that the accused got up and dressed and then another 
police officer entered the living room and searched 
the chair and sixteen tablets were found lying on 
the seat cover of the chair. Later analysis revealed 
the tablets to be LSD. It was found-in-fact that 
no one had anything to do with the chair except the 
accused between the two searches. The accused was 
convicted of possession and appealed and the 
opinion of the High Court was that on the findings- 
in-fact it was a legitimate inference that the 
accused had placed the tablets there and that it could 
be reasonably inferred also that the accused must 
have moved the tablets by hand from some unknown 
part of the woman's living room to the seat cover of 
the chair. He must therefore have had the tablets 
in his hands for "at most a second or two". In the 
opinion of the Court this proved fleeting contact 
between the accused and the tablets and in the 
context of the other findings-in-fact it was not
- bU
enough to justify a finding that he had them in his 
possession within the meaning of the Sub-section. 
Accordingly, in the "quite unusual and exceptional 
circumstances" conviction was quashed. It is clear 
then that control was proved and knowledge of the 
tablets inferred in the circumstances but, 
presumably, in the absence of evidence as to where 
the accused had obtained the tablets from, it was 
"possession" in a highly technical sense and indeed 
it is to be noted that in the report of the Court’s 
Opinion the mention is of "fleeting contact" rather 
than possession.
2.33 (b) case law subsequent to the 1971 Act. In Calder
V Milne (30) the accused appealed against conviction 
of possession of cannabis. The accused was found- 
in-fact to share a flat with three others and 
although he had exclusive use of a room as a 
bedroom other occupants were permitted to use the 
room as a sitting-room if they wished. Occasionally 
the accused’s girl friend used the room although 
she was not present on the relevant date nor the 
previous night. Police officers with a warrant 
searched the accused’s room and found two cigarette 
ends in a waste paper bucket which also contained 
cannabis although the quantity was not specified 
by the analysts as they had not been asked toi At 
the trial the accused gave evidence on his own
(30) unreported. High Court of Justiciary, 18th 
February 1975. COCN: A12/75
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behalf saying that he had smoked cannabis earlier 
than the date in question but in another part of 
the house and had flushed the reefer ends away. The 
ends found were not his. Others in the flat had 
smoked cannabis. The Sheriff disbelieved the 
accused’s statement that the reefer ends were not 
his and convicted him. The Court stated in its 
Opinion that "there is no finding-in-fact as to 
when the accused was last in his bedroom before 
the search and there is nothing to show when he last 
slept in the room or in the house. In all the 
circumstances, it is quite impossible to hold that 
the possession of the cannabis in question had been 
brought home to the accused." Conviction was 
quashed. Clearly, the Court felt that the 
prosecution had failed to eliminate an important 
alternative explanation: namely, that the other 
occupants in using the bedroom as a sitting room 
had used the cannabis. If control was possible, 
though mere proximity is insufficient on the 
authority of R v Irala-Prevost supra, then there 
was no evidence of knowledge, of the substance found, 
on the part of the accused and he gave evidence to 
deny that it was his.
2.34 "Fleeting possession" arose again in R v Wright (31) 
where the accused was convicted of possessing 
cannabis. He had been in a car with others and a
(31) 1^1976^ Crim.LR248
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police officer in a car following them saw the 
accused throw something from the car. This turned 
out to be a small tin containing cannabis. In 
evidence at his trial the accused said that he had 
no cannabis and was not aware that his companions 
in the car had any. He did not know the car behind 
was a police car. Another person in the car gave 
him the tin. He did not know what it was. He had 
been told to throw the tin out of the window and had 
done so. He knew this other person used cannabis 
and on being told to throw the tin away it occurred 
to him that it might contain drugs. The judge left 
the issue of possession to the jury mainly on the 
basis of custody and control. The accused appealed 
on the ground that the judge gave the jury no 
assistance about the necessary mental element. The 
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the ground 
that it was clear from Warner supra that for the 
purposes of the 1964 Act a distinction was to be 
made between mere physical custody and possession, 
which connoted a mental element. If a person was 
handed a container and at the moment he received it 
did not know or suspect, and had no reason to 
suspect, that it contained drugs and if, before he 
had time to examine the contents, he was told to 
throw it away and immediately did so, he could not 
be said to have been in possession of the drugs so 
as to be guilty of an offence contrary to Section 5 
of the 1971 Act. The judge ought to have directed
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the jury to this effect and his failure to do so 
was a fatal defect and conviction quashed. In 
Coffey V Douglas (32) the Court held that in the 
particular circumstances of the case there was no 
evidence of "fleeting possession". The accused was 
found to have been seen by police officers at a 
window, disappear then appear at a front door and 
let them in. In the interval in which the accused 
was out of sight there was scuffing and a toilet in 
the house was heard to be flushed and when police 
officers looked in the toilet they saw cigarette 
ends, floating in the water, which later analysis 
revealed cannabis resin. There was held to be, on 
appeal against conviction, insufficient evidence to 
infer possession, even "fleeting possession". The 
meaning of the term was also considered in R v 
Pragliola (33) where the accused had had a 
distinctive pipe removed from his flat by the police 
but returned to him when no charges were made. A 
subsequent examination of the same pipe at a later 
date showed traces of cannabis resin which had not 
been there on the earlier examination. The time 
between the return of the pipe and its removal by 
the police for a second time amounted to 1 year 8 
months. The accused was charged with possession of 
cannabis resin and submissions by defence counsel at 
the close of the prosecution case questioned whether
(32) unreported. High Court of Justiciary 26th May 
1976 COON A47/76
(33) fl97f] Crim.LR612
as a matter of policy the charge could be put in 
this way, considering the period of time involved.
The learned judge held that there was no case to 
answer because any extension backwards in time in 
cases of possession is oppressive in truth and in 
fact the possession of cannabis in this extension 
back relates to the moment when the police took 
possession and is of restricted duration and the 
offence charged is in effect of recent possession of 
a drug. The learned judge clearly indicated that he 
regarded recent possession as being a "last few 
minutes and last few hours". The jury were directed 
to return verdicts of not guilty. It appears that 
here, as in Calder v Milne supra, the prosecution 
did not exclude various alternatives and these arose 
out of the central weakness of the prosecution case 
namely the length of time involved; for example, 
someone else may have borrowed the pipe during the 
period. There was no evidence of knowledge of the 
presence of the traces of cannabis resin by the 
accused, all there was evidence of was "fleeting 
contact".
2.35 In McKenzie v Skeen (34) the police with a warrant
searched a flat in which the accused occupied a room 
and there found, on a mantlepiece, a wooden board 
and three utensils suitable for smoking cannabis. 
Analysis revealed traces of cannabis indicating that
(34) unreported. High Court of Justiciary: 2nd 
August 1977 COCN: A21/77
cannabis had been in the utensils. In a suitcase 
the officers found a small opaque glass jar with a 
lid which was in position. This jar contained 
cannabis seeds which did not come within the 
definition of cannabis in the Act and also 10 
milligrammes of cannabis in the form of small 
flakes. This cannabis was amongst the seeds and 
might not be seen through the glass of the jar.
The seeds were clearly visible. The officers also 
found in a cupboard in this room another smoking 
utensil and analysts subsequently revealed traces 
of cannabis indicating that cannabis had been in 
it. After caution the accused said that the 
smoking utensils had been in the room when she 
moved in and she had obtained the jar and seeds 
in Morroco. Only one police officer gave evidence 
of seeing the cannabis in the jar and a forensic 
scientist said that the vegetable material was 
extremely small and could not be seen within the 
jar without holding it up to the light. He himself 
had only detected the fragments of vegetable material 
upon tipping the contents out and carefully 
segregating the seeds. The trial judge convicted 
the accused of being knowingly in possession of the 
cannabis in the jar. In quashing the conviction 
the court held that there was no evidence which 
showed or from which an inference could be drawn 
that the accused knew of the presence of the 
vegetable material in the jar. The Lord Justice
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Citifk (Lord WheatlüJ^ said (35)
"In most cases possession of a container will 
support the inference of possession of its 
actual contents but it must always be a question 
to be decided in the particular circumstances 
of the particular case."
In R V, Peaston (36) the accused occupied a bed- 
sitting room in a house comprising entirely of such 
accommodation. He received through the post in 
an envelope a film capsule containing 7.7 grammes 
of amphetamine hydrochloride. This envelope had 
been pushed through the letter-box by the postman 
with other letters and placed with them on the 
hallway table. The accused was unaware of the 
envelope's arrival. A police officer with a warrant 
to search the accused's room took the envelope to 
the room and handed it to the accused who opened it 
and gave the contents to the policeman. The accused 
was charged inter alia with being in possession of 
a controlled drug and at trial his submission of no 
case to answer was overruled. He then changed his
plea to one of guilty. He then appealed on the
ground that on the admitted facts he could not be
said to be "in possession" of the drug in question.
In dismissing the appeal the Court held that since 
the accused had ordered the supplier to send the drug 
through the post to his address, he was properly to 
be regarded as in possession of the envelope
(35) ibid
(36) (1979) 69 Or.App.R2Û3CA
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containing it when it arrived through the letter-box 
of the house in which he was living. At the appeal 
the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Widgery) distinguished 
the instant case from that of Warner supra on the 
basis that the present case concerned a person who 
had given instructions to receive the controlled drug, 
which Warner had not done.
2.36 Up to this point the case law has concerned the
concept of possession in relation to individuals but 
the courts have been concerned with joint possession; 
in R v Searle (37) the accused and others were 
convicted of possession a quantity of dangerous 
drugs of various kinds. The drugs were found in a 
vehicle which all the accused were using for a 
touring holiday. It was not possible to attribute 
the possession of any particular drug to any 
particular accused and the prosecution put the case 
on the basis of joint possession of all the drugs.
The accused led no evidence. The judge told the 
jury in effect that if they believed that each 
accused knew of the presence of the drugs, even in 
the possession of others in the van, then they too 
were guilty of possession. In allowing the appeals 
the court held that the effect of the summing up 
was to equate knowledge with possession. However, 
mere knowledge of the presence of a forbidden 
article in the hands of a confederate was not enough,
(37) |j97lJ Crim.LR592
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joint possession had to be established. The sort 
of direction which ought to have been given was to 
ask the jury to consider whether the drugs formed a 
common pool from which all had the right to draw at 
will, and whether there was a joint enterprise to 
consume drugs together because then the possession 
of drugs by one of them in pursuance of that common 
intention might well be possession on the part of all 
of them. The summing up was inadequate and possibly 
misleading. Although there was ample evidence to 
justify a conviction it was impossible to say with 
certainty that all the accused were guilty and so it 
was not a case in which the statutory proviso could 
be applied. This is to be contrasted with, for 
example, the Canadian case of R v Bourne (38) where 
it was held that to prove joint possession it is 
only necessary to prove that an accused knows that 
a companion has a forbidden drug in his custody and 
that it was with the accused's consent, although 
something more than mere indifference or negative 
conduct is required. In Allan v Milne (39) four 
accused were convicted of possessing cannabis. The 
material facts were that a search by warrant 
uncovered a quantity of cannabis and a pipe as well 
as a set of scales for measuring small weights. The 
cannabis and the pipe had been found under a kitchen 
sink and all the accused were aware that it was there 
and each had access to it. Three of the accused had
(38) (1970) 7 1WWR385 (British Columbia Court of 
Appeal)
(39) 1974 SLT (Notes) 76
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lived in the flat for over a year and the fourth 
had been there for at least a period of weeks. The 
accused were or had recently been students and were 
on close terms. The kitchen and living room were 
used communally. The scales were found on the kitchen 
table and were not a domestic type. In the absence 
of evidence to the contrary the only reasonable 
inference from these circumstances was that all the 
accused had knowledge of the presence of the cannabis 
in the flat and of its whereabouts. The trial judge 
was also satisfied that all the accused had access 
to the cannabis and could use it as he or she chose. 
The accused appealed to the High Court which held, 
without issuing opinions, that the findings-in-fact 
were sufficient for conviction.
2.37 It is submitted then that this analysis of the 
term "possession" in terms of Section.5(1) 
necessarily impinges on the remainder of the 
section for the term is used there repeatedly 
but it is a reasonable presumption that Parliament 
intended the term to be used in the same way in 
each part of that section. It appears from the 
case law, and in the light of jurisprudential 
inquiries, impossible to lay down a precise meaning 
for the term of possession although it does seem 
clear that there must be evidence of custody and 
knowledge or custody in such circumstances that the 
requisite knowledge can be inferred. It is submitted
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however, that this knowledge is knowledge that the 
thing is in such control. It is not necessary 
that a person should know the character of the thing; 
that it is a drug which is in law a controlled drug, 
in order to constitute possession. But this review 
of the case law reveals, it is submitted, the wisdom 
of Lord Wilberforce's remark that (40)
"In relation to (possession) we find English 
law, as so often, working by description rather 
than by definition".
2.38 (b) Section 5(2): the unusual wording of the 1971 
Act is illustrated in this section where in Sub- 
section(l) it is provided that it shall not be 
lawful for a person to have a controlled drug in 
his possession and in Sub-section (2) it is an 
offence for a person to have a controlled drug in 
his possession in contravention of Sub-section (1). 
The meaning of "possession" has been canvassed 
above but it should be noted that in relation to 
possession the offences in this section do not 
specify a minimum quantity of controlled drug that 
has to be found in an accused's possession before 
he can be convicted. An extensive case law in 
relation to this topic is considered under a 
separate heading infra (41).
2.39 (c) Section 5(3): one of the developments in drug 
law is the offence contained within Sub-section (3):
(40) Warner (1969) AC.256 at p309
(4 1) One recent writer has suggested as "the obvious 
amount" a minimum quantity of 100 milligrammes
but gives no reasons for deciding on this
 ^ri -1 n  \ r>/. x T n r - . o  . -  . '
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"subject to Section 28 of this Act, it is an 
offence for a person to have a controlled drug 
in his possession, whether lawfully or not, 
with intent to supply it to another in 
contravention of Section 4(1) of this Act".
This is the offence of possession of a controlled 
drug with intent to supply it unlawfully to another. 
The offence therefore is not concerned with 
whether the possession is lawful or unlawful but only 
with the intention to supply it unlawfully. The 
major concern, it is submitted, of this offence is 
the meaning of the phrase "with intent to supply" 
which is the essence of the offence and the 
aggravating factor for the purposes of punishment.
In R V Harris (42) the Court of Appeal held that a 
woman did not supply heroin to a man when she 
injected him with his own heroin but Lord Parker 
did say (43) obiter that it would be a supply 
within the meaning of the 1965 Act if she injected 
him with her heroin but the circumstances of the 
case were plainly unusual. In R v King (44) the 
accused gave evidence in a trial on an offence of 
contravening this section to the effect that it 
was his habit, if he was visited by friends who also 
smoked cannabis, to make a "reefer cigarette from 
his own supply, to smoke some of it and then pass it
(42) jl96^ 2AIIER49
(43) ibid at p5 1
(44) |l978^ Crim.LR228; discussed infra at para 3.20
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on to his friends. The latter would have a puff 
of it and then return the cigarette to the accused 
and the process would be repeated. Expert evidence 
was given to the effect that this practice was 
routine when two or more persons smoked cannabis 
together. Counsel was invited to address the court 
as to whether the passing round of such a cigarette 
could be supply within the meaning of the Act.
During the course of the argument the question arose 
as to whether an intent to supply was a real or 
constructive intent: The presiding judge held firstly 
that Section 5(3) required a real intent to supply, 
a willingness to do what is referred to, and that 
there must be a real likelihood that this will be 
done ; at least in the application of the provision 
in England and Wales, and secondly, that "supply" 
in Section 5(3) must be given its ordinary 
everyday meaning following Holmes v Chief Constable 
of Merseyside Police (45) and that it appears to mean 
the passing of possession from one person to another, 
following the dicta of Lord Parker CJ in R v Mills 
(46). Where, as here, a person passes round a 
cigarette among several people in circumstances where 
some or all of them contemplate only taking a puff 
and passing it on, that does not constitute supplying 
the material in the cigarette as it exists. It is 
only a supply if at the beginning the accused has 
the material in his possession and at the end it has
(45) ^ 197^ Crim.LR125; discussed infra at para 3.20
(46) jj968j IQB522
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come into the possession of another in the sense 
that the other can do with it as he wishes. The 
control over a cigarette exercised by an individual 
within a circle of smokers as described is not such 
a degree of control as to make it a "supply" by the 
accused within the meaning of Section 5(3). It is 
submitted then that the parting of possession is the 
core of supplying drugs to another. The mischief 
that Parliament is aiming at with this provision 
is the circulation of drugs. It may well be that 
financial gain is a compelling factor in the 
supplying of drugs but that is not a requirement of 
this section; although evidence of such transactions 
accompanying the apparent passing of possession 
may give rise to an inference in the absence of any 
explanation. In an Australian case Falconer v 
Redersen (47) Anderson J. said in a trial for 
trafficking in Indian hemp:
"I do not think it relevant in order to 
constitute trafficking in a drug that a person 
so accused acted without reward."
But in R V Moore (48) the accused was charged with 
possession of cannabis resin with intent to supply 
or, alternatively, with offering to supply, in 
terms of Section 4(3)(a), in circumstances where 
he had persuaded two girls who had never smoked 
cannabis before to leave a public house with him and 
"go for a smoke". The accused was arrested outside
(47) [1974] VR 185 at pi
(48) [1979^  Crim.LR789
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the public house as he was rolling a reefer which 
he admitted he intended smoking with two girls. The 
resin amounted to 12.95 grammes. At the close of 
the prosecution case the defence submitted that on 
the authority of R v King supra the accused could 
not be convicted and that the case cited was 
for the proposition that there was here nothing 
more than an offer to supply "smoke" rather than the 
material in the cigarette. In short that the control 
of the cigarette that Moore intended to pass to the 
girls was not sufficient to make it "supply" within 
the meaning of the Act. The trial judge held that 
firstly "supply" should not be given too narrow a 
definition and in this case there was an offer to 
supply and secondly, declining to follow the 
decision in R v King supra, there was a case to 
answer on both counts. This resulted in Moore 
changing his plea to guilty to offering a controlled 
drug with intent to supply. Clearly, these 
decisions are contradictory and as both are Crown 
Court cases the matter requires settlement elsewhere. 
If the mischief aimed at is the circulation of 
drugs then, it is submitted, that passing of a 
cigarette to another, irrespective of purpose, is 
"supply" within the meaning of the Act. The fact 
that a person receiving a cigarette, as here, only 
retains it for a few seconds while taking a puff 
amounts only to a difference in degree rather than 
in principle. It is ventured then when the conflict
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comes to be resolved the decision in R v Moore 
supra will be preferred,
2,40 It appears on the authorities cited that the passing 
of possession is a strong determining factor in 
assessing whether there has been an intention to 
supply, although whether this is conclusive is not 
decided. It seems equally uncertain as to whether 
the fact that such passing of possessiOïVis temporary 
is also material. The fact that the United Kingdom 
legislation has left the offence of supplying 
generally undefined has been described as (49)
"allowing the courts some room to manoevre in 
seeking to find and apply just and humane 
solutions to difficult individual cases."
In other jurisdictions the solution has been to 
create an offence of "trafficking in" a drug and 
that such offence is to be presumed where the 
quantity of drug found in the possession of the 
accused exceeds amounts determined by the legislature 
in the relevant statutes; such an offence is 
regarded as being of greater severity than 
possession only (50).
(49) R Brown "Supplying" Drugs in England and 
Australia 4 Crim.LR 131
(50) For example, in Qng An Chuan v Public 
Prosecutor |^ 198 AC648, a Singapore appeal 
to the Privy Council, convictions for 
trafficking were upheld and the accused hanged. 
For Hong Kong: see Faulkner and Field at p51
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2,4 1 (d) Section 5(4): this Sub-section provides a
defence in relation to the offence of possession,
"In any proceedings for an offence under Sub­
section (2) above in which it is proved that 
the accused had a controlled drug in his 
possession, it shall be a defence for him to 
prove —
(a) that, knowing or suspecting it to be a 
controlled drug he took possession of
it for the purpose of preventing another 
from committing or continuing to commit 
an offence in connection with that drug 
and that as soon as possible after taking 
possession of it he took all such steps 
as were reasonably open to him to destroy 
the drug or to deliver it into the 
custody of a person lawfully entitled to 
take custody of it; or
(b) that, knowing or suspecting it to be a 
controlled drug he took possession of it 
for the purpose of delivering it into 
the custody of a person lawfully 
entitled to take custody of it and that 
as soon as possible after taking 
possession of it he took all such steps 
as were reasonably open to him to 
deliver it into custody of such a person."
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These defences are additional to the defences in 
Section 28. The onus of proving one of these 
defences is placed on the accused and in order to 
succeed he must prove the matter on balance of 
probabilities: R v Carr-Briant (51). The section 
provides that once the prosecution have proved 
that the accused "had a controlled drug in his 
possession" the defences operate. As the defences 
relate exclusively to unlawful possession in 
Section 5(2) it is submitted that the prosecution 
must prove such unlawful possession. A close 
reading of the sub-sections make the defences self- 
explanatory but it should be noted that there are 
limits, in particular that any such action is 
"for the purpose of delivering it" and "as soon as 
possible" after taking possession. In Meider v 
Rattee (52) the accused took possession of an 
ampoule of methadene from a registered addict who 
was then lawfully in possession of the drug. This 
was done on a Friday. The accused's purpose was 
to help the addict to cut his intake and to 
return the ampoule to him on Monday if it was 
required. The accused still had the ampoule when 
seen by police officers on the Monday morning. She 
was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled 
drug and at her trial it was argued that she came 
within the terms of Section 5(4)(6) as it was not
(51) [^1943^ KB6Û7
(52) [i980J CLY 530
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"reasonably open to her" to deliver the ampoule 
to anyone other than the addict. She was convicted 
but conditionally discharged. On appeal by case 
stated it was held that assuming, though this was 
doubted, that the accused's "purpose" within the 
Sub-section was to "deliver" it to the addict rather 
than keep it for him, it could not possibly be said 
that delivery to an authorised person was not 
reasonably open to the accused between Friday and 
Monday. The words "such a person" in the Sub-section 
meant delivering to any authorised person not the 
addict only.
2.42 (e) Section 5(5): this Sub-section provides that the
defence in Sub-section (4) applies with modification 
to an attempt, in terms of Section 19 of the 1971 
Act, to possess unlawfully a controlled drug. This 
defence is similar to that in terms of Section 5(4) 
and on the same authority on balance of probabilities 
The defence is that if the accused is proved to 
have attempted to get unlawful possession of a 
controlled drug he has a defence if he proves that
(a) knowing or suspecting it to be a controlled drug, 
he attempted to take possession of it for the 
purpose of preventing another from committing or 
continuing to commit an offence in connection with 
that drug; or (b) knowing or suspecting it to be 
a controlled drug, he attempted to take possession 
of it for the purposes of delivering it into the 
custody of a person lawfully entitled to it.
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2.43 (f) Section 5(6): this Sub-section preserves the
accused's right to rely on a defence in terms of 
Section 28 or a general defence in law, such as 
insanity or duress.
2.44 The punishment for an offence under Section 5 is 
set out below: (53)
Class A Class B Class C
Section 5(2)
a. Summary 12 months 3 months or 3 months or
or £400 or £500 or £200 or
both both (54) both (55)
b. Indict: 7 years or 5 years or 2 years or
:ment a fine or a fine or a fine or
both both both.
Section 5(3)
a. Summary 12 months 12 months 3 months or
or £400 or or £400 £500 or
both or both both (56)
b. Indict: 14 years 14 years 5 years or
:ment or a fine or a fine a fine or
or both or both both.
(53) in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 4 of the
1971 Act as amended.
(54) words substituted by 1977 Act Schd. 5 para
l(l)(c)(i) and 1975 Act Schd. 7B para l(l)(c)(i
(55) words substituted by 1977 Act Schd. 5 para
l(l)(c)(ii) and 1975 Act Schd, 7B para l(l)(c)(:
(56) words substituted by 1977 Act Schd. 5 para
1 ( 1 )(b) and 1975 Act Schd. 7B para 1(1)(b)
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Part Two: Evidential Problems
2.45 It is essential in any prosecution for unlawful 
possession of a controlled drug for the Crown to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the substance 
found in the possession of the accused is a 
controlled drug in terms of the Act. Generally, 
the prosecution send the substance to forensic 
scientists for analysis and thereafter call them 
as witnesses to speak to the facts. But in the 
context of possession certain difficulties have 
arisen concerning proof of the nature of the 
substance.
2.46 In Bird v Adams (l) the accused was arrested for 
having in his possession LSD and at the police 
station he was cautioned and he admitted the 
possession, and also supplying to others. He was 
charged with unlawful possession and thereafter 
went to trial. The prosecution evidence included 
that of the police officer to whom the admission 
was made and at the close of the prosecution case 
the defence submitted that there was no case to 
answer on the ground that there was no proof that 
the accused had been in possession of a prohibited 
drug for there had been no analysis and the accused 
was incompetent to say what the substance was that
he possessed. The justices ruled that the prosecution
(I) Crim.LR 174
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had proved the nature of the substance and, the 
accused not giving evidence, convicted him. He 
appealed by case stated to the Court on the
question whether the evidence offered on behalf of 
the prosecution was sufficient to prove that the 
substance in the accused's possession was in fact a 
substance in the Act. In dismissing the appeal, the 
court held that there were many instances where an 
admission made by an accused on a matter of law in 
respect of which he was not an expert was really no 
admission at all and there were cases where an 
admission of a fact was valueless because the 
circumstances were such that an accused could not 
possibly have the necessary knowledge, but here the 
accused admitted that he had in his possession a 
dangerous drug and had been peddling it. The accused 
had certainly sufficient knowledge of the 
circumstances of his conduct to make his admissions 
at least prima facie evidence of its truth which was 
all that was required at the stage in the proceedings 
when the submission of no case was made and, 
accordingly, the justices had correctly ruled that 
there was a case to answer. On a close reading of 
the report of the case there appears to be no 
reasoning as to why an admission such as Bird made 
should be sufficient; no principles were laid down 
that established why it was that a person charged 
with a contravention of drug legislation should have
"sufficient knowledge of the circumstances of his 
conduct" to render the likelihood of the truth 
being greater in what he said. In the notes to 
this report in the Criminal Law Review the learned 
commentator said (2)
"The only circumstance referred to, however, 
appears to be the fact that the accused had
been peddling the drug. It does not appear
in what respect, if any, the act of peddling 
added to his personal knowledge of that with 
which he was dealing. In disposing of it to 
others as LSD he may have been, and probably 
was, relying entirely on what he had been told 
by his own supplier."
The activity of dealing in drugs for gain is
notoriously lacking in trust and a spirit of
goodwill and in many transactions, it is submitted, 
adulterated goods are frequently passed off as more 
pure or of a higher quality. In the court's 
enthusiasm to refuse the appeal, no doubt for 
policy reasons, an authority was established that, 
to say the least, was unsatisfactory. In Mieras v 
Rees (3) the accused was charged with offences of 
unlawfully supplying a substance believing it to be 
a controlled drug, namely STP, contrary to Section 
19 and 4(3) of the 1971 Act. The accused admitted 
that on all three occasions he supplied the substance
(2) ibid at pi75, and see the same notes for the case 
law for the civil aspects of similar admissions
(3) 0975J Crim.LR224
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in the belief that it was STP or a derivative, 
but said that he had subsequently learned that the 
substance had no connection with STP. The 
prosecution were unable, for reasons not disclosed 
in the report, to prove that the substance was the 
prescribed drug but, relying on the accused's 
belief at the relevant times, the justices convicted 
him. The accused appealed by way of case stated 
to the Divisional Court. In allowing the appeal the 
court held that the prosecutor had failed to 
discharge the burden of showing that the substance 
supplied was a prescribed (sic) drug; that, in the 
circumstances, there was no actus reus and, 
therefore, notwithstanding the presence of mens rea 
it was impossible to establish attempt (4). There 
appeared at this point to be two contradictory 
decisions: in Bird v Adams supra the Divisional 
Court held that the accused's admission that a 
substance was a controlled drug amounted to at 
least prima facie evidence because he had "sufficient 
knowledge of the circumstances of his conduct" 
whereas in Mieras v Rees supra the same court held 
that the prosecution had failed to establish that 
the substance supplied was a controlled drug and 
the accused's belief that the substance was a 
particular controlled drug was not regarded as 
sufficient evidence. In R v Wells (5) the police
(4) the authority cited was Haughton v Smith |l974^ 
2WLR1
(5) (j976] Crim.LR518
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made inquiries into drug offences and the accused 
told an officer that she had consumed cannabis and 
amphetamine sulphate and she was indicted for, and 
pleaded guilty to, possessing those drugs. She 
then sought to withdraw her plea, relying on Mieras
V Rees supra, but the judge refused leave. In the 
Court of Appeal the court held, in dismissing the 
appeal, that the submission that the prosecution 
must identify the drugs by scientific evidence before 
a court could accept a plea of guilty was wrong.
In the last analysis all evidence as to the nature 
of the substance was an expression of opinion, 
though scientists might be able to express more 
reliable opinions than others. There was no 
suggestion and no evidence to suggest that the 
accused's belief as to the nature of the substance 
was mistaken. Mieras v Rees was a plea of not 
guilty and the circumstances required proof of the 
nature of the substance. Here, the Criminal 
Division appeared to be following Bird v Adams supra 
as the relevant authority. To distinguish Mieras
V Rees on the ground that there was a plea of not 
guilty meant that where an accused went to trial
in England the unsupported admission was insufficient 
and further evidence as to the nature of the 
substance was required and yet with a plea of guilty 
the court was prepared to accept such unsupported
b O  -
admissions (6). In Lang v Evans (7) the accused 
admitted supplying cannabis and cannabis leaves to 
another and in the circumstances the Crown Court 
held obiter that, considering the cases cited supra, 
they were entitled to conclude that a person who 
was supplying such a plant would know its true 
identity. However, in view of the then technical 
problems concerning the definition of cannabis 
leaves the court was not prepared to allow the 
prosecution to found on the unsupported admissions. 
In R V Chatwood (8) the accused and three others 
who had previously been involved in the abuse of 
drugs made oral and written admissions to the police 
that they had injected themselves with various 
class A controlled drugs including heroin. Each 
was charged with Section 5 offences to which they 
tendered pleas of not guilty. The prosecution 
evidence from a forensic scientist was that he 
could not tell whether a substance was heroin 
without analysing it and from a police officer was 
that, while he might have a good suspicion about 
a substance being heroin he could not be certain.
At the close of the prosecution case the defence 
submitted that there was no case to answer citing
(6) following the report of R v Wells, a letter 
was published in the same journal confirming 
that the Courts-Martial Appeal Court had refused 
leave to appeal in a case involving unsupported 
admissions: jî.97lT| Crim.LR62 but see footnote 9
infra
(7) jj97^ Crim.LR286 
rS) fj gSolcrim.LRdfi
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as authority Haughton v Smith supra ; Mieras v 
Rees supra and Wells supra. The submission was 
rejected and only one accused gave evidence, to 
the effect that the substance with which he had 
injected himself was flour. The accused were 
convicted and appealed. In dismissing the appeals 
the court held that Haughton v Smith supra was not 
binding as it was essentially concerned with the 
law of attempts and Mieras v Rees supra was 
similarly concerned with attempts (9). Bird v Adams
(9) The report for R v Chatwood points out that the 
Criminal Law Review report for Mieras v Rees 
was inaccurate. The report said that the 
accused had been charged with unlawfully 
supplying a substance believing it to be a 
controlled drug when in fact the accused had 
been charged with attempting in terms of 
Section 19 of the 1971 Act to commit an 
offence under Section 4(3) by unlawfully 
supplying a substance believing it to be STP.
In effect, therefore, the correct distinction 
between Mieras v Rees and R v Wells is not 
that in the former there was a plea of not 
guilty and in the latter there was a plea of 
guilty but rather in the former the offence was 
an attempt and in the latter the offence was 
a completed on(L,
— b / —
supra was concerned with the question whether an 
admission of possessing a controlled drug was prima 
facie evidence that the substance was in fact such a 
drug, and that case correctly stated the law.
R V Wells supra proceeded entirely on the same 
reasoning as Bird v Adams supra. The accused's 
statements were sufficient to provide prima facie 
evidence of the substance which had been in their 
possession and the jury clearly disbelieved the 
evidence of the accused who did give evidence.
2.47 Consequently, it would appear to be the law in
England and Wales that the opinion of the accused 
that the substance which he or she had in his or 
her possession is a controlled drug, is evidence of 
that fact: Bird v Adams supra and R v Wells supra
being the authorities. The reasoning behind this 
principle would appear to be that as the possessor 
of the controlled drugs has special knowledge as to 
the propensities of the drug and, indeed, possession 
of the drugs is obtained particularly for those 
effects, then that ipso facto increases the weight 
to be given to that evidence contained in the 
admission. This certainly appears to be borne out 
in R V Chatwood supra where an essential fact 
appears to be that the accused had previously been 
involved in the abuse of drugs and were therefore 
expressing an opinion, an informed opinion, as to 
the nature of the drugs which they admitted to 
having in their possession.
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2.48 Further, it is submitted that none of the cases 
cited above is binding in Scotland. Each case is 
concerned essentially with an unsupported admission 
by an accused person that he had a controlled drug 
in his possession at a certain time. While in 
Scots law the making of a confession need not itself 
be corroborated (10) a confession alone is 
insufficient. The amount of evidence needed to 
corroborate a confession depends on the circumstances 
of the case and especially on the circumstances
and reliability of the confession (11). It is 
submitted that the courts in Scotland would require 
considerably more corroboration to such a confession 
than the quasi-expert status given to the accused 
in England.
2.49 It would appear to be that in England and Wales in 
order to secure a conviction for possession of a 
controlled drug it is not necessary that the actual 
substance should be produced, nor that it should be 
subjected to analysis and found to be the substance 
it is alleged to be. It would appear from the 
authorities cited that there is sufficient evidence 
for a conviction where the Court feels it can safely 
rely on an admission that the substance in question
(10) Mills V H M Advocate 1935JC77; Innes v H M 
Advocate 1955 SET (Notes) 69
(11) Sinclair v Clark 1962 JC57
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is the controlled drug narrated in the summons (12). 
It would also appear that in Scotland identical 
unsupported admissions would be insufficient and 
that corroboration would be required: corroboration 
which essentially varies according to the facts and 
circumstances of each case. The law relating to 
the misuse of drugs may therefore be the same for 
each jurisdiction but, it is submitted, its 
application varies in accordance with the varying 
requirements in the law of evidence.
(12) The problem of identification has been
considered in other jurisdictions: for example 
in R V Moshesha (1974-75) LLR428 the High 
Court of Lesotho held that, as dagga (cannabis) 
is a "notorious plant" in that country, the 
unchallenged evidence of a police officer that 
the substance in question was dagga was 
sufficient to establish prima facie proof of 
the identity of that substance.
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Part Three: Traces or Minute Quantities.
2.50 As the general law of possession of controlled drugs 
has developed through the reported cases since the 
passing of the 197 1 Act so certain themes of a 
subsidiary but nevertheless important nature have 
taken root and grown. One such theme has sometimes 
been that of de_ minimts non curat lex (1) which 
appears to have had an earlier planting in certain 
Commonwealth jurisdictions than those in the United 
Kingdom (2). The original lacuna in the statutes 
that haS given to this matter is that while
sections provide that possession of controlled drugs 
is to be an offence, no indication is given in the 
statutes of the minimum quatitity of a controlled 
drug that it is an offence to possess. Ordinarily, 
this is of little or no concern but in certain 
cases an accused is proved to be in possession of 
minute quantities and this has raised complex 
issues. The case law has, in its development, 
produced certain tests to be applied in common 
circumstances but also results have been obtained 
by the judges applying the widely used rules of 
statutory interpretation. These results it must be
(1) "the law does not concern itself with trifles" 
Brown’s Legal Maxim 10th ed. p88: some cases 
refer to "traces" rather than ^  minim,I s .
(2) generally see Macfarlane chp.2 1 and by the same 
author Narcotics Prosecution and the Defence of 
De Minim^is Non Curat Lex ( 1974-75) 17 Crim.LQ98 
and Faulkner and Field at pi72
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said vary with the circumstances of the particular 
cases and, now, with the jurisdiction for 
differences have appeared in the law as applied in 
Scotland and England and Wales. Some cases are 
concerned with the earlier legislation and some with 
the 1971 Act but it will be of somC assistance to 
have the terms of the amount offence rehearsed; 
Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1971 Act provide that 
it shall not be lawful for a person to have a 
controlled drug in his possession and Section 2 and 
Schedule 2 of the Act define controlled drugs for 
the purposes of the Act. Cannabis and cannabis 
resin are included in Part II of the 2nd Schedule.
2.51 (a) cases prior to the 1971 Act. In Hambleton v 
Callinan (3) the accused were arrested by the 
police on suspicion of being in unlawful possession 
of drugs. They were asked for and gave to the 
police some samples of urine which were placed in 
bottles and sealed and labelled. Subsequent 
analysis revealed traces of amphetamine powder in 
Callinan's urine and he was charged with possession 
of amphetamine powder having been found in his 
urine sample: contrary to Section 1(1) of the 1964 
Act. After that the justices found that the accused 
was not in possession of amphetamine. The 
prosecutor appealed and argued that a man could be 
in possession of a prohibited substance within the 
meaning of the offence charged if he had traces of
(3) [j96^ 2AIIER943
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it in his urine, in his intestines or any other 
part of his body in which it can be found. Lord 
Parker CJ agreed with the justices and held that 
where, as here, something is literally consumed 
and changed in character, it was impossible to say 
that a man was in possession of it within the 
meaning of the Act. This, it is submitted, is the 
ratio decidendrof the case but his Lordship 
continued and said, obiter, that he could see (4) 
"no reason why in another case the time when 
the possession is said to have taken place 
should not be a time prior to the consumption 
because as it seems to me the traces of, in 
this case, amphetamine powder in the urine is 
at any rate prima facie evidence - which is 
all the prosecution need - that the man 
concerned must have had it in his possession, 
if only in his hand prior to raising his hand 
to his mouth and consuming it. Accordingly, 
it seems to me that the possible difficulty 
that the decision in this case raises for the 
police does not arise in practice because the 
date of his possession can always be laid 
prior to consumption."
The problem of how minute a quantity of controlled 
drug may be and yet still establish possession of 
a controlled or dangerous drug first seems to have 
arisen in R v Worsell (5) where police officers
(4) ibid at p945
(5) |j96^ 2AIER1183; ^97ô] IWLRIll; jl96^ 
Crim.LR140
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stopped a motor car in which the accused and two 
others were travelling, one of them owning the car.
A search revealed a hypodermic syringe and a small 
tube under the dash-board of the motor car. There 
is no doubt that the tube may have contained at one 
time some heroin but the accused was convicted of 
possession of a controlled drug although the 
quantity consisted only of a few small droplets 
which were only discernible microscopically and 
were impossible to measure or pour out. The tube 
appeared empty and there was nothing in it that was 
visible to the human eye. The accused appealed and 
the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. In giving 
the judgment of the court Salmon LJ (as he then was) 
indicated that the case had been argued on the 
basis that the accused was in possession of the 
controlled drug in the tube at the moment of his 
arrest. That being so, his Lordship held that (6) 
"before the offence can be committed it is 
necessary to show that the accused is in truth 
in possession of a drug. This court has come 
to the clear conclusion that inasmuch as this 
tube was in reality empty (that is, the droplets 
which were in it were invisible to the human eye 
and could only be discerned under a microscope 
and could not be measured or poured out) it is 
impossible to hold that there was any evidence
(6) ibid at p 1184
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that this tube contained a drug. Whatever it 
contained, obviously it could not be used and 
could not be sold. There was nothing in 
reality in the tube."
The penultimate sentence proved to be of considerable 
importance in subsequent development. His Lordship 
did say that if the indictment had libelled an 
earlier date then there would have been in the 
circumstances of this particular case grounds for 
a conviction. The importance of the case is that 
it appears to be the authority for the general 
proposition that there could be no offence unless 
the quantity of the drug was such that it could be 
used in some way or sold. In R v Graham (7) the 
accused was convicted of possessing cannabis resin 
found in scrapings from the pockets of his clothes. 
The quantity of the drug was very small but capable 
of being weighed and measured. His defence was 
that he did not know that the cannabis resin was in 
his pockets and was not truly in possession of it.
He said that he had been convicted of possessing 
cannabis in 1967 and the resin might have been left 
over from then or left by friends who had used his 
clothes in the meantime. He appealed on the grounds 
that the quantities were so small as to amount to 
nothing (8). The Court of Appeal dismissed the 
accused’s appeal holding that as the quantities 
could be weighed and measured it could not be said
(7) |l969] 2AIIER1181; ^969^ Crim.LR193; 113 Sol.
J.87
(8) relying on R v Worsell supra
- 95 -
that there was no cannabis resin in his possession.
As Fenton Atkinson LJ said (9):
"on the evidence of the scientific officers 
that what was found - could in fact be 
measurable and weighed in milligrammes, we 
do not think that as a matter of law it could 
be said that there was in truth no cannabis in 
the appellant's possession."
It could be seen therefore that the Court of Appeal 
was laying down limits for prosecution for 
possession of minute quantities of dangerous drugs 
but as there was no explicit numerical indicators 
it was all essentially a question of degree. The 
matter was considered again in R v Frederick (10) 
when the accused appealed against conviction of 
having in his possession approximately 307 grains 
of cannabis resin. The evidence was that the 307 
grains were found in one place in the accused's flat 
and elsewhere two pipes and a tobacco pipe were 
found and discovered to have traces of cannabis 
resin. There was no evidence that these traces were 
so small as to amount to virtually nothing. The 
prosecution based their case on possession by the 
accused of the cannabis resin found and totalling 
307 grains, on possession of the traces of cannabis
resin found in the pipes and pouch, and on inferences
which could be drawn from those facts that the accused
(9) R V Graham ibid at pi 182
(10) [*1969^ 3AIER804; ( 1969) 53Cr.App.R455
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had been in possession of other cannabis resin.
The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The 
accused appealed and it was then held that he had 
been correctly convicted and the matter dismissed. 
Edmund Davies LJ said in judgment (11) that the 
Crown had had an extremely strong case in relation 
to the 307 grains and could rely on the presence of 
the traces in the pipes and the pouch to support 
that case. The prosecution, he continued, had no 
need to seek to establish as an entirely separate 
ground on which a conviction could be based the 
actual presence of the drug in the pipe and pouch 
at the time when the police took possession of those 
articles. However, the charge in the indictment was, 
he held, wide enough to cover the case which the 
Crown sought to establish. Counsel for the accused 
had submitted that as only traces of cannabis and 
cannabis resin had been found in the pipe and the 
pouch possession of such a quantity could not in 
itself constitute the offence charged and he relied 
on R V Worsell supra. This case was distinguished 
by his Lordship on the grounds that it turned on 
"very special facts", the amended charge there being 
that the accused was in possession of "a few 
droplets of diamorphine" and the dicta that there was 
nothing in reality in the tube was cited (12). But 
R V Graham supra was coritrasted by his Lordship with
(11) ibid at p807
(12) R V Worsell supra per Salmon LJ at pi 184
R V Worsell supra and he pointed out (13) that in 
the former the scientific officer had been able to 
measure and weigh the drugs in question so that it 
could not be said as a matter of law that there was 
in truth no cannabis in Graham's possession. In the 
instant case his Lordship noted that there was no 
investigation of the scientific evidence with a 
view to establishing that what were described as 
"traces" of cannabis and cannabis resin found in the 
pouch and two pipes in reality amounted to nothing.
R V Frederick supra then is an authority in the 
development of the test of measurability of drugs 
in a prosecution. The question of minuteness arose 
again in R v Marriott (14) where the accused was 
found to have in his bedroom a penknife which on 
forensic analysis was found to have a minute quantity 
of cannabis resin attached to the tip of its blade 
and he was charged with being in possession of a 
quantity of cannabis resin contrary to the 1965 Act. 
It was contended on his behalf that to be in 
possession of cannabis resin for the purposes of the 
1965 Act the accused had to have knowledge of the 
cannabis resin on the penknife at the time he was 
in possession of the knife. The assistant recorder 
rejected the contention and directed the jury that 
the prosecution did not have to establish any 
knowledge on the part of the accused but only that
(13) R v Graham supra at p806
(14) [l97lj 1WLR189; 1971 1AIIER595
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he was in possession of cannabis resin without 
any licence or authority. The accused was convicted. 
On appeal against this, on the ground that the trial 
judge had misdirected the jury, it was held, 
allowing the appeal that the prosecution had to prove 
not only that the accused had unauthorised possession 
of cannabis resin but also that he had reason to 
know at least that there was some foreign substance 
on the penknife blade. In Booking v Roberts (15) 
the accused had been found in possession of a 
hookah pipe which had at some time been used for 
the smoking of cannabis or cannabis resin and 
chemical tests performed on the bowl of the pipe 
showed that traces of cannabis resin were present 
in the bowl on the date in question. The amount of 
cannabis resin in the bowl could not be weighed 
but was known to be at least 20 microgrammes, this 
being the minimum amount of cannabis resin that 
could be chemically detected. The pipe contained 
traces of a burnt substance which presumably 
could be smoked again. The accused had used the 
pipe for smoking cannabis resin some time before 
his arrest. The accused was convicted as the 
justices were of the opinion that there was 
sufficient cannabis resin in the pipe to be measured 
as 20 microgramme8. On appeal the question for the 
opinion of the court was whether the possession of 
an amount of cannabis resin which could not be
(15) 1^1973^ 3WLR465; ^973^ 3AIIER962
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weighed but could be chemically detected and 
measured as 20 microgrammes at the very least 
could amount to possession contrary to the 1965 
Act. In giving judgment Lord Widgery CJ said (16) 
"it is quite clear that when dealing with a 
charge of possessing a dangerous drug without 
authority, the ordinary maxim of ^  minimts 
is not to be applied, in other words if it is 
clearly established that the accused had a 
dangerous drug in his possession without 
authority, it is no answer for him to say:
"Oh, but the quantity of the drug which I 
possessed was so small that the law should 
take no account of it." The doctrine of 
de minimis as such in my judgment does not 
apply but on the other hand, since the offence 
is possessing a dangerous drug, it is quite 
clear that the prosecution have to prove that 
there was some of the drug in the possession of 
the accused to justify the charge, and the 
distinction which I think has to be drawn in 
cases of this kind is whether the quantity of 
the drug was enough to justify the conclusion 
that he was possessed of a quantity of the 
drug or whether on the other hand the traces 
were so slight that they really indicated no 
more than at some previous time he had been in 
possession of the drug. It seems to me that
(16) ibid at p964
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that is the distinction that has to be drawn: 
although its application to individual cases 
is by no means easy."
His Lordship then proceeded to consider the reported 
cases and he concluded that the distinction between 
R V Worsell supra and R y Graham supra was that 
in the former the quantity was insufficient to be 
measured at all whereas in the latter the quantity 
of cannabis found was capable of measurement, 
although it consisted of no more than traces of 
cannabis in the scrapings from three of the 
accused's pockets (17). His Lordship concluded 
that :
"It is, I think, quite clear, as I said 
earlier in this judgment, that in these cases 
the tribunal of fact has to decide whether 
the quantity or traces spoken to by the 
expert witness is enough to justify the 
conclusion that the accused was in possession 
of a quantity of the drug, rather than it 
should amount to no more than an indication 
that he had on some other occasion had the 
drug in his pocket. I do not profess to 
suppose that it is always or offers an easy 
distinction to draw, and I do not think that 
courts trying these cases in future will be 
assisted by any .attempt on. our part to lay 
down any sort of mathematical formula to
(17) ibid at p965
- 101 -
determine what is or what is not enough in
terms of quantity to justify a conviction. I
think that the distinction to which I have 
referred must be in the mind of the tribunal 
of fact, that they should approach such 
questions not leaving their common sense at 
home and bearing in mind that there is a 
heavy onus on the prosecution in all criminal 
cases to prove beyond all reasonable doubt 
that the offence has been committed. I think
that if tribunals of fact approach this
question in that way, we shall get as near to 
a satisfactory and consistent series of 
answers as by any other method."
Applying these principles his Lordship held that 
as the quantity of cannabis could not be measured 
in the sense that no precise figures could be 
given for its weight and size, yet it was measur : 
:able in the sense that it must have been at least 
20 microgrammes and in the circumstances the appeal 
would be dismissed. The case is also noted for 
the dissenting judgment of MacKenna J. which, it 
is submitted, reveals a preference for a far more 
physical or literal test of measurability than 
that suggested by Lord Widgery. The dissenting 
judgment holds that the "traces" are proof that 
the accused had once been in possession of a drug 
but there was not enough to prove that he was still
in possession. It continued (18):
"If I were asked where the line should be 
drawn, I would be tempted to answer that 
it must be drawn substantially above 20 
microgrammes."
And later:
"The figure .. was ascertained by a 
chemical test: if there had not been at 
least 20 microgrammes present the result of 
the test would have been different. There 
was no putting of the cannabis on a weighing 
scale or measuring it by any instrument." 
MacKenna J. was for acquittal: he believed the 
legislature had not intended that a man be 
convicted for possessing a forbidden drug simply 
if a chemical test gave a positive reaction.
Bean J. agreed with the Lord Chief Justice and, 
accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. The 
importance of Booking v Roberts, it is submitted, 
lies in the dicta of Lord Widgery and his clear 
rejection of the de minimis rule: the inference 
being that dangerous drugs are so dangerous or at 
least so important that the courts must consider 
every case involving them. But, to avoid over 
zealous prosecutions for minute amounts the test 
was to be one of measurability, even if only that 
an approximation was made. In deciding the case
(18) ibid at p966
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in this way Lord Widgery was clearly applying 
the test of a weighable and measurable quantity 
to be found in the authority of R v Graham supra. 
Further, it has to be said that an alternative 
test of usability expounded by Salmon LJ in 
R V Worsell supra appears to be in direct conflict; 
or, at least, in 1973 the courts were faced with 
the problem of having authorities for two different 
tests of possession of minute quantities of drugs (19)
2.52 The interim conclusion for the cases on the
legislation prior to the 1971 Act is that they had 
produced two different tests of possession of minute 
quantities of drugs. Although the preponderence of 
cases was for the test of measurability nevertheless 
the authority was strong for the test of usability. 
Whatever Parliament’s intention had in fact been 
prior to 1971, when the 1971 Act came into force 
the new legislation contained no provisions which 
appeared to take cognisance of the problems that 
had developed.
(19) further on this point see D M Davies
Possession of Drugs in Minute Quantities 
138JPN58 where the author discusses the 
difficulties in reconciling R v Worsell and 
Booking v Roberts and see also A R L Ansell 
"Traces" Revisited j^ l97l| 123NLJ8B4
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2.53 (b) cases subsequent to the 1971 Act. In R v
Colyer (20) the accused was in possession of a pipe 
which, although it had no bowl, could be used 
either to smoke cannabis within it or to hold a 
reefer cigarette. No drug was visible to a 
forensic scientist but he carried out certain 
tests which indicated the presence of at least 2 
microgrammes of cannabis at the time of the 
accused's arrest. One microgramme is a millionth 
of a gramme and 20 microgrammes is roughly 
equivalent to a millionth of an ounce. It was 
held that Bocklng v Roberts supra was not binding 
on the court (2 1) and on the evidence heard in this 
case the reasoning in the dissenting judgment of 
MacKenna J. was to be preferred. To say that the 
amount of cannabis found in this case by the 
chemical test was measurable was stretching the 
meaning of the word unduly. Further, considering 
the minute amount of cannabis found in this case 
by the chemical test and the elaborate method used 
by the scientists to establish its presence, it 
could not be said that the prosecution had produced 
a prima facie case that the accused knew he had 
control of the drug. Accordingly, there was no case
(20) (1974) Crim.LR243
(2 1) on the grounds that the Crown Court is a
branch of the Supreme Court having equal status 
with the High Court, Accordingly, a decision 
of the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench 
Division is not binding upon the Crown Court,
but is only of persuasive authority.
to answer. It is submitted then that if an 
accused claims that he was quite unaware of the 
drug forming the basis of the prosecution then he 
is denying that he had the necessary mens rea for 
the particular offence of possession and the onus 
of proof is on the prosecution to show beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused did know of its 
presence: R v Marriott supra. It would seem then, 
following R V Colyer supra, that a highly 
complicated chemical test revealing only traces or 
evidence of past presence of a drug is only very 
inadequate evidence and raises no inference of 
knowledge. The theme of minute quantity arose 
again in R v Hierowski (22) where the accused had 
his van searched by police officers and they found 
three reefer ends which he admitted were his. They 
were lying on the floor and two of them contained 
not less than 20 microgrammes of resin and one of 
them 1 milligramme Of resin. Evidence was led by 
the prosecution that the 20 microgrammes of cannabis 
resin was invisible and only showed up on chemical 
analysis and also that any part of the cannabis 
plant (including the leaves) when burnt would, by 
a process of distillation, leave invisible traces 
of resin. It was held that the Crown had only 
raised the reasonable suspicion that on a previous 
occasion the accused had been smoking cannabis in 
his van although this was not the offence charged.
(22) [l978j| Crim.LR563
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Further, the Crown had not excluded the 
possibility that the accused had smoked a cannabis 
leaf and this was not then illegal. In addition, 
the prosecution had relied on the traces of 
cannabis resin in the cigarette as allowing 
knowledge to be inferred. The Crown argued that 
in the circumstances the accused must have known 
of the presence of cannabis resin. His Honour 
held that it was customary for users of reefers 
to retain them if they thought they still contained 
cannabis and it followed that the accused would 
not have left them in the back of the van if he 
had thought that there was still cannabis in them. 
Finally, applying the earlier authorities to 
convict the accused in the circumstances would be 
too artificial altogether and, therefore, there 
was no case to answer. Thus, in both R v Colyer 
supra and R v Hierowski supra the trial judge had 
refused to be bound by the authority of Booking v 
Roberts supra which created some difficulties 
because as was said later in 1978 (23):
"judges and indeed prosecuting authorities 
have relied on Booking v Roberts as authority 
for the proposition that a quantity as minute 
as 20 microgrammes is sufficient to sustain a 
charge of being in unlawful possession of a 
controlled drug."
(23) R V Carver fl97^ 3AIIER60 per Michael DaVles J 
at p62
- 107 -
Nevertheless, the saga continued with R v Bayliss 
and Oliver (24) in which the accused were indicted 
on a number of counts relating to possession and 
supplying cannabis resin. At the close of the 
prosecution case the defence submitted that the 
counts of possession of 0.094 grammes of cannabis 
resin should be withdrawn from the jury. The 
evidence was that two pieces of resin amounting 
each to 0.011 and 0.083 grammes had been found 
separately in the communal living room of the house 
where the two accused and one other lived. The 
resin was not of the same type nor packaged in the 
same way. The court held, applying R v Worsell supra 
and upholding the defence submission, that there 
was no evidence that the amounts were usable nor 
that they amounted to a usable quantity. Further, 
the indictment was bad for duplicity as it was not 
perraissable to add quantities together as in the 
present circumstances. The increasingly complicated 
and conflicting authorities were considered further 
in R V Carver supra where the accused was found to 
have possession of a roach end and a wooden box 
containing traces of vegetable matter. A forensic 
scientist gave evidence for the prosecution and 
said that a test produced a reaction indicating the 
presence of not less than 20 microgrammes of cannabis 
resin in each roach end and from the hinges and
(24) [i978^ Crim.LR361
cracks in the lid of the wooden box he recovered 
2 milligrammes of cannabis resin by means of 
scraping with a scalpel. Neither amounts could be 
used in any way which the drug legislation intended 
to prohibit. The jury convicted the accused who 
appealed to the Court of Appeal against conviction 
on three grounds: first, the quantities of drug were 
so minute that common sense would equate them with 
nothing. The Court allowed the appeal on this ground 
in respect of the 20 microgrammes in the roach end.
As Michael Davies J. said (25):
"applying the common sense test, probably the 
20 microgrammes ought to be regarded as amounting 
to nothing. Booking v Roberts ought no longer 
to be relied on in support of a contrary view." 
The appeal was not allowed in relation to the amount 
of 2 milligrammes as the forensic scientist's 
evidence was that this was about the size of 2 
pinheads which the common sense test could not 
equate with nothing. Secondly, since the mischief 
which the statute is intended to strike at is the 
use of dangerous drugs, possession of a quantity 
too small to be used ought to be ignored. This 
ground of appeal in the submission was accepted by 
the court (26):
(25) R V Carver ibid at p62
(26) ibid at p63
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"So far as the 2 milligrammes are concerned, 
and a fortiori the 20 microgrammes, on the 
evidence (of the forensic scientist) these 
quantities were too small to be usable for 
any purpose which the statute was intended to 
prohibit. "
The effect ot this, it is submitted, is to tip the 
judicial balance in favour of the "usable" test at 
the expense of the test of "measurability". To 
obtain a conviction the prosecution must prove that 
the accused had possession of a controlled drug that 
is usable in some way which the 1971 Act sought to 
prohibit. The fact that the relevant controlled 
drug can be measured is, legally, irrelevant; the 
test, on the authority of this case, is whether the 
quantity of controlled drug can be used. The third 
ground of appeal was that an accused ought not in 
law to be held to be in possession of a drug unless 
he has knowledge of the material alleged to be 
possessed and an intention to exercise control over 
it. Their Lordships, having allowed the appeal on 
the earlier points, found it unnecessary to deal 
with this submission and the "difficult problems" 
which may arise in connection with the meaning of 
"possession" and its application to the facts of a 
particular case. This whole decision was welcomed 
by at least one commentator (27):
(27) C. Manchester "Dangerous Drugs and De Minimis" 
(1979) 95LQR31 at p33 and A N Khan described 
the decision in R v Carver as "logical and 
reasonable" see Cannabis De MinimI.s 134JPN102
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"Deciding whether a quantity is "measurable" 
is a difficult task as the divergence of 
judicial opinion shows, and it is hardly 
satisfactory to try to distinguish cases like 
Worsell and Graham on this ground, for is not 
any (author’s emphasis) quantity, however 
small, measurable by scientific means? The 
correct test should be whether the quantity 
is usable, for after all it is the use (or 
rather, misuse) of drugs which is the mischief 
aimed at by the statute."
In R V Webb (28) the accused appeared on two charges 
each for being in unlawful possession of cannabis 
resin. The first charge related to cannabis resin 
amounting to 26.4 milligrammes found in various 
articles in the accused's room on a certain date.
The articles were a plastic container (0.4 mg), 
a polythene bag (8 mg) and two cigarette ends
(16 mg. and 2 mg). The second charge included a
total of 0.6 mg of cannabis resin found in a 
cigarette packet in the accused's room on a later 
date. The prosecution called evidence that showed 
that if cannabis resin was used in a cigarette, 
fragments of cannabis resin were sprinkled over the 
tobacco before it was rolled. The prosecution also 
called evidence indicating that all these quantities 
of cannabis resin were visible to the naked eye and
could be dislodged and removed with ordinary
(28) [l97^ Crim.LR463
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implements such as a penknife or tweezers and 
placed in a new cigarette; and that the cannabis 
resin in the cigarette ends could alternatively be 
placed in a new cigarette if the surrounding tobacco 
was re-used, and that although the average quantity 
of cannabis resin in a cigarette was 50-100 
milligrammes, a whole cigarette with as little as 
10 milligrammes had been found. The quantities of 
0.4 milligrammes and 0.6 milligrammes were only 
above the size of a pin head and were at least 
easy to notice and handle. On a submission at the 
end of the prosecution case, the learned Recorder 
made two rulings: firstly, quite apart from the 
issue of possession, there was no evidence that the 
quantities of 0,4 milligrammes in the first charge 
and 0.6 milligrammes in the second charge were, in 
practical reality, usable in any manner which the 
1971 Act was intended to prohibit and that there 
was no case to answer in respect of the cannabis 
resin of those quantities. There was, however, 
evidence on which the jury could decide that the 
larger quantities were so usable and the prosecution 
in order to prove that any quantity in question 
can in practice be used to contribute at least a 
part of the cannabis resin needed to make up a 
whole cigarette even if further cannabis resin has 
to be added. It is submitted that the Recorder here 
was applying the test of common sense based on
R y Carver supra in holding that the small amounts 
are in practical reality not usable. The second 
ruling was that the first charge did not need to 
be severed into one count for each quantity either 
on the grounds of duplicity on the face of the 
count or on the ground that, on the evidence more 
than one offence had been disclosed. In short, the 
circumstances of this case revealed a sufficient 
similarity between the quantities of the drug for 
them to be combined for the purpose of prosecution; 
something that was disapproved of in R v Bayliss 
and Oliver supra.
2.54 The 1971 Act is a United Kingdom statute applying 
equally to each jurisdiction of England and Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. For this reason 
Parliament is presumed to have intended that the 
law should apply equally but this has not been so. 
In Keane v Gallacher (29) police officers with a 
search warrant entered and searched the room 
occupied by the accused and he admitted to them 
that the contents of the room belonged to him. The 
police officers discovered on top of the sideboard 
a tin which contained nothing but a small quantity 
of resinous material. One of the police officers 
then gave a common law caution stating that she 
suspected that the resinous material was a 
controlled drug to which the accused replied 
"So what?". In a pocket of a pair of jeans lying 
beside the bed the police officers found a small
(29) 1980 SLT144: another appeal by the Crown was 
heard on the same day with a similar result;
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plastic bag which contained nothing but a small 
quantity of a resinous substance like cannabis 
resin. In answer to a further caution regarding 
the contents of the plastic bag the accused made 
no reply. Analysis discovered that the resinous 
material found in the tin was cannabis resin and 
weighed 10 milligrammes and that the resinous 
material found in the plastic bag was cannabis 
resin and weighed not less than 1 milligramme.
In each case the resinous material was examined 
both chemically and microscopically. ' In submission 
the defence solicitor argued inter alia that the 
Crown had failed to prove that the quantity of 
cannabis resin found in possession of the accused 
was "usable" and this was on the authority of 
R V Carver supra. The learned Sheriff acknowledged 
that while that decision was highly persuasive it 
was not binding but in the circumstances it would 
be followed. The accused was acquitted and the 
Crown took an appeal by way of stated case and in 
the High Court the Advocate Depute argued that while 
accepting that these must be an "amount" of the 
controlled drug found in the possession of the 
accused, that requirement had been satisfied in the 
instant case, since the material found was visible, 
measurable and weighable and had been identified as 
a controlled drug - cannabis resin. Accordingly, 
the usability test should not be applied. Counsel
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for the Respondent relied on the usability test 
in R V Carver supra and argued that the decision 
should be adopted and applied in Scotland for the 
reasons persuading the English bench. In 
considering this matter, the court took the view 
that the answer to the problem should be found in 
the terms of the Act itself and it followed then 
that if it is established that an accused person 
was, without legal authority, in possession of 
material and that material was a controlled drug 
then a conviction for a contravention of Section 
5(1) of the Act should follow. In the instant 
case the charge echoed the relevant section of 
the Act and no plea was taken to the relevancy 
of the charge. The opinion of the court was 
that (30):
"The decision in R v Carver seems to entail 
the importation into Section 5(1) of a 
qualification to the term "controlled drug", 
namely "which is capable of being used". If 
that be the case, it would add an additional 
onus on the prosecution to prove that fact. 
If Parliament had intended that such a 
qualification should be added it would have 
been simpler to give express effect to it."
(30) ibid at p 147
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And later (31):
"The plain wording of (Sub-section 5(1).) 
makes "identification in an acceptable manner" 
and not "capable of being used" the test, and 
there does not appear to us to be any 
absurdity in that."
The usability test appeared to the court to replace 
"identification" with "usable" unjustifiably and 
in considering the matter the existing authorities 
were reviewed. The opinion of the High Court was 
that the ratio decidendi in R v Worsell supra was 
that in reality there was nothing in the tube in 
question, and the question of use never arose.
In R V Graham supra the question of use did not 
appear to have been raised. In Booking v Roberts 
supra a conviction was sustained on certain 
principles laid down by Lord Widgery CJ and there 
the test of "usability" never arose. In the 
circumstances the "innovation" of the test of 
usability was held by the court not to be justified 
and, in the words of the opinion: (32)
"The fact that the Crown failed to prove that 
the quantity of cannabis resin found in the 
Respondent's possession could be used for a 
purpose struck at by the Act is an irrelevant 
consideration."
(31) ibid at p 147
(32) ibid at p 147
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It appears then that in Scotland, but not in the 
rest of the United Kingdom, the usability test has 
been rejected firmly and the ratio decidendi would 
appear to make the test one of identification in 
an acceptable manner. Indeed, counsel for the 
Respondent raised an additional point in arguing 
that what had been found in the possession of his 
client was consistent with him having previously 
been in the possession of a controlled drug and did 
not establish that he was then presently in 
possession of a controlled drug. The opinion of 
the court was that where identification of the matter 
found as being a controlled drug is satisfactorily 
established, then this point does not arise, since 
at the point of time of the discovery of the material 
the person was in possession of a controlled drug.
The opinion of the High Court of Justiciary was 
delivered on 11th January 1980 and on 11th June 1980 
the matter was raised in the House of Commons when 
Mr. David Steel MP asked the Solicitor General for 
Scotland if he was satisfied that relevant 
judgments by the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland 
and the Court of Appeal in England are compatible 
with the uniform application of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971. The Solicitor General for Scotland 
(Mr Nicholas Eairbairn QC MP) replied saying that 
the recent decisions of the High Court of Justiciary
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in Keane v Gallâcher supra and MiIn v McLeod supra 
expressly disproved of the test of "usable quantity" 
which appeared in the English case of R v Carver 
supra. The decisions were based on the fact that 
Section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, under 
which all these cases were prosecuted, contains no 
reference to such a test and the concept of a 
"usable quantity" where small quantities of 
controlled drugs were concerned necessitated an 
unjustified extension to the words of Section 5:
He continued; the High Court of Justiciary took 
the view that the proper test to be applied was 
not whether a "usable quantity" existed, but 
whether the substance identified as a controlled 
drug was in the possession of the accused. In 
the view of the Solicitor General this is the 
correct test to be applied and there is no 
anomaly in the law, only in the application of 
it at present. It may be that on some future 
occasion the decision in R v Carver will be 
reconsidered in the light of the argument that 
prevailed in Keane v Gallâcher and MiIn v McLeod 
(33). To date (34) the matter has not been 
reconsidered in such a way.
2.55 In Tarpy v Rickard (35) the facts were that a 
police raid on the accused’s flat uncovered
(33) (Parliamentary News) 1980 SLT156
(34) November 1981
(35) 1980 Crim.LR375. This report uses "cannabis"
and "cannabis resin" interchangeably although 
they are in law separate controlled drugs;
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visible fragments of cannabis on various articles 
from which it was concluded that there was at least 
12 milligrammes altogether. The accused was 
convicted inter alia of possession of cannabis 
resin by magistrates and he appealed to the Crown 
court where conviction was upheld. An expert 
called by the defence gave evidence that 100 
milligrammes of cannabis resin with the average 
tetrahydro cannabis content would be needed to 
affect an average man, but that a child of two 
years of age would be affected by 12 milligrammes. 
The Crown Court held that the 197 1 Act was 
intended to prohibit possession of a quantity of 
cannabis resin sufficient to affect a child. A 
case was stated for the opinion of the Court,
where it was submitted that because the 12 
milligrammes on its own would have no effect it was 
not a "usable" amount, and that the charge was bad 
for duplicity, it not being permissible for the 
prosecution to aggregate the four separate amounts 
found, to produce a total of 12 milligrammes.
It was held dismissing the appeal that there was 
no reason why a quantity of drug should be looked 
at on its own to see whether it was usable. The 
High Court applied the dicta in Bocking v Roberts 
supra per Lord Widgery CJ when he said that it 
was for the tribunal of fact to say whether the 
evidence showed actual possession of a quantity of
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drug rather than a mere indication of earlier 
possession. In R v Webb supra the presiding judge 
had left to the jury whether 26 milligrammes 
could form a usable part of an amount that would 
affect the user. In the instant case Ackner
LJ said that with the addition of the word 
"significant" to "part" he would not disagree with 
the direction in R v Webb supra, Further, as for 
the point about duplicity, the court held, 
applying R v Bayliss and Oliver supra, that the 
appeal would be dismissed on that point. In 
R v Boyesen (36) the accused was charged with 
possessing 5 milligrammes of cannabis resin, that 
being the quantity of the drug which was found in 
a plastic bag. The only evidence of usability 
appeared from a ruling of the trial judge when he 
referred to a prosecution expert who had averred 
that even one milligramme of cannabis was a usable 
quantity because it could be seen, picked up, put 
in a pipe or cigarette, touched or manipulated. 
Accordingly, he overruled a submission by defence 
counsel that the quantity in the present case was 
not usable. The accused was convicted and appealed 
It was held that common sense should prevail in 
deciding whether the quantity of cannabis resin 
charged was usable for the purpose of charging a 
contravention of Section 5, and in the instant case
(36) (1981) 72 Cr.AppR43CA
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five milligrammes of cannabis resin was not such 
a usable quantity and, accordingly, the appeal would 
be allowed and the conviction quashed. In giving 
judgment Wien J. said: (37)
"It seems to this Court to be offensive that 
the whole machinery of the law should be brought 
into operation to prosecute a man for allegedly 
possessing five milligrammes of cannabis resin. 
We are not concerned with any other drug. It 
may be that to possess a minute quantity of 
morphine, heroin or cocaine would be regarded 
differently. But this is a Class B drug viz. 
cannabis resin. One wonders how in common 
sense 5 milligrammes could be regarded as 
usable. Theoretically, it may be possible 
to add that quantity of cannabis resin to more 
and more again, to make what is called a 
"reefer"; but it is difficult to see how in 
common sense such a minute quantity could be 
regarded as usable. We do not regard it as 
capable of being used. Alternatively, it 
amounts to "nothing". We can adopt either of 
the alternatives mentioned in Carver's case," 
And later (38) discussing the quantity of 5 
milligrammes :
"It would require exceptional circumstances to 
justify a prosecution in respect of such a 
minute quantity."
(37) ibid at p45
(38) ibid at p46
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2.56 Conclusion. It appears then that certain
differences have arisen in relation to prosecutions 
for contraventions of Section 5 of the 1971 Act for 
possession of controlled drugs. These differences 
relate to the views taken by the High Court of 
Justiciary in Scotland and the Court of Appeal in 
England in the construction of the same section of 
the same Act and the result is, as the Solicitor 
General for Scotland had conceded, an anomaly in the 
application of the law. These differences arise 
from the minimum quantity of a controlled drug which 
the courgs regard as necessary before they will 
consider the case. In Scotland the test is that 
the controlled drug must be identifiable in an 
acceptable manner, on the authority of Keane v 
Gallacher supra, and in England and Wales, and 
probably Northern Ireland, the test is that the 
controlled drug must be of a usable quantity and 
that what constitutes such a quantity is a matter 
for the tribunal of fact, on the authority of 
R V Carver supra. While the latter decision was 
welcomed in England (39), in Scotland it has been 
described by one writer (40) as unsatisfactory as 
it is revisionist, arbitrary and, further,
"it cannot fail to keep defence lawyers 
pushing against the open door till all the 
milligrammes from one to 1000 are notched 
off one by one."
(39) C Manchester "Dangerous Drugs and De Minim*.s"
supra
(40) The author's name is not given (1979)
24JLS513 at p5l4
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The last point was clearly illustrated in R v 
Boyesan supra. Whatever the correct view, it 
appears safe to say that the courts have treated 
the issue of possession of a minute quantity of a 
controlled drug as an issue concerning the meaning 
of the term "possession" soluble only by the 
application of the appropriate rule of statutory 
construction. Indeed, this was the basis of an 
article by Mr. Barlow (41) in which he analysed the 
case law as it then was and he discovered four 
approaches adopted by the courts. These approaches 
come into the categories of substantive and 
adjectival, with two in each- Substantive (1) the 
literal approach which Barlow defined as represented 
in England by the decisions of revisionist judges 
who had introduced the test of measurability, as in 
R V Graham supra, for which there was no statutory 
warrant. This approach in turn is subdivided 
between the fundamentalists, who believed that as 
there is no express stipulation in the governing 
statute of the amount necessary to warrant conviction 
any amount will do, and the revisionists who 
suggested that the quantity ought at least to be 
scientifically measurable. (2) the mischief rule, 
and this approach, Barlow claims, allows the courts 
the right to determine the objects of the statute 
and hence the relevance of minute quantities to the
(41) N L A Barlow Possession of Minute Quantities 
of a Drug, j^ l97?J Crim.LR26
terms of the section. This social policy approach 
considers whether the objectives of the drug 
control statute are threatened by the possession of 
a quantity of drugs, spent at pharmacological power 
and thus unusable for any of the purposes for which 
they are prohibited. If there is no such threat 
then a prosecution and conviction and all that 
follows is pointless. Adjectival (3) The past- 
possession approach, argues Barlow, assumes the 
validity of the literal approach for the purpose 
of conviction but sentences on the basis that a 
larger quantity was in fact "possessed": the
first authority on this point being Canadian:
R V McLeod (42). Barlow criticises this approach 
as an (43):
"impermissi ble instance of judicial 
speculation that may have been entirely 
without factual foundation."
(4) The relevance of minute quantities to the 
issue of knowledge. If the quantity is so small 
that it takes sophisticated chemical tests to 
reveal their presence it may well be that the 
accused was ignorant of the control exerted by 
him or her over that controlled drug. Barlow 
argues that whereas before, the courts inferred 
knowledge by the mere presence of the controlled 
drug irrespective of quantity now the courts will
(42) (1955) IIICCC137 (BCCA) and discussed by 
Macfarlane at p451
(43) Barlow ibid at p29
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consider the surrounding facts and circumstances 
from which to infer knowledge. In concluding, 
Barlow argues that where the prosecution insists 
on proceeding on the basis of possession of 
minute quantities of a controlled drug then it 
should be a common sense presumption that the 
accused was unlikely or unable to be aware of 
minute drug traces found in his or her custody.
He argues further that if the prosecution 
overcome that presumption, perhaps by leading 
evidence of incriminating admissions, then, 
nevertheless the "usable quantity" test should 
be applied in addition (44). It has to be 
conceded that Barlow’s suggestions concerning 
presumptions would be valuable safeguards so far 
as an accused person is concerned and these may 
well dissuade prosecutors from bringing cases in 
which such small amounts are involved. But, our 
main concern must be the anomaly in the 
application of the law in Scotland and the rest 
of the United Kingdom, a result, surely, not 
intended by Parliament. The view that one takes 
of the matter depends largely on what criteria 
chooses to consider in the first place and which 
rules of construction one prefers. For that 
reason it is difficult, it is submitted, to argue
(44) The author goes further and suggests as an 
alternative a "use potential" test: see
Police V Emeraldi (1976) NZLR476CA
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which of the two tests that are now applied is 
the correct one. If two judges in different 
jurisdictions come to different conclusions in 
relation to the saim problem it is a complicated 
matter to resolve or reconcile these differences.
In the present problem it is submitted that the 
English test of usable quantity does indeed place 
an additional burden on the prosecution and that 
this is not a burden specifically placed there by 
Parliament. Scrutiny of the relevant section 
shows no intention explicitly to make the 
controlled drug in question only proscribed if it 
is of a "usable" amount and, further, no 
indication is given as to the limits which have 
in fact been established by judicial dicta only. 
Indeed, it is submitted that the matter has been 
placed in an even more unsettled state by the most 
recent decision (45) which seems to suggest that 
such numerical limits that have been settled apply 
or may apply only to cannabis resin and that other 
controlled drugs, or at least those in other 
classes in the Act, may be subject to different 
limits. In short, the law is uncertain. The 
Scots test of "identification in an acceptable 
manner" avoids the inherent difficulties of the 
test of usability. The Crown in Scotland must prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had a
(45) R V Boyesen supra per We in J at p45
controlled drug in his possession and if that 
is done then they have discharged the burden on 
them. The Crown in Scotland need not show that 
the quantity of controlled drug concerned is a 
usable quantity. The Scots test would appear to 
apply to all controlled drugs in terras of the 1971 
Act. The inherent fault of the Scots test, 
however, is that there is presently no indication 
of the true meaning of identification in an 
acceptable manner. It is possible that in seeking 
to avoid certain of the English complications the 
Scots judges have posed themselves a question of 
comparable complexity but perhaps that remains to 
be seen. The dicta in Keane v Gallacher supra 
gives no indication of any lower limit and to that 
extent the law is uncertain for the problem that 
arises is the difficulty of distinguishing 
between possession of a controlled drug and evidence 
of past possession where the evidence is minute 
in the extreme. Therefore, the conclusion must be 
that this aspect of the law of possession is 
uncertain, unsatisfactory and in need of further 
examination either by the courts or, preferably, 
by Parliament itself.
Part Four: Meaning of Terms, Definitions and Doubts
2.57 Repeatedly in the case law reference is made to 
cannabis and to cannabis resin in relation to the 
same substance when, in terms of Section 37(1) of 
the 1971 Act, they are separate controlled drugs. 
Indeed, the whole aspect of identification of 
cannabis and its constituent parts and cannabis 
resin proved to be a major diversion in the 
development of the law. In this section of the 
work it is proposed to consider two problems that 
developed; firstly the judicial uncertainties 
expressed as to definitions and identification of 
particular parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis 
and, secondly, the difficulties that arose where 
the prosecution proved that an accused person had 
possession of a substance but failed, for various 
reasons, to prove which controlled drug that 
substance was.
2.58 A. In terms of Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act 
the definitions are (before any anendment):
"(a) Cannabis : (except in the expression "cannabis 
resin") means the flowering and fruiting tops of 
any plant of the genus Cannabis from which the 
resin has not been extracted, by whatever name 
they may be designated;
(b) Cannabis Resin n^ans the separated resin, 
whether cures or purified, obtained from any plant 
of the genus Cannabis."
Both of these controlled drugs are to be found in
Class B of Part II to Schedule 2 of the 1971 Act.
But in addition to the definitions in Section 37(1) 
the 1971 Act also contains in Part IV a list of 
certain expressions and their meanings as they are 
used in Schedule 2 of the Act and this list 
includes -
(c) Cannabinol Deritatives means the following 
substances, except where contained in cannabis or 
cannabis resin, namely, tetrahydro derivatives of 
cannabinol and 3 - alkyl homogues of cannabinol 
or of its tetrahydro derivatives.
As the case law has developed so certain difficulties 
became apparent and these arose generally out of 
the statutory definitions (1). In Harding v Hayes 
(2) an appeal was taken by the prosecution to the 
Divisional Court on the ground that the justices 
had not permitted scientific evidence to be led 
which would have established that cannabis leaves, 
found in the possession of the accused, were part 
of the "flowering or fruiting tops" of the cannabis 
plant in terms of Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act.
At trial the accused had asserted that leaves were 
not part of the plant within the meaning of the 
Act and this was upheld by the justices who then
(1) A similar problem emerged with the 1965 Act but 
presently only the 1971 Act is examined: see
N Bragge The Definition of Cannabis in the 
Divisional Court 971^ 123NLJ964: for a 
scientific discussion see E G G  Clarke and A E 
Robinson When is Cannabis Resin? 10 Med,Sci & 
Law 139
(2) |l974^ Crim.LR713
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dismissed the charge of possession. On appeal it 
was held that the case would be remitted to the 
justices with a direction to continue the hearing 
and allow the scientific expert to give evidence.
In so directing their Lordships followed Constable 
V Broadley (3) in which a finding by justices that 
cannabis did include the leaves was upheld. This 
was done on the evidence of a scientific expert 
who stated that there was no part of the cannabis 
plant other than the root which was not part of the 
"flowering or fruiting tops". Both of these cases 
were cited in R v Berridale Johnston (4) where 
the accused was indicted on one count of possession 
of cannabis containing cannabis resin (sic). The 
defence moved to quash the Indictment on the grounds 
that this was an offence not known to the law. The 
judge invited the prosecution to delete the words 
"containing cannabis resin" and add an alternative 
count of possessing cannabis resin. This was done 
and the prosecution evidence included a scientist 
who stated firstly that cannabis leaves were part 
of the "flowering and fruiting tops" of the plant 
and thus within the legal definition of cannabis, 
although this was conceded not to be the case in 
cross-examination. Secondly, that once the leaf 
was removed from the plant it was "separated" and
(3) unreported: 10th July 1973
(4) 1^197^ Crim.LR306
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thus converted into cannabis resin. The defence 
submission was that there could be no case to 
answer on the basis of the first Crown point and 
that the second was so confusing that it should not 
go to the jury. The prosecution argued that the 
court was bound by Harding v Hayes supra following 
Constable v Broadley supra that cannabis leaves 
were part of the fruiting and flowering tops but 
the defence argued that it was a question of fact 
for the jury and that neither of these cases laid 
down that principle or were relevant. In the 
event the judge dismissed the first point and 
left the second to the jury who found the accused 
not guilty. In so dismissing the first point the 
judge appeared to hold that the leaves were not 
part of the flowering or fruiting tops and 
therefore not cannabis within the meaning of 
Section 37(1). And in finding the accused not 
guilty the jury appeared to hold that they did not 
believe that a separated leaf is the separated 
resin contemplated by the section. The great 
uncertainty that arose was that if the question as 
to whether cannabis leaves were part of the 
flowering and fruiting tops was a question of fact 
in every case, as the defence had suggested, then 
precedents became irrelevant and expert scientific 
evidence was required in every case and so the 
possible inconsistencies increased for although
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the technical meanings of the words could be given 
to the court it would continue to be a matter of 
debate as to whether any given part of the plant 
in question fell within that definition.
2.59 The complications conLij nued with R v Goodchild (5) 
where the essential question was; what constitutes 
cannabis? At trial the accused had admitted 
possession of "cannabis leaves". The Crown 
expert evidence in substance was that the material 
consisted of dried cannabis leaves plus a small 
amount of stalk to which the leaves were attached 
and that there was no evidence that this material 
contained any of the fruiting or flowering parts 
of the plant. But, the material did contain the 
active chemical constituents of cannabis resin 
and tetrahydro cannabinol, a cannabinol derivative. 
The defence evidence was that generally greater 
amounts of cannabis resin were to be found in 
the flowering tops than in the lower aerial parts 
of the plant, that cannabinol derivatives were to 
be found in the resin of all parts of the plant 
and that the vegetable part of the plant had leaves 
but no flowering parts and that these particular 
leaves were not part of the flowering or fruiting 
parts of the plant. The submissions at trial were; 
from the Crown, that so far as the charges 
involving cannabis were concerned the statutory
(5) [l977j 2AIIER163; |j977] Crim.LR287
definition of cannabis included the whole of the 
aerial plant; from the defence that the cannabis 
leaves without more specification were not within 
the statutory definition. The trial judge held as 
a matter of law that "the flowering or fruiting 
tops of any plant of the genus Cannabis" applied 
to the whole plant above the ground but he certified 
that the case was fit for appeal on the question 
whether possession of some leaves and stalk only 
from an unidentified part of a plant of the genus 
Cannabis (a) disclosed an offence of being in 
possession of a controlled drug in terms of 
Section 5(1) and (2) or (3) of the 1971 Act, and 
(b) if so, possession of which controlled drug or 
drugs? The Court of Appeal in giving judgment held 
that for material to come within the definition 
of "Cannabis" in Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act it 
must be shown that it is part of the "flowering or 
fruiting tops" of the cannabis plant; that is, 
the floral structure at the tip of the stems; it 
is not sufficient merely to show that the material 
is some part of the plant from above the ground 
from which cannabis resin can be extracted. 
Accordingly, possession of material consisting only 
of cannabis leaves from the vegetable part of the 
plant, and the stalk to which they are attached, 
although cannabis resin can be extracted from the 
leaves, is not unlawful possession of a controlled
- IbJ -
drug, that is, "cannabis" for the purposes of 
Section 5(2) of the 1971 Act, The appeal was 
allowed. It has to be said that although there 
may be valid historical reasons why Parliament 
had adopted such a restricted definition in the 
1971 Act (6) this decision meant that in certain 
known circumstances a person could be in legitimate 
possession of a certain part of a plant from which 
cannabis resin could be extracted! On the same day 
and in the same court R v McMillan (7) was heard 
on appeal. The ground was that it had not been 
established at trial that the cannabis leaves found 
in the accused’s possession were cannabis within the 
meaning of Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act. At trial 
the jury had been directed that cannabis leaves 
could be part of the "flowering or fruiting tops" 
of the cannabis plant following expert evidence to 
that effect. It was held on appeal that as the 
distinction between the mere leaf and the flowering 
or fruiting top of the cannabis plant which could 
include the leaf had not been pointed out to the 
jury, their verdict could not be said to be safe 
or satisfactory and, accordingly, conviction would 
be set aside. The same court again had occasion to 
hear R v Mitchell (8) where the accused had been 
convicted of possessing cannabis with intent to 
supply unlawfully. R v Goodchild supra had been
(6) further on this point see ibid dicta per Slynn 
J at p 167
(7) 1^1977] Crim.LR680
(8) [l977^ 2AIIER168
heard after trial but before Mitchell’s appeal 
was heard but there the court considered evidence 
from an analyst who had seen the material consisting 
of herbal material and seeds taken from the accused. 
She was able to say inter alia that the clean seeds 
(that is, seeds apart from the husks) found in the 
accused’s possession contained no active constituent, 
that they contained no cannabis resin and that they 
were on sale continuously as bird seed. She also 
said that the herbal material consisted of clean 
seeds of cannabis, of stalk and of leaf and beyond 
that she was not able to go. The court held, 
applying R v Goodchild supra that it was insufficient 
to show that the material consisted of leaves and
stalk for it had to be shown that the material was
part of the "flowering or fruiting tops". Further, 
as the analyst had said that the clean seeds without 
their husks did not contain cannabis resin, the 
court held further, that these seeds did not 
constitute cannabis within the meaning of Section 
37(1) and conviction quashed. In Lang v Evans (9) 
the accused was arrested by police for possessing 
cannabis, an offence which he denied at first 
although later he made a written statement in which 
he admitted "giving Billy cannabis and cannabis 
leaves". He was convicted but appealed to the Crown
Court and it was held that although the appeal was
(9) [l977~] Crim.LR286
devoid of all merit it would have to be allowed.
The court held on the authorities (10) that they
were entitled to conclude that a person who was
supplying such a plant would know its true identity.
But in view of the statutory definition given to
cannabis, namely the fruiting and flowering tops,
the court was not prepared to hold that a person,
unless he was a pharmacologist, would be able to
distinguish between the fruiting or flowering top
from the rest of the plant. It was held per curiam
that thereafter it would only be possible to secure
a conviction for possessing cannabis by producing 
)
an analysts report and that the magistrates were 
right to convict as since that date the law had 
been altered by R v Goodchild supra and R v Macmillan 
supra. The Court of Appeal heard another case before 
this complex problem was resolved: R v Goodchild 
(No. 2) (11). The accused was found in possession 
of some leaves and stalks from a cannabis plant 
which had been separated from the plant. He was 
charged inter alia with unlawful possession of 
cannabis resin, a class B drug, but the trial judge 
directed the jury to acquit him on the ground that 
the separation of the leaves and stalk from the
( 10) see ibid at p287
(11) under the heading of R v Goodchild (No. 2) 
Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1977)
9 7 ^  1AIIER649: one of the charges on this 
Indictment resulted in the first Goodchild case: 
{I977] 2AIIER163
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plant did not constitute separation of the resin 
in order to bring the leaves and stalk within the 
statutory definition. The Attorney-General 
referred the acquittal to the Court of Appeal and 
it was held that to constitute the "separated resin" 
of a cannabis plant, and therefore to constitute 
cannabis resin within Section 37(1) there had to 
be deliberate removal by some process of the resin 
of the plant, and the mere possession of leaves 
and stalk which had been separated from the plant 
and which contained resin did not amount to unlawful 
possession of cannabis resin, contrary to Section 5(2) 
Accordingly, the trial judge had been right to 
direct the acquittal of the accused. But, the 
accused had also been charged on the same Indictment 
with unlawful possession of a cannabinol derivative, 
a class A drug, and at the trial the Crown adopted 
the procedure of handing in as admissions 
statements by several experts as to the nature of 
cannabis and a cannabinol derivative. In one of 
these it was stated by an expert that the leaves 
and stalk in the accused's possession contained 
matter which came within the definition of 
cannabinol derivatives in Part 4 of Schedule 2 to 
the 1971 Act, namely a tetrahydro derivative of 
cannabinol. On that evidence, the trial judge 
ruled that the accused was in possession of a
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cannabinol derivative within Section 5(2) and, 
thereupon, the accused changed his plea to that 
charge to plead guilty and a conviction was entered. 
The accused then appealed against that conviction 
on the ground that possession of the separated 
leaves and stalk could not constitute unlawful 
possession of a cannabinol derivative within 
Section 5(2) of the 1971 Act merely because a 
cannabinol derivative was present naturally in them. 
The Court of Appeal held on this point that the 
trial judge had not erred in law in accepting the 
expert's statement that there was present in the 
leaves and stalk in the accused's possession a 
cannabinol derivative within the definition in 
Part 4, or in ruling that the mere presence 
naturally in the leaves and stalk of a cannabinol 
derivative was sufficient for the purposes of 
Section 5(2). Accordingly, the appeal against 
conviction on this point would be dismissed, 
although in doing so the court disapproved of the 
Crown practice in this case of submitting a large 
number of written statements preferring instead 
a few witnesses who, being present, could be 
cross-examined.
2.60 Thus, while Constable v Broadley supra and 
Harding v Hayes supra appeared to have been 
overruled by R v GoodchiId the cases subsequent 
to that case left the law in an unsatisfactory 
state. Although the correctness of the court's
— 10 O “
decisions were not in doubt it had become the law 
that possession for whatever reason of the leaves 
of the cannabis plant was not of itself illegal 
even although they were known to used by smokers 
for their psycho-active ingredients. Further, a 
second point was that while the Court of Appeal held 
Goodchild to have been correctly convicted in R v 
Goodchild (No. 2) supra there was no potential 
oppression in that a person in possession of material 
from the cannabis plant (other than from the flowering 
or fruiting tops) could be convicted of possessing 
a Class A drug (a cannabinol derivative) but not of 
the less serious offence of possessing a Class B drug 
(cannabis). This whole matter fell within the remit 
of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (12) 
and they advised the Home Secretary accordingly (13). 
As a result the Criminal Law Act 1977 provided by 
Section 52 for an amendment to Section 37(1) in 
that there was substituted a new definition -
""cannabis" (except in the expression "cannabis 
resin") means any plant of the genus Cannabis 
or any part of any such plant (by whatever name 
designated) except that it does not include 
cannabis resin or any of the following products 
after separation from the rest of the plant, 
namely
(12) see Section 1(2) of the 1971 Act
(13) the advice was given "urgently": see letter 
printed at HC Vol 933 col 597
- loy -
(a) mature stalk of any such plant
(b) fibre produced from mature stalk of 
any such plant, and
(c) seed of any such plant,"
This section came into force on 8th September 1977.(14)
2.61 B. The second question to be discussed here was
the problem where possession of something had been 
proved, but doubts existed as to what that something 
was and indeed whether the substance was a 
controlled drug. In Henson v MeikleJohn (15) the 
accused was found to have been in possession of 
certain items containing materials which subsequent 
analysis showed to be cannabis resin. The accused 
was aquitted on a charge of possessing cannabis 
resin contrary to Section 5(2) on the basis that 
there was no evidence adduced by the Crown from the 
two analysts that the material found in possession 
of the accused could be obtained only from a plant 
of the genus Cannabis. This qualification was 
required in terms of the definition of cannabis 
resin in Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act and the trial 
judge found that the Crown had not excluded the 
possibility of synthetic production. The appeal by 
the prosecutor was heard by the High Court of 
Justiciary but remitted back to the trial judge with 
a question as to whether evidence had been led to 
the synthetic production of cannabis resin and for
(14) SI 1977 No. 1365
(15) unreported: 25th May 1977: see GOCN: A9/77
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whom and to what effect. In his note to the High 
Court of Justiciary the trial judge replied that the 
prosecutor had led evidence from two forensic 
scientists and they had conceded inter alia that 
the three active principles could be synthesised 
but that in this case there had been no evidence to 
exclude synthetic production of the material 
analysed and the Crown appeal was refused. Again 
in Muir v Smith (16) where pieces of brass which 
together formed a pipe and contained at least 20 
microgramines of cannabis as debris were found in 
the accused's flat. On the accused's appeal to the 
Crown Court against conviction of possessing 
cannabis resin, it w A %  found that 20 microgrammes 
were the debris of a larger amount of cannabis 
resin or herbal cannabis. The accused appealed by 
case stated to the Divisional Court and there it 
was held that as the Crown Court could not decide 
whether the accused had possessed cannabis resin 
or herbal cannabis, it could not be said that the 
case against the accused had been proved. The 
appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed. It 
seems, therefore, to have been proved that the 
accused had a controlled drug in his possession but 
the prosecution could not prove which of two 
possible controlled drugs the substance was, that 
is to say, cannabis resin or herbal cannabis. As
(16) [l978 I Crim.LR293
neither could be eliminated it would not be said 
that the other had been proved. In passing it has 
to be said that the report on this case refers to 
"herbal cannabis" but this, with respect, is not a 
term for any controlled drug within the meaning of 
the 1971 Act. Similarly, in R v Best (17) where the 
accused and four others were each indicted on a 
separate count of unlawful possession of cannabis 
resin. Because a prosecution witness was unavailable 
and an expert was of opinion that the substance 
possessed was either cannabis or cannabis resin, 
leave was sought to amend each count to charge 
unlawful "possession of a controlled drug, being 
either cannabis resin or cannabis." Defence 
objections were rejected and the accused were 
convicted. They appealed against conviction and the 
sole ground that each count as amended was bad for 
duplicity. It was held in the Court of Appeal that 
the appeal failed. Cannabis and cannabis resin 
were linked in the list of Class B drugs set out in 
Part II of Schedule 2 of the 1971 Act. Seen 
together in that context they could be charged as 
they had been in the instant case without offending 
against the rules of duplicity. The clear allegation 
was of a single act of possession of an identified 
substance, which the evidence disclosed as cannabis 
or cannabis resin and no other substance. Since
(17) [^1970 Crim.LR787; ]j979^ 70 Cr.App.R.21
cannabis and cannabis resin came from the same part 
of the Schedule and were linked in it, there could 
be no complaint at common law, let alone under the 
Indictment Rules 1971 about the combination, as here, 
of cannabis or cannabis resin,
2.62 It has to be said that at first sight Muir v Smith 
supra and R v Best supra are irreconcilable as 
being contradictory. The distinction is perhaps 
more a matter of criminal procedure than substantive 
law. In the former the accused was convicted of 
possessing cannabis resin and on appeal to the Crown 
Court it was held that in truth the substance was 
either cannabis resin or herbal cannabis leaving 
the Divisional Court with a summons narrating one 
substance and the evidence suggesting either that or 
alternative, albeit a close alternative. In the 
latter case the Indictment, following leave to amend 
being granted, narrated two close alternative 
substances and this was substantiated by the evidence 
If this is correct then the distinction is indeed 
a narrow one: in short, in the latter the Indictment 
equated the evidence. It would also suggest that 
in future where the prosecutor proceeds on the 
possession of a small quantity then the alternative 
might be included from the outset but if this is the 
case then one questions, surely, the fairness to the 
accused and the return on the efforts where the 
quantity is minute.
2.63 In Arnott v Macfarlane (18) the accused allowed
policemen into his house and admitted that he was 
the occupier. The police had a warrant and searched 
the house and found in the bottom of a paper refuse 
sack in the kitchen four cigarette ends. These 
cigarette ends were roaches and analysis subsequently 
revealed 0.02 grammes of cannabis resin. The 
accused was cautioned and charged and replied 
"I accept full responsibility for the stuff you 
found. No-one else was involved". The accused 
was served with a complaint with a charge of 
unlawful possession of cannabis and after trial 
was convicted of unlawful possession of cannabis 
jresix^and fined £20. He appealed to the High 
Court of Justiciary and the appeal was allowed, 
the court holding that there was no evidence to
<5
substantiate the trial judges finding-in-fact 
that cannabis resin is the residue of smoked 
cannabis. The ratio decidendi of the case would 
seem to be that one cannot infer the presence of 
cannabis resin from the actual presence of 
cannabis or vice versa. It is submitted that in 
this case the prosecution served a complaint that 
narrated the wrong controlled drug as the copy of 
the analyst's report used as a production plainly 
stated the relevant substance to be cannabis resin. 
There appears, further, to be no suggestion in the 
report of the appeal that at the end of the Crown
(18) unreported 25th February 1976 COCN A23/76
case the prosecutor moved to amend the complaint 
in accordance with the evidence Î
Section 6: Restriction of cultivation of cannabis 
plant,
2.64 The 1971 Act provides by Section 6:
"(1) subject to any regulations under Section
7 of this Act for the time being in force, 
it shall not be lawful for a person to 
cultivate any plant of the genus Cannabis.
(2) subject to Section 28 of this Act, it is 
an offence to cultivate any such plant 
in contravention of sub-section (1) above". 
This provision is derived from Section 6 of the 1965 
Act which provided for the penalization of the 
intentional cultivation of the cannabis plant.
It is striking that the section in the 1965 Act 
makes it an offence to "Knowingly" cultivate 
whereas the offence in the 1971 Act is simply to 
cultivate. The specific requirement of mens rea 
in the earlier section is reinforced in the side- 
note to the section which describes the offence as 
being the "penalization of intentional cultivation". 
The omission in the 1971 Act has not otherwise 
gone unnoticed for at the Second Reading of the 
Bill (l) one member said that the absence of the 
word "knowingly" was obvious from clauses 4 , 5 ,  6 
and 9 especially as it had been included in clause 8
(1) Mr. Clinton Davies :16th July 1970: HC Vol 803 
col.1823
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but the matter was not taken further.
2.65 It has been shown how the statutory definition of 
cannabis in terms of Section 37(1) of the 1971 
was subsequently amended as a result of developments 
in the case law and that the effect of this 
amendment is to designate the whole of the cannabis 
plant, at any stage of its development, a controlled 
drug (2). In seeking to establish the mens rea 
in the offence of cultivation of the plant of the 
genus Cannabis, as it is now defined, some 
assistance is rendered by the Oxford English 
Dictionary which defines "cultivate" as:
"1. to bestow labout and attention upon land 
in order to raise crops; to till. 2. to 
produce or raise by tillage."
It is submitted then that to "cultivate" one is 
required to undertake some positive act and also 
to direct one's mind both to the act and to the 
intended result of the act. The case law on the 
offence is minimal but in the one reported case 
the definitions in the OED were reflected in the 
dicta. Tudhope v Robertson (3) was an appeal to 
the High Court of Justiciary by stated case from 
a trial where an accused husband and wife were 
found not proven of contravening Section 6. The 
learned Sheriff held that his findings-in-fact
(2) see paras 3.57 to 3.60
(3) 1980 SLT 60
— 1 4  0  —
disclosed no evidence of the necessary bestowing 
of labour and care required in cultivation nor any 
evidence from which that could be inferred. The 
findings-in-fact were that police officers saw the 
tops of plants in a window and believing them to be 
plants of the genus Cannabis obtained a warrant to 
search the house. There, they found in the same 
room, on a table at the window, fifteen plants in 
one pot, the plants appeared to be fresh and healthy 
with leaves fully out. A caution at common law 
was given and the husband replied "I thought its 
legal until its hash producing" and his wife 
replied "I thought they had to be a certain height 
before its illegal." The search also produced a 
dish containing a small paper bag containing 
cannabis seeds. The Sheriff also found-in-fact 
that the search did not produce any watering can, 
spray, tools or other implements with which to 
tend the cannabis plants. Accordingly, he held 
that there was no evidence of cultivation. But on 
appeal the Court held that the Sheriff was plainly 
wrong and that there was ample evidence to 
demonstrate sufficient cultivation to lead to a 
conviction of the offence libelled. That evidence, 
the court held (4), lay in the positioning of the 
plants to secure the light necessary to growth, the 
condition of the plants, the presence of the seeds, 
and the objective which the accused had in mind in
(4) ibid at p62
having the plants in their house at all. The 
finding of not proven was therefore quashed and 
the case remitted to the Sheriff with a direction 
to convict both accused. The Court added that the 
replies made by both accused to caution was sufficient 
indication of joint responsibility. It appears that 
in essence the Court had accepted the submission by 
Crown Council that the learned Sheriff had 
misdirected himself by taking too narrow and 
restricted a view of the verb "to cultivate" in 
relation to these specific plants. In the instant 
case the evidence of the discovery of seeds indicated 
the element of planting and the positioning of the 
plants at the window and their fresh condition 
indicated cultivation.
2.66 It is submitted therefore that Parliament has not 
specified a particular mental element or state of 
mind for the offence in Section 6 of the 1971 Act 
despite doing so for the earlier offence. However, 
in interpreting the statute to discover the actus 
reus of the offence a mental element arises with 
respect to the inclusion of the word "cultivate".
The acts which must be done to constitute 
cultivation require knowledge or intention, that 
is to say, desire of consequences, and to that 
extent the mental element is certain.
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2.67 The paucity of case law in relation to this offence 
would appear to be a fairly common occurrence generally. 
Recent researches have failed to produce any cases
in Hong Kong on a similar provision (5). In Canada 
there have been several reported decisions and it 
is of some interest to note that in that jurisdiction 
the same meaning in the OED has been accepted (6).
Both the Hong Kong and Canadian offences of 
cultivation are concerned with marijuana (cannabis) 
or opium poppy whereas the UK provision relates 
only to the former. This was raised when the Bill 
was being considered by the Committee of the Whole 
House (the Lords) when Lord Kilbracken said (7) 
that he could not see why this clause was restricted 
only to the cannabis plant and, indeed, he 
instanced the opium poppy as another suitable item 
to be so restricted, His Lordship’s inquiry was not 
taken further.
2.68 Further analysis to discover the exact mens rea and 
comparisons with developments in other jurisdictions 
are now largely futile. The meaning of cannabis in 
the 1971 Act as amended by the 1977 Act results in 
the whole of the cannabis plant, at any stage of its 
development, a controlled drug for the purposes of 
the 1971 Act. This means that the unlawful supply, 
production (8) and possession of the controlled drug
(5) Faulkner and Field at p64
(6) see McFarlane at p247 for Canadian authorities
(7) 9th February 1971: HL Vol 315 col.68
(8) production includes cultivation; see Section 37(1)
“ 14? -
cannabis are governed by Sections 4 and 5 of the 
1971 Act and, accordingly. Section 6 has become 
redundant. This was the conclusion of the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs (9) and the Council 
recommended to the Home Secretary that Section 6 
of the 1971 Act should be repealed (10). The 
Legalise Cannabis Campaign criticise this (11) 
apparently on two grounds: Firstly that the 
recommendation fails to consider reducing the 
penalties for cultivation which in their view is 
a less immoral offence as it is usually an activity 
done for the individual for his or her own use: 
Secondly, replacing the term "cultivation" by 
"production, supply or possession" in accordance 
with the recommendation may well result in heavier 
sentencing by the courts because the implications 
are more serious. The first point certainly is 
more concerned with the short term and may or 
may not be disposed of once the Home Secretary's 
view of the Council’s recommendation is known.
The second point appears to place the offence of 
cultivation in a less serious category as 
compared to the other offences in the 1971 Act but, 
following R V Leonard (12), this need not be so for 
there certain circumstances were held sufficient to 
allow the court, for the purposes of sentencing
(9) Report and Review of the Classification of
Controlled Drugs and Penalties etc. (Home Office 
1979) page 19
(10) Ibid at p2 1
(11) in a booklet they published entitled "Trash 
Rehashed" (London 1979) page 32
/ 1  n \ n n  o  n i-\ ' f 1 m -
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sentencing at least, to infer cultivation with 
intent to supply, an aggravation not explicitly 
in the 1971 Act.
2.69 The punishment on conviction of an offence in 
terms of Section 6 has not been amended since the 
passing of the 1971 Act:
(a) Summary 12 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 14 years or a fine, or both. (13)
Section 8: Occupiers etc. of premises to be 
punishable for permitting certain activil&(%to 
take place there.
2.70 The 1971 Act pre.vi(ifôby Section 8:
"A person commits an offence if, being the 
occupier or concerned in the management of 
any premises, he knowingly permits or suffers 
any of the following activies to take place 
on those premises, that is to say -
(a) producing or attempting to produce a 
controlled drug in contravention of 
Section 4(1) of this Act;
(b) supplying or attempting to supply a 
controlled drug to another in 
contravention of Section 4(1) of this 
Act, or offering to supply a controlled 
drug to another in contravention of 
Section 4(1);
(13) Section 25 and Schedule 4; 1971 Act
- J 0 1 -
(c) preparing opium for .S'.moking,
(d) smoking cannabis, cannabis resin or 
prepared opium."
The purpose generally of this Section is to make it 
an offence for a person to knowingly permit or suffer 
certain activities to take place on premises but in 
order to commit those offences such a person must 
have a certain status and that is, that he is the 
occupier of these premises or is concerned in the 
management of them. Each status will be considered 
in turn:
(a) the occupier. This offence has its origins in 
the less extensive provisions of Section 5 and 
Section 8(c) and (d) of the 1965 Act and the meaning 
of "the occupier" in Section 5 was considered in 
R V Mogford (1) where two girls both over 15 but 
under 2 1 years of age were left in their parents 
home while the parents were on holiday and in that 
time the police raided the house and discovered 
that cannabis was being smoked there. The two girls 
were charged with, being the occupiers of the 
premises, permitting the premises to be used for 
the purposes of smoking cannabis. The presiding 
judge, Neill J, held that on the facts the two girls 
were not the occupiers of the premises because they 
were not in legal possession of them during the 
temporary absence of their parents, and, further, 
because his Lordship did not consider the two girls
(I) [j976j 1WLR988
had sufficient control of the premises to be the 
occupiers. Finally, the mere fact that the two 
girls could invite guests to, and exclude others 
from, the house did not amount to the nature and 
measure of control envisaged by the statute. In 
this judgment did not specify what he meant by 
his use of the term "legal possession or control" 
nor did he set the limits of either (2). But, if 
it appears that his Lordship had some technical 
meaning in mind for the term "the occupier" then 
this was not a line of thought that was accepted 
in Scotland. In Christiston v Hogg (3) the accused 
was convicted of permitting the house of which he 
was an occupier to be used for the purpose of 
smoking cannabis or cannabis resin. The facts of 
occupation were that although the accused possessed 
a rent book he had not paid rent for some eight 
months. The reason for this was that the building 
of which the accused's flat formed part had been 
condemned as unfit for human habitation. Despite 
that, the accused had continued to live in the flat 
and when the police were investigating this matter 
the accused had said that he was the occupier and the 
police knew that he lived there. The accused 
appealed on the ground that he was a squatter and 
that he lived in the premises but had no legal right 
or title. His counsel cited R v Mogford supra as
(2) generally on the term "the occupier" see 
Bruce v McManus 1915 3KB1
(3) 1974 SLT (Notes) 33
authority. The opinion of the Court in dismissing 
the appeal was (4)
"No violence is done to the wording of the 
Section if the words "the occupier" are 
construed as bearing their ordinary meaning 
and connotation. In our opinion "the occupier" 
within the meaning of the section is a person 
who has possession of the premises in question 
in a substantial sense involving some degree 
of permanency and who, as a matter of fact, 
exercises control of the premises and dictates 
their use. Every case will depend on its own 
facts. We see no reason to restrict the 
interpretation of the words "the occupier" to 
describe one who has a legal right or title to 
inhabit the premises. In distinction to the 
remarks of Nie 11 J, looking to the mischief 
struck at by the section, it would appear to 
us that if it were meant so strictly to limit 
and circumscribe the meaning to be attached 
to those words that would have been made plain 
in the Act by definition or otherwise and that 
Parliament has not chosen to do."
2.71 In R V Tao (5) the offence in Section 8 of the 1971 
Act was considered and the circumstances were that 
the accused was a student living in a hostel owned 
by his college in Cambridge. A furnished room had 
been allocated to him at the hostel and the accused
(4) ibid at p34, per the Lord Justice General (Emslie)
(5) fl976] 3AIIER65
paid the college for the use of the room and 
lived there from the time he first went to Cambridge. 
The police were called to the hostel because of a 
small fire in the accused's room although he was 
not present then. On entering the room the police 
smelt burning cannabis and found traces of cannabis 
resin in the room. The accused was convicted of 
a contravention of Section 8(d). He appealed 
atg%lng that although he was in occupation of the 
room he was not "the occupier" of the room in 
terms of Section 8. In dismissing the appeal the 
court used arguments that were strikingly similar 
to Christison v Hogg supra although the latter 
had not been cited in submissions nor referred to 
in the judgment. Lord Parker CJ said (6):
"The fact that whereas in many Acts one finds 
the phrase "the occupier" defined, there is 
no comparable definitions in this Act, suggests 
to this court that it was the intention of 
Parliament, in framing Section 8 to leave it 
to the tribunal of fact to determine whether, 
on the facts of each particular case, a given 
person was "the occupier" of the premises in 
question."
And his Lordship said that in seeking to find the 
mischief against which this section was aimed, the 
answer suggested that (7)
(6) ibid at p67
(7) ibid at p67: the same point concerning the mischief 
of the section was raised in Wheat v E. Lacon & Co. 
fl96^AC522 per Lord Denning MR: quoted in |l976^ 
Crim.LR at p 5 17
"Parliament was intending not that a legalistic 
meaning should be given to the phrase "the 
occupier" but a common sense interpretation, 
that is to say "the occupier" was to be regarded 
as someone who, on the facts of the particular 
case, could fairly be said to be "in occupation" 
of the premises in question, so as to have the 
requisite degree of control over those premises 
to exclude from them those who might otherwise 
intend to carry on the forbidden activities."
His Lordship said that the Court of Appeal agreed 
with the decision of Neill J. in R v Mogford supra 
but did not agree with the reasoning by which he 
reached that decision (8). Nevertheless, the 
judgment continued and analysed the accused’s 
right of occupation and concluded, on the facts, 
that it was (9)
"not merely a right to use (the room) but a 
sufficient exclusivity of possession, so that 
he can fairly be said to be "the occupier" 
of that room for the purpose of Section 8.
He does not have to be a tenant or to have an 
estate in land before he can be "the occupier" 
within that section. It is in every case a 
question of fact and degree whether someone can 
fairly be said to be "the occupier" for the 
purpose of that section."
(8) ibid at p68
(9) ibid at p69
2.72 This matter has been followed in some detail 
because, it is submitted, the wording of the 
section limits the commission of the offences to 
a special category of people who might, but for 
the offences, provide facilities which would 
assist those using controlled drugs. Consequently, 
it is of great importance to know the limits set 
by Parliament and the courts to that special 
category.
(b) the section also includes the alternative 
category of those "being concerned in the 
management of premises," In Yeander v Fisher (10) 
the licensee of a public house and his wife were 
convicted of being concerned in the management 
of premises, the public house, which were used 
for the purposes of smoking cannabis and of 
dealing in cannabis contrary to Section 9(0(^b) 
of the 1964 Act. At all material times Mrs. 
Yeander was in charge of the bar in the public 
house but on none of the occasions when the 
offences were committed was Mr. Yeander seen 
to be there. On appeal against conviction, 
because Section 9(l)(b) of the 1964 Act, as 
distinct from Section 9(l)(a), created an 
absolute offence under which anyone on the spot 
and concerned with the management of the premises 
would be liable if the premises were used for
(10) [l95^ 3AIIER158
smoking or dealing in cannabis. The attitude 
of the bench, therefore, can be encapsulated in 
the dicta of Lord Parker CJ (11):
"this statute is dealing with the very 
important matter, particularly today, of 
dangerous drugs. I certainly take judicial 
notice of the fact that drugs are a great 
danger today: and legislation has been
tightening up the control of drugs in all 
its aspects."
In deciding whether the offence was absolute or not 
the Lord Chief Justice said that the test depended 
on the words of the particular statute and the 
subject matter with which it is dealing. His 
Lordship's view of the subject matter has been 
indicated but he held in addition that the offence 
was also a regulation for the public welfare and 
therefore in a category of case in which the 
provisions are more readily held to be absolute.
As to the wording of the statute, his Lordship 
pointed out that whereas the offence in para (a) of 
Section 9(1) made explicit references to knowledge 
by inclusion of the phrases "knowingly" or "which 
to his knowledge has been used", the offence in 
para (b) of Section 9(1) contained no such provisions, 
It was conceded that while it was true that where you 
get the word "knowingly" expressly or impliedly used
(11) ibid at p 16 1
in provision and not in another the matter was not 
conclusive: nevertheless, his Lordship thought that 
the matter in para (b) was intended by the 
legislature to be an absolute offence. If this 
decision and the attitude of the bench appeared to 
be firm then it was to remain so until Sweet v 
Parsley (12) where the accused, the sub-tenant of 
a farmhouse, let out several rooms to tenants who 
shared the use of the kitchen. She herself retained 
and occupied a bedroom. Later she gave up living 
there, though she came occasionally to collect 
letters and rent. On a certain date, quantities of 
drugs including cannabis resin were found in the 
farmhouse and she was charged with being concerned 
in the management of premises used for the purpose 
of smoking cannabis resin contrary to Section 5(6) 
of the 1965 Act. She conceded that the premises 
had been so used and the prosecutor conceded that 
she did not know this and she was convicted of the 
offence. On appeal to the House of Lords it was 
held that the offence created by Section 5(6) was 
not an absolute offence and the conviction should 
be quashed. The words "used for the purpose" in 
Section 5(6) refer to the purpose of the management, 
and mens rea is an essential ingredient of the 
offence. This case had become a cause celebre
(12) |1970| AC133; [j969| 2WLR470; for an excellent 
analysis see the article by D R Miers at (1969) 
20 NILQ 161
between conviction and its being quashed because 
of the harshness of the law as perceived by the 
press. The matter was referred to by Lord Reid in 
his speech when he remarked that the British press 
were vigilant to expose injustices and the public 
outcry and sense of injustice provoked by this case 
appears to have influenced the bench for this 
decision contrasts markedly with Warner v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner (13) where almost the same 
composition of the House adopted a completely 
different approach on a similar problem. Sweet v 
Parsley supra is also noted for the general though 
not universal willingness of their Lordships to 
consider the general principles involved in the 
interpretation of criminal statutes. The case 
marked a determined reassertion of the rule that 
there is a presumption in favour of mens rea and 
that this included negligence (14). Further, the 
"half-way house" of negligence as the criterion.of 
liability in offences of strict liability was 
discussed but with differing results. The speeches 
of Lords Reid and Pearce suggest that the burden of 
rebutting negligence by proof of reasonable mistake 
should remain on the accused while Lord Diplock 
interpreted the authority (15) as leaving the accused 
with an evidential burden only; meaning that the
(13) [l968] 2Ai\ER356
(14) 1'  ^ ^   ^j and Wales: see Section 8:
[j968j 2Ai\ER356
Criminal Justice Act 1967
(15) Proudman v Daymar (1941) 67 CLB 536
accused need only raise a doubt that he took 
reasonable care and that he need not prove anything 
on balance of probabilities. At any rate, the 
case received an enthusiastic reception from 
criminal lawyers and halted an ealier disturbing 
trend. The matter of "being concerned in the 
management" next received judicial examination 
subsequent to the passing of the 1971 Act. In 
R V Joseph and Christie (16) the accused ran a 
card school in the basement of a house owned but 
not occupied by the local council. They were 
squatters and were there without lawful authority 
as trespassers. In a raid the police found packets 
of cannabis, many in the possession of a man who 
had been with the accused. The accused were 
convicted of being concerned in the management of 
premises upon which they knowingly permitted the 
supplying of a controlled drug contrary to Section 
8. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the 
question whether an accused is lawfully in 
possession of the premises in question is irrelevant 
An accused needs no interest in premises in order 
to be concerned in their management. The dicta by 
the Lord Chief Justice appeared to suggest that 
control of the premises would satisfy the 
requirements of the law for this phrase or, 
alternatively, if the accused was owning them or 
organising or managing them. It should also be
(16) The Times LR: 26th February 1977
added here that the Act does not contain, nor does 
there appear to be, an authoritative decision on the 
meaning of "premises" (17) in this connection.
2.73 Section 8 makes it an offence for a person to
knowingly suffer or permit certain activities to 
occur. These words contain the essence of the 
requirement for criminal liability for this offence 
and they must now be considered with the case law (18). 
Knowingly. In legislation of the present nature, 
the requirement of knowledge is generally interpreted 
as applying to all the elements of the offence.
The term "knowingly" does not limit the mens rea 
to actual knowledge of the relevant circumstances 
but also embraces wilful blindness or connivance 
(19). But there is authority that constructive 
knowledge - the failure to make reasonable inquiry - 
generally has no place in criminal law (20).
Fermit, In legislation where it is an offence to 
"permit" something to be done many authorities
(17) but the matter has been considered in certain 
civil matters; see inter alia Andrew v Andrews
& Mears [l908^ 2KB567; Bracey v Read |l963| Ch.88
(18) This aspect of criminal law has a case law that 
is so extensive as to be excessive and no attempt 
is made here to r^isew the whole field
(19) see R v Thomas ^ 9 7 ^  Crim.LR517
(20) Roper v Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd. 
|j95^ 2TLR284 per Devlin J at p289
require that the accused should have known of 
the conduct in question, since a man cannot be said 
to permit what he does not know about (21). The 
fault element in offences of "permitting" is 
expressed in a variety of ways but negligence is 
rejected so that offences of "permitting" can be 
committed either knowingly or recklessly.
Suffers. The interpretation of "permit" applies 
to offences of "suffering" although there Î*» clear 
statutory definition of "suffer" (22)
"if a person is in a position to prevent a 
thing without committing a legal wrong and 
does not do so, then in the common use of 
language that person suffers that thing. Of 
course, one cannot be said to suffer a thing 
which one cannot prevent, or which by law 
one ought not to prevent. But these 
appellants are in a position in which both 
physically and legally they could prevent 
this .... and they have not done so, and, 
therefore, in my opinion, they may properly 
be said to have "suffered" it 
The requirement of knowingly permitting or 
suffering applies to each of. the activities 
contained in the four sub-sections.
(21) see Williams p83 for English authorities and 
Gordon p316 for Scots
(22) Rochford RPC v Port of London Authority (1914) 
83LJKB1066
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2.74 The first case to be considered in relation to 
these matters is R v Ashdown (23) where four 
co-tenants of the same premises jointly entered 
into a tenancy agreement with the landlords. 
Subsequently, one co-tenant smoked cannabis or 
cannabis resin on the premises and this was done
in the full knowledge of the other co-tenants, who, 
it appeared, did nothing to stop it and were 
subsequently convicted of permitting premises to be 
used for smoking cannabis contrary to Section 5 of 
the 1965 Act. In dismissing the appeals 
Roskill LJ speaking for the Court of Appeal (24) 
said that the essence of the offence is knowingly 
permitting the activity to be carried on and that 
there was no privilege or immunity attaching to 
the position of co-tenants which would prevent him 
being guilty of an offence in these circumstances.
2.75 (a) producing or attempting to produce a controlled
drug. In terms of Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act 
"produce" means producing it by manufacture, 
cultivation or any other method and "production" 
has a corresponding meaning. Further, in terms of 
Section 19 of the 1971 Act it is in itself an 
offence to attempt to commit an offence under the 
provisions of the Act. To this extent therefore 
the offence in Section 8(a) is unnecessarily long
(23) (1974) 59 Cr.App.R193
(24) ibid at p 194
in its description (25). The overlap in the 
offences in Sections 4, 6 and 8 ha% been 
considered by the Advisory Council on the Misuse 
of Drugs (26) and the only case concerning this 
offence raised this very point. In Taylor v Chief 
Constable of Kent (27) the accused was the occupier 
of certain premises and cannabis plants were found 
on the premises in a room not occupied by the 
accused although he knew they were there. Both 
sides admitted that the plants had been cultivated 
by another occupant of the premises who had been 
convicted of an offence under Section 6 of the 1971 
Act. A charge was preferred against the accused of 
contravening Section 8 and he pleaded not guilty 
submitting inter alia that there was no production 
of a controlled drug; that the activity in 
question was cultivation of the plants of the genus 
Cannabis under Section 6 which was not an activity 
proscribed by Section 8; that the present charge 
in effect equated Section 6 with Section 4 as a 
result of the amendment to Section 37(1) by Section 
52 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and that the 
amendment was not intended to have that effect.
The prosecution relied on the plain words of 
Section 37(1) which specifically referred to 
production by cultivation and that embraced
(25) and Section 8(6) also
(26) see supra under Section 6
(27) [l98l^ Crim.LR244
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cultivation of cannabis plants. Following 
conviction the accused appealed by case stated 
to the Divisional Court. In dismissing the appeal 
the court held that, bearing in mind that production 
included production by cultivation, the effect of 
the amendment to the definition of "cannabis" to 
include not only the flowering or fruiting tops, 
but virtually the whole of the plant, was to 
render cultivation of cannabis plant synonymous 
with production of a controlled drug. It 
accordingly followed that the accused was guilty 
of the offence charged and had been properly 
convicted.
2.76 (b) supplying or attempting to supply a controlled 
drug; or offering to supply a controlled drug.
In terms of Section 37(1) of the 1971 Act 
"supplying" includes distributing,
2.77 (c) preparing opium for smoking. This offence 
relates solely to opium and is thus contrasted 
with the other offences under sub-sections (a) 
and (b) which concern 'controlled drugs'.
2.78 (d) smoking cannabis, cannabis resin or prepared 
opium. This offence relates to opium and cannabis 
and is thus contrasted with the other offences 
under sub-section (a) and (b) which concern 
controlled drugs.
2.79 Clause 8 of the 1971 Bill was subjected to
considerable attention at various stages and some 
interesting points were raised, if not answered.
The Honourable Member for Cardigan thought that 
the clear statement that guilty knowledge was a 
"condition precedent" to conviction, and 
indicated by the term "knowingly" was a great 
safeguard against injustice, but at the same time 
(28) he suggested different tests for the 
occupiers of public and private premises in that 
the former would be subject to absolute offences 
with statutory defences and for the latter there 
would be "the ordinary standard of criminal proof" 
but he thought such a distinction would achieve 
a balance between a determination to protect the 
innocent and, on the other hand, a desire to 
punish the guilty. The matter was not taken any 
further but, it is submitted, there would have had 
to have been clear definitions of these terms by 
the legislature to avoid almost certain difficulties 
in the matter of public and private premises. 
Further, the Honourable Member for Ashford pointed 
out an inconsistency in the Bill where there was 
a different classification of drugs of plant origin 
in one part of the schedule and their pharmacologi: 
ically active ingredients in another Sch. as Part I 
Class A "cannabinol" and "cannabinol derivatives"
(28) Mr. Elstyn Morgan HC.vol 803 col. 1837
and Part II Class B "cannabis" and "cannabis 
resin". The result being, he said, that one of 
the effects of the inconsistency is that the 
offence referred to in clause 8(2) involving 
the smoking of cannabis or cannabis resin does not 
include cannabinol or its derivatives. (29)
Finally, in a speech in the House of Lords, two 
interesting points were brought out by Lord 
Kilbracken (30) when he moved an amendment by which 
he sought to delete the smoking of cannabis, 
cannabis resin ot^ prepared opium as an offence in 
terms of clause 8(d) because, firstly, although the 
clause made it an offence to allow a person to smoke 
a certain substance on premises it was not an 
offence to smoke that substance and, secondly, the 
noble Lord did not see why of all the drugs in 
the three schedules only these ones specified 
should be the subject of an offence. Effectively, 
it was an offence to permit someone to smoke 
cannabis on one's premises but not such an offence 
to allow someone to inject heroin. In reply for 
the Government Lord Windleshara said that liability 
for smoking was traced to 1920, which Act enacted 
treaty obligations from The Hague Convention of 
1912 and these were therefore drugs already subject 
to offences and, anyway, the main difference between 
smoking and taking an intravenous method was that
(29) Mr. William Deedes, Standing CommittedA 
19th Nov. 1970 col. 219
(30) HL vol. 315 col. 72
the former could in all probability be detected 
easier because of the distinctive smell (sic).
Lord Foot said that the clause was concerned with 
moral guilt and the method involving intravenous 
use was "very much more serious" and that a person 
who knows about heroin being taken on his premises 
should be open to prosecution. Thus, it would 
appear that while the case law has given some 
indication of the mens rea of the offences the 
section itself has inherent difficulties,
2,80 In terms of Section 25 and Schedule 4 of the 1971 
Act the punishment is:-
Class A Class B Class C
a. Summary 12 months or 12 months or 3 months
£400 or £400 or both or £500
both or both (31)
b. Indictment 14 years or 14 years or 5 years or
a fine or a fine or a fine or
both both both.
(31) words by 1977 Act Schd. 5 para
l(l)(b) and 1975 Act Schd. 7B para 1(1)(b)
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Section 9: Probition of certain activities etc. 
relating to opium.
2.81 Section 9 of the 1971 Act provides:
"subject to Section 28 of this Act, it is an
offence for a person -
(a) to smoke or otherwise use prepared opium; 
or
(b) to frequent a place used for the purpose 
of opium smoking; or
(c) to have in his possession -
(i) any pipes or other utensils made or
adapted for use in connection with the 
smoking of opium, being pipes or 
utensils which have been used by him 
or with his knowledge and permission 
in that connection or which he intends 
to use or permit others to use in that 
connection; or
(ii) any utensils which have been used by
him or with his knowledge and permission 
in connection with the preparation of 
opium for smoking.
Section 9 therefore is concerned exclusively with 
opium which, of all the controlled drugs in the 
1971 Act, has the longest involvement with the law. 
The Pharmacy Act 1868 was the first attempt by the 
British legislature to place a measure of control
over opium and its preparations. The 1869 Act 
prohibited any person from selling or offering to 
sell, dispense or compound poison unless he was a 
chemist or druggist, or from selling any poison 
unless the container was distinctly labelled.
This was the only restriction on the sale of opium, 
although substances in Part I of Schedule A, such 
as arsenic and cyanide could only be sold to a 
person known to the seller. For historical reasons
(l) the legal control of opium was slowly tightened 
and refined so that a multiplicity of actions 
associated with opium were proscribed. These legal 
controls, arising out of an increasing knowledge of 
opium and its use, became more subtle and precise. 
Section 8 of the 1965 Act was replaced by a 
modified Section 9 of the 1971 Act which is subject 
to the statutory defence in Section 28. It is 
interesting to note that opium appears to have 
been singled out by the legislature for the closest 
attention of all the controlled drugs; the 
activities in relation to this offence are not 
applicable to any other controlled drug: it is
not an offence, for example, to smoke cannabis nor 
to frequent a place where cannabis is smoked.
Opium is a Class A controlled drug in Schedule 2 of 
the 1971 Act and it therefore attracts the severest 
penalties. There is no power in terms of the 1971
(1) see Bean p20
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Act to allow the Secretary of State to make 
regulations providing that these activities are 
lawful in certain circumstances. Finally, the 
possession of "pipes or other utensils" is not 
illegal in relation to other controlled drugs, 
only for opium (2). The reasons for this state 
of affairs is very properly a matter for legal 
historians although the matter has been raised 
elsewhere (3).
2.82 Sub-section (a). While it is not an offence in 
terms the 1971 Act to smoke any controlled drug 
other than opium, it has to be said that in smoking 
such a controlled drug a person will probably be 
in possession of that controlled drug and 
therefore committing an offence in Section 5 of 
the 1971 Act. Both sections 5 and 9 apply to opium 
and it is submitted that there is a considerable 
degree of overlap of these two offences. The 
essential difference however is to be found in
(2) in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 in New Zealand 
it is provided by Section 13 that the possession 
of "any needle, syringe, pipe or other utensil, 
for the purpose of the commission of an offence 
against the Act" is itself an offence, and
this applies to any controlled drug,
(3) see HL vol. 315 col.80 (quaere only opium) 
and HC col. 803 col. 1823 (quaere apparatus)
Schedule A where more severe penalties apply to 
offences under Section 9. The offence of smoking 
or otherwise using opium is the only offence of 
consumption under the Act.
2.83 Sub-section (b). The offence in this sub-section 
is to frequent "a place used for the purpose of 
opium smoking". It is submitted that such a place 
is what is generally known as an opium den and with 
this offence the legislature sought to prohibit the 
attendance at such places by anyone, irrespective 
of whether or not they themselves smoked opium 
there. Any person who is the occupier of such a 
place or is concerned in the management would 
commit an offence in terms of Section 8(2). That 
such a place is so used in an essential part of a 
charge against an accused and his or her knowledge 
of that use must be proved by the prosecution. 
However, we must now consider the meaning of 
"frequent",
2.84 Scotland. Within the meaning of Section 57(1) 
of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1889 and 
Section 79 of the Paisley Police and Public Health 
Act 1901 "frequenting" does not necessarily involve 
more than one visit to a place, without coming and 
going. However in Linton v Clark (4), a case 
under an Edinburgh Police Act dealing with known 
thieves, it was held that it was not frequenting to
(4) (1887) 1 White 522
walk once along Princes Street accosting four or 
five men on the way. Frequenting requires more 
than mere use for passage, but it is not clear 
how much more. Lord Young thought the "act" had 
to be done several times (5). But it has been 
held in cases under local betting legislation 
that one can frequent a street by walking up and 
down in it or even standing still for a period of 
20 minutes (6). Sheriff Gordon distinguished the 
latter case from Linton v Clark supra on the ground 
that in the latter the accused walked along the 
street in one direction like any ordinary pedestrian 
(7).
2.85 England. In English law it appears that any
judicial interpretation of frequenting has arisen 
in the context of other offences. As a result of 
the case law there appears to be two essentially 
different meanings. Firstly, frequenting can be 
seen to be mere physical presence at a point in time. 
In R V Cross (8) the Court of Exchequer seems to 
have taken the view that the mere fact that a 
person was in a particular street constituted a 
frequenting of that street for the purpose of an 
offence contrary to Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 
1824 which makes it an offence to be a suspected
person and to frequent certain places with intent to
(5) ibid at p527
(6) Davies v Jeans (1904) 4 Adams 336; Lang v 
Walker (1902) 4 Adams 82
(7) Gordon p 547
(8) (1857) 1 H & N 651
commit an arrestable offence. However, this was 
doubted in Clarke v R (9) where the Divisional 
Court took the view that repeated visits to the same 
locality or, at the very least, to loiter or linger 
in a locality for a period of time was required. 
Secondly, frequenting can be seen to be the presence 
for some identifiable criminal purpose of a 
continuous nature. In Airton v Scott (10) the 
accused had been convicted under a bye-law of 
frequenting a public place for the purpose of 
betting, that place being an athletic ground. Lord 
Alverston said (11):
"As to the word "frequent", it was plain that 
being long enough on the premises to effect 
the particular object aimed at was "frequenting".
2.86 The English authorities, and the Scots also, were 
considered in Nakhla v The Queen (12) which was 
an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.
The essential facts were that at the instigation 
of the police a man who had been involved in certain 
burglaries went to a particular street with his 
cohabitee in order to sell the accused stolen 
property. The police watched and recorded the whole 
proceedings. The accused was arrested with the stolen
(10) (1909) 100LT393; 25TLR250; and see Jones v 
Scott 73 JP 149
(11) 25TLR at p250
(12) [1975J 2AIIER138
property and was charged with being a rogue and 
vagabond under Section 52(i)(j) of the Police 
Offences Act (New Zealand) 1927, the indictment 
alleging that "being a suspected person he did 
frequent a public place, namely Onental Terrace 
with a felonious intent". The judge directed 
the jury that they could find the accused guilty 
of "frequenting" a public place if they found it 
proved that he had been there long enough to 
exhibit a felonious intent. The accused was 
convicted and he appealed to the Judicial Committee 
who held that the mere physical presence in a place 
of a suspected person or reputed thief who, while 
in the place, was proved to have had a felonious 
intent was not by itself sufficient to constitute 
"frequenting". In general, "frequenting" involved 
the notion of something which, to some degree at 
any rate, was continuous or repeated. The 
circumstances in which "frequenting" might arise 
included or involved enquiring as to the reason 
why a person went to or remained at a place, the 
time during which he was at or near the place, the 
nature of the place and its significance or 
relevance in regard to the purpose or object with 
which he went to the place, the events taking place 
while he was there and, in particular, the extent 
of his movements, the nature of his behaviour and his
continuing or recurrent activities. For those 
reasons the facts did not warrant a finding that 
the accused had "frequented" the particular street 
named and, accordingly, the appeal was allowed 
and conviction quashed.
2.87 These cases, it is submitted, leave matters
unsettled in so far as Section 9(b) of the 197 1 
Act is concerned. The reasoning is that the 
Sub-section makes it an offence for a person to 
frequent a place used for the purpose of opium smoking 
There is no requirement by that section, or indeed 
any other, that the accused should be a "suspected 
person" or that he should intend "to commit an 
arrestable offence" or that he should have "a 
felonious intent". And the Scots authorities are 
concerned with either known thieves or betting 
offences. It is submitted further that the 
principle that in English law frequenting requires 
an activity which in the nature of things involves 
more than mere physical presence at a point of time 
or presence for some identifiable criminal purpose 
of a continuous nature does not and cannot apply to 
offences in Section 9(b). The authorities cited 
appear to suggest that an individual who has 
certain characteristics in law can by his actions 
be "frequenting". It is submitted that the offence
—  ill —
in Section 9(b) is concerned with places that have 
certain characteristics: "a place used for the 
purpose of opium smoking". Accordingly, as the 
legislature appears to have emphasised matters in 
this way, it follows that the legislature did not 
intend more than simply punishing people being 
found on these types of premises. It is conceded 
that the matter is uncertain and will remain so 
until tested in the courts.
2.88 Sub-section (c). The essence of this sub-section 
is that it is an offence for a person to have in 
his possession either pipes or other utensils made 
or adapted for use in connection with the smoking 
of opium or any utensils which have been so used.
In Section 9(c)(i) the utensils must have either 
been used by the accused or used with his knowledge 
and permission, or which he intends to use or permit 
others to use. In Section 9(c)(ii) the accused 
must have used the utensils or such use must have 
been with his knowledge and permission. It is of 
importance to note that this "paraph0halia" offence 
relates only to opium and not to any other controlled 
drug.
2.89 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule
4 of the 1971 Act for conviction of an offence under 
Section 9 is -
(a) Summary 12 months or £400 or both
(b) Indictment 14 years or a fine or both.
Section 11; Power to direct special precautions for 
safe custody of controlled drugs to be taken at 
certain premises.
2.90 The 1971 Act provides by Section 11;
"(1) Without prejudice to any requirement 
imposed by regulations made in pursuance of 
Section 10(2)(a) of this Act, the Secretary 
of State may by notice in writing served on 
the occupier of any premises on which controlled 
drugs are or are proposed to be kept give 
directions as to the precautions or further 
precautions for the safe custody of any 
controlled drugs of a description specified in 
the notice which are kept on those premises.
(2) It is an offence to contravene any 
directions given under Sub-section (1) above."
2.91 Section 10(2)(a) of the 1971 Act grants power to 
make regulations requiring precautions to be taken 
for the safe custody of controlled drugs and these 
regulations have been made : the Misuse of Drugs 
(Safe Custody) Regulations 1973 (1) require 
controlled drugs, other than those specified in 
Schedule 1 , generally to be kept either in a locked 
safe or room or in a locked receptacle (2) and also
(1) Sj' 1973 No. 7 98
(2) Regulations 1, 2 and 5 and Schedule 1: 
operational from 1st July 1973
— 179 “
require that where such drugs are kept on premises 
occupied by a retail pharmacist or in a nursing 
home or similar institution and are not under the 
supervision of a pharmacist or the person in charge 
should be kept in a locked safe, cabinet or room 
which complies with the requirement of Schedule 2 
or, alternatively, in the case of a registered 
pharmacy, which is certified by the local chief 
officer of police as providing an adequate degree 
of security. Provision is made, in the latter 
case, for the inspection of premises and the renewal 
and cancellation of certificates. (3)
2.92 The notice to be served on the occupier in terms 
of Section 11(1) must be done in accordance with 
Section 29 of the 1971 Act. This being done, the 
occupier must comply with any direction given.
The offence is to contravene any direction. 
"Contravention" includes failure to comply and 
"contravene" has a corresponding meaning (4). It 
is submitted that the Crown will have made out a 
case when the actus reus is proved. The sub-section 
creating the offence does not provide explicitly 
for any mental element and the statutory defence 
does not apply to this offence (5). This offence 
may fairly be described as regulatory or a plain 
welfare offence in seeking to ensure that controlled 
drugs are kept in certain, protective conditions.
(3) Coming into effect from 1st October 1974
(4) Section 37(1)
(5) See Section 28(1)
2.93 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule
4 of the 1971 Act for a conviction of an offence
under Section 11(2) remains as it was originally 
provided for:
(a) Summary 6 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 2 years or a fine, or both.
Section 12: Directions prohibiting prescribing, 
ipply etc. of controlled drugs by practitionersSUT
!tc. convicted of certain offences
2.94 The 1971 Act provides by Section 12(1) that the
Secretary of State is empowered to give a direction 
to a practitioner or a pharmacist who has been 
convicted of certain offences connected with drugs. 
Section 12(2) provides that:
"A direction under this sub-section in respect 
of a person shall -
(a) if that person is a practitioner, be a 
direction prohibiting him from having in 
his possession, prescribing, administering, 
manufacturing, compounding and supplying 
and from authorising the administration and 
supply of such controlled drugs as may be 
specified in the direction.
(b) if that person is a pharmacist, be a direction 
prohibiting him from having in his possession, 
manufacturing, compounding and supplying and
from supervising and controlling the manufacture, 
compounding and supply of such controlled drugs as 
may be specified in the direction."
2.95 The 1971 Act provides by Section 7 that certain 
activities which would otherwise be unlawful may be 
authorised by the Secretary of State. The activities 
prohibited by Section 12(2) are those for which 
authorisation is expressly required in terms of 
Section 7(3). Section 12 came into effect, along 
with the remainder of the 1971 Act, on 1st July
1973 (1) and on that date the transitional provisions 
contained in Schedule 5 paragraph 3 ceased to take 
effect.
2.96 Sub-section 6 provides that it is an offence to 
contravene a direction given under Sub-section 2. 
"Contravention" includes failure to comply and 
"contravene" has a corresponding meaning (2).
There is no explicit requirement as to the mental 
element in this offence and it is submitted that 
to make out the actus reus is sufficient. The 
statutory defence in Section 28(1) does not apply 
to this offence.
2.97 In relation to Scotland, the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1980 applies in relation to offences 
in terms of Section 12 of the 197 1 Act and therefore
(1) SI 1973 No. 795
(2) Section 37(1)
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proof of certain matters of a routine nature may 
be possible by service on the accused person of a 
copy report relating to those matters (3).
2.98 The punishment in terms of Section 25 of Schedule 
4 for conviction of an offence under Section 12(6) 
varies in accordance with the name of the drug -
Class A
(a) Summary 12 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 14 years or a fine, or both
Class B
(a) Summary 12 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 14 years or a fine, or both
Class C
(a) Summary 3 months or £500, or both
(b) Indictment 5 years or a fine, or both (4).
Section 13: Directions prohibiting, prescribing,
supply etc. of controlled drugs by practitioners in 
other cases.
2.99 The 1971 Act provides by Section 13(3) that it is 
an offence to contravene a direction prohibiting 
practitioners and doctors from possessing, 
supplying etc, controlled drugs. This section 
contains provisions similar in nature to those 
formerly contained in Section 1(2) and (4) of the 
1967 Act. But, Section 13 of the 1971 Act must
(3) See Section 26 and Schedule 1
(4) Amended by substitution by the 1977 Act Schd. 5 
para l(l)(b) and by the 1975 Act Schd. 7B para 
l(l)(b)
essentially be seen in conjunction with Sections 
10 and 14 of the same Act. The former section 
gives the Secretary of State power to make 
regulations for preventing the misuse of 
controlled drugs and the latter allows the 
Secretary of State to make investigations where 
grounds for a direction under Section 13 are 
considered to exist. Indeed these three sections 
of the 1971 Act together represent the way in 
which the control of drugs in Britain in the 
last 50 years has centred round the doctor/addict- 
patient relationship. This concept was established 
as a result of the Rolleston Committee Report of 
1926, a committee consisting of nine members, all 
holding medical qualifications. The result was 
that the development of the control of drugs leaned 
heavily towards certain medical aspects and 
Britain was able to cope with the continuity 
problem without recourse, until recent years, to 
the criminal law and heavy sanctions; a course of 
action which was not followed in the United States 
where the "marajuana scare" of the 1930's was 
dealt with by the criminal courts. In Britain then 
the problem of drugs was seen almost entirely as 
a medical one (1). The powers granted to the 
Secretary of State in terms of Section 13 essentially 
cover for where that relationship has broken down.
(1) Bean p59 et seq
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2.100 Section 13(1). The Secretary of State is empowered 
by this sub-section to give a direction to a 
doctor. The meaning of "doctor" is given in the 
interpretation Section (2). The direction is made 
in relation to a contravention of regulations made 
with respect to the notification of drug addicts
in terms of Section 10(2)(h) the supply of 
controlled drugs to addicts in terms of Section 
10(2)(i) or^who has contravened the terms of a 
licence issued in terms of Section 10(2)(i).
2.101 Section 13(2). The Secretary of State is empowered 
by this sub-section to give a direction to any 
practitioner. The meaning of "practitioner" is 
given in the interpretation Section (3). This 
direction is made in circumstances where the 
Secretary of State considers that a practitioner
is or has been prescribing, administering or 
supplying or authorising the administration or 
supply of any controlled drugs in an irresponsible 
manner. What exactly constitutes an "irresponsible 
manner" is not defined in the Act and must then be 
considered as being a matter of discretion for the 
executive. This section came into effect on 1st
(2) Section 37(1): "doctor" means a fully registered 
person within the meaning of The Medical Acts 
1950 to 1969
(3) Section 37(1): "practitioner" (except in the 
expression "ve%ru\ary practitioner") means a 
doctor, dentist, vel^fuiary practitioner or 
vekâfiaary surgeon
July 1973 (4) and the power contained therein 
could only be exercised on or after that date.
The section applies where a practitioner "is or has 
been" acting in a certain manner and this, it is 
submitted, precludes the Secretary of State from 
anticipating a practitioner so acting. However, 
this sub-section may be read in conjunction with 
Section 15 which provides for temporary directions 
in circumstances where such a direction is required 
to be given without delay. A temporary direction 
has a period of operation of six weeks beginning 
with the date on which the direction takes effect (5)
2.102 Section 13(3). This sub-section provides that 
it is an offence to contravene a direction 
under Sub-section (1) and (2). This sub-section 
contains no qualifying words concerning mens rea 
and It is submitted that in the circumstances 
the offence is made out with proof of actus reus 
only.
2.103 The 1971 Act, in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 
4, provides the punishment for each offence and 
these have been amended to the extent of deleting 
"6 months or £200, or both" and inserting "3
months or £500, or both" in the punishment for
Class C drugs (6).
(4) by SI 1973 No. 795
(5) Section 15(5), subject to sub-section (6)
(6) Amended by substitution by the 1977 Act Schd.5 
para l(l)(b) and by the 1975 Act Schd. 78 
para l(l)(b)
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Section 17: Power to obtain information from 
doctors, pharmacists etc. in certain circumstances.
2,104 The 1971 Act empowers by Section 17 the Secretary 
of State to obtain information from doctors, 
pharmacists and certain other people in particular 
circumstances. This section reflects what the 
Home Secretary said at the Second Reading of the 
Bill (1) about the then existing state of the law: 
"it is inflexible because - the Home Secretary 
cannot move as quickly as he would want to do, 
and should do, to deal with the rapidly 
changing picture both of drug availability and 
habits of addiction,"
The section then should allow the Secretary of State 
to obtain the information that he requires in 
order to deal with what appears to him to be a 
social problem caused by the extensive misuse of 
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs. It is of 
some interest to note here that the long title 
of the Act refers to dangerous or otherwise 
harmful drugs whereas many of the criminal offences 
refer to controlled drugs. The latter phrase 
means any substance or product for the time being 
specified in Parts I, II or III of Schedule 2 of the 
1971 Act (2) and the former phrase, it is submitted, 
is a far wider one but not defined in the Act. The
(1) Mr. Maudling HC Vol 803 co. 1750: 16th July 1970
(2) Section 2(l)(a)
Secretary of State is also empowered to (3):
"conduct or assist in conducting research 
into any matter relating to the misuse of 
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs." 
and this power may well be exercised in relation 
to Section 17.
2.105 Sub-section (2) essentially regulates the manner 
and time by which the information required by the 
Secretary of State is to be provided. The sub­
section indicates that this information is not to 
relate to the identity of any person for or to 
whom any such drug has been prescribed, 
administered or supplied, and thus maintaining the 
strict doctor/patient code of confidential 
communication.
2.106 Section 17 provides for two offences relating to 
this power to obtain information. These offences 
are not subject to the statutory defence contained 
in Section 28 of the 1971 Act. The first offence 
is contained in sub-section (3):
"A person commits an offence if without 
reasonable excuse (proof of which shall lie 
on him) he fails to comply with any requirement 
to which he is subject by virtue of Sub­
section (1) above."
In seeking a conviction under this sub-section 
the prosecution, it is submitted, must prove two
(3) Section 32
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essential matters: firstly, that the accused
person is subject to a requirement to provide 
information under the Section and, secondly, that 
the accused person failed to comply with such a 
requirement. This failure to comply may be 
regarded as a contravention of a requirement (4).
It is submitted then that the offence is one of 
strict responsibility and that once the prosecution 
have made out the two elements mentioned then no 
enquiry need be made into, or evidence adduced 
allowing an inference to be drawn as to, the state 
of mind of the accused person at the relevant 
time. The sub-section, however, itself provides 
a statutory defence that the accused person may 
avail himself of: he may be able to show that he 
failed to comply with the requirement made because 
there was a reasonable excuse. The onus of proof 
of this reasonable excuse is explicitly placed on 
the accused and this onus may be displaced on a 
balance of probabilities (5).
2.107 The second offence is contained in Sub-section (4): 
"A person commits an offence if in purported 
compliance with a requirement imposed under 
this section he gives any information which 
he knows to be false in a material particular 
or recklessly gives any information which is 
so false."
(4) See Section 37(1)
(5) R V Carr - Briant |^ 1943^  KB607
j oy
It has to be said that the offence in this sub­
section arises only if there is an obligation to 
give information imposed by this section. The 
essence, it is submitted, of this offence is that 
information given is "false in a material 
particular" and such information may be false not 
only on account of what it states but also on 
account of what it omits or implies (6). The 
falsity must be in a "material particular" and 
a particular may be material if it renders more 
credible something else (7). Unlike the other 
offences in this section, sub-section (4) would not 
sufficiently be made out by the prosecution 
simply by proving that the information given was 
false in a material particular. In addition to 
the actus reus there is clearly stated in the 
sub-section to be a mens rea ; the accused person 
must have been shown to know of the falsity in a 
material particular and here "know" means actual 
knowledge. The sub-section also provides that it 
is an offence to give recklessly any information 
and this connotes that the information is given 
without caring whether it is true or false (8).
A person may act recklessly without having a 
dishonest motive (9). It is certain, then, that
(6) R V Lord Kylsant j^ l932^  1KB42.2 and R v 
Bishir.igian ^936| IAIIER586
(7) R V Tyson (1967) LR CCR107
(8) Williams Brothers Direct Supply Stores v 
Cloote (1944) 60TLR270
(9) R V Bates p952^ 2AIIER 842 approved R v 
Russell fl953] IWLR77
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the information must be false, but the accused 
considering the recklessness, need not know in 
every case that it is false. If he suspects or 
believes or has reason to believe it is false, he 
will be guilty but nor need he intend to deceive (10)
2.108 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 
4 of the 197 1 Act for each offence is:
Section 17(3) Summary only £200 (11)
Section 17(4) Summary 6 months or £400, or both
Indictment 2 years or a fine, or both.
Section 18: Miscellaneous offences.
2.109 The 1971 Act provides by Section 18 for several 
miscellaneous offences and these are derived in 
general terms from Section 13 of the 1965 Act.
The Section consists of four separate offences in 
relation to regulations made under the 1971 Act 
and also in relation to licence conditions and 
false statements and information given for the 
purposes of the Act or regulations. The statutory 
defence contained in Section 28 of the 1971 Act 
does not extend to these offences.
(10) Def^y V  Peek (1889) 14 App Cas j’l886-9o']
AIIERI and Shawinigan v Voskins & Co.Ltd.
[l96i] 3AIIER 396; ^96l| IWLR1206
(11) increased by 1977 Act Schedule 6 and 1975 
Act Schedule 7C
2.110 The 1971 Act provides by Section 10 that:
"(1) subject to the provisions of this Act, 
the Secretary of State may by regulations 
make such provisions as appears to him 
necessary or expedient for preventing the 
misuse of controlled drugs."
This wide enabling sub-section is followed but 
not restricted by particular circumstances in 
which regulations may be made: for example:
"(2)(a) - for requiring precautions to be 
taken for the safe custody of controlled 
drugs". )
This sub-section includes a total of nine examples 
of where the Secretary of State may make regulations.
2.111 The 1971 Act provides by Section 3 that the
prohibition on the importation and exportation 
of a controlled drug in terms of Section 3(1)(a) 
and (b) does not apply:
"(b) to the importation or exportation of a
controlled drug under and in accordance with 
the terms of the licence issued by the 
Secretary of State and in compliance with any 
conditions attached thereto".
2.112 It is now proposed to deal with each of the offences 
in turn and separately. The reason is to seek the 
conditions of liability for each offence and to 
consider how, if at all, they differ.
2.113 Section 18(1). The regulations made by the
Secretary of State in terms of Section 10 are 
The Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1973 (1) and The 
Misuse of Drugs (Safe Custody) Regulations 1973 
(2) and The Misuse of Drugs (Notification of and 
Supply to Addicts) Regulations 1973 (3). This 
sub-section provides that:
"It is an offence for a person to contravene 
any regulations made under this Act other than 
regulations made in pursuance of Section 
10(2)(h) and (i)".
It is therefore an offence to contravene any of 
the regulations contained in The Misuse of Drugs 
Regulations 1973 or The Misuse of Drugs (Safe 
Custody) Regulations 1973 for they were made in 
pursuance of this section but are not excepted 
as provided for. It is not however an offence in 
terms of Section 18(1) to contravene The Misuse of 
Drugs (Notification of and Supply to Addicts) 
Regulations 1973 because that is specifically 
made in pursuance of Section 10(2)(h) and (i)
and is therefore excepted (4).
(1) SI 1973 No. 797
(2) SI 1973 No. 798 (made in pursuance of Section
10(2)(a).)
(3) SI 1973 No, 799 (made in pursuance of Section 
10(2)(h) and (i).)
(4) but see Section 13
2.114 The offence in this sub-section is made out by
the Crown when it is shown that the accused has
contravened a regulation: contravention in 
terms of Section 37(1) includes failure to 
comply with and, it is submitted, that the 
offence is one of strict responsibility.
2.115 Section 18(2). The offence in this sub-section 
is made out by the Crown when it is shown by them 
that the accused has contravened a condition or 
other term of a licence issued by the Secretary 
of State for the importation of controlled drugs
or a licence or other authority issued under
regulations made under this Act. The licence or 
other authority should not be made in pursuance 
of Section 10(2)(i). It is submitted that this 
offence is also one of strict responsibility.
2.116 Section 18(3).
"A person commits an offence if, in 
purported compliance with any obligation 
to give information to which he is subject 
under or by virtue of regulations made under 
this Act, he gives any information which he 
knows to be false in any material particular 
or recklessly gives any information which is 
so false."
It has to be said that the offence in this sub­
section arises only if there is an obligation to 
give information imposed by any regulation made 
under the 1971 Act. This refers inter alia to
obligations imposed on every person authorised 
by or under the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1973 
supra regs. 5 to 8 to supply any drug listed in 
Schedules 2 to 4 to the regulations, each of whom 
 ^ is required to keep a register of those drugs 
contained, supplied and possessed by him, in 
accordance with reg. 19. Every such person must 
furnish particulars of such drugs obtained, 
supplied and possessed by him, when required by 
the Secretary of State to do so, in accordance with 
reg. 20(f). The actus reus of the offence then 
appears to be to give any information which is 
false in any material particular. The information 
given may be "false in a material particular" not 
only on account of what it states but also on 
account of what it omits or implies (5). The 
falsity must be in a "material particular" and 
a particular may be material if it renders more 
credibléL something else (6).
2.117 Section 28 of the 1971 Act does not apply to the 
offences under Section 18. The mens rea of the 
offence in Section 18(3) is indicated clearly by 
the word "knows" which here means actual knowledge. 
Further, "recklessly" connotes that the information 
is given without caring whether it is true or 
false (7). A person may act recklessly without
(5) R V Lord Kylsant ^193^ 1KB422; R v Bishirgian
j^ l936j 1AIIER586
(6) R V Tyson (1967) Lr GCR 107
(7) Williams Bros. Direct Supply Stores v Cloote 
(1944) 60 TLR 270
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having a dishonest motive (8), It is certain 
then that the information must be false, but the 
accused need not know it is false. If he suspects 
or believes or has reason to believe it is false 
then he will be guilty; nor need he intend to 
deceive (9).
2.118 Section 18(4)
"A person commits an offence if, for the 
purpose of obtaining, whether for himself 
or another, the issue or renewal of a licence 
or other authority under this Act or under 
any regulations made under this Act he -
(a) makes any statement or gives any information 
which he knows to be false in a material 
particular, or recklessly gives any 
information which is so false, or
(b) produces or otherwise makes use of any 
book, record or other document which to 
his knowledge contains any statement or 
information which he knows to be false 
in a material particular."
Various oÇ the constituent phrases in this sub­
section have been discussed in relation to the 
other sub-sections of Section 18 so that this 
portion is accordingly limited. But, it has to be 
said that both offences under this sub-section arise
(8) R V Bates |195:^ 2AIIER 842 approved in R v 
Russell [l953] IWLR 77
(9) Dey^ v^ y v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas. |^I886-9oJ 
AIIERI and Shawingian v Voskins & Co.Ltd.
[l96l] 3AIIER 396; [1961] IWLR 1206
only if the false information is given to obtain 
the issue or renewal of a licence or other 
authority. The actus reus of the offence in Section 
18(4)(a) is the making of a statement or the 
giving of information for such a purpose. The 
actus reus of the offence in Section 18(4)(b) 
is the producing or otherwise making use of any 
book, record or document for such a purpose.
2.119 The mens rea of the offence in Section 18(4)(a) 
is indicated clearly by the word "knows" which 
here means actual knowledge and was discussed 
above (10). The burden on the Crown is to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew of 
the falsity in a material particular or acted 
recklessly with regard to this fact. The mens 
rea of the offence in Section 18(4)(b) is indicated 
clearly by the words "to his knowledge". The 
burden on the Crown in this offence is to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that 
the document is false in a material particular.
It is submitted that the variation in wording - 
"know" in Section 18(4)(a) and "to his knowledge" 
in Section 18(4)(b) - requires the more restricted 
meaning of knowledge in the latter offence whereas 
knowledge or recklessness or wilfulness is 
acceptable in the former (11).
(10) see para 3.117 supra
(11) see Roper v Taylor's Central Garage etc.
1^ 1951] 2 TLR 284 at p288
2.120 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 
4 for all of the offences is
(a) Summary 6 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 2 years or a fine, or both.
Section 19; Attempts etc. to commit offences.
2.121 The 1971 Act provides by Section 19 that -
"It is an offence for a person to attempt to 
commit an offence under any other provision 
of this Act or to incite or attempt to incite 
another to commit such an offence."
This follows the provision of Section 18 of the 
1965 Act:
"If a person attempts to commit an offence 
against this Act, or solicits or incites
another person to commit such an offence, he
shall, without prejudice to any other liability, 
be liable on summary conviction to the same 
punishment and forfeiture as if he had committed 
an offence against this Act."
It has to be said from the outset that the offence 
contained in Section 19 of the 1971 Act has no 
operation with regard to the misuse of controlled 
drugs. The commentary that follows is a summary 
of the law in Scotland and in England as it applies
to the two offences in the section which are
attempts to commit offences under the Act and 
incitement to commit those offences. The Act also
contains provisions relenting to the prosecution 
and punishment of contraventions of Section 19 in 
Section 25.
"(3) An offence under Section 19 of this Act 
shall be punishable on summary conviction, 
on Indictment or in either way according to 
whether under Schedule 4 to this Act, the 
substantive offence is punishable on summary 
conviction, on Indictment or either way; and
the punishment which may be imposed on a
person convicted of an offence under that 
section are the same as those which, under 
that Schedule may be imposed on a person 
convicted of theSüIdSVûaVw/C, offence. In this 
section "the substantive offence" means the 
offence under this Act to which the attempt 
or, as the case may be, the InCtb&ment or 
attempted Incitement mentioned in Section 19 
was directed."
The effect of this sub-section is essentially to 
make the punishment for an attempt at an offence
in the Act the same as the actual offence
attempted. In punishing an accused person for 
attempting such an offence the law is punishing 
that person for something they did not do. The 
justification of this is that a person who intends 
to do an illegal act and does not succeed is just 
as wicked as a person who does succeed. Also, as
— I y 3 —
one learned commentator has put it (1):
"it is only common sense to lock the stable 
door once the horse has shown signs of intending 
to get out, and foolish to wait until it has 
gone."
2.122 Scots Law. Sections 63(1) and 312(o) of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 provide 
that any attempt to commit an offence shall itself 
be an offence, and as these sections are general 
in their terms they should apply to statutory 
offences as well as common law. It would seem to 
follow from this that a statutory provision in an 
Act that does not make a specific reference to an 
attempt being an offence is nevertheless covered 
by the terms of the 1975 Act. Section 19 provided 
for attempts and incitements. Conspiracy is an 
inchoate crime in that it does not require the 
putting into effect of any criminal purpose, it is
crm'-t
itself a substantive|and consequent on this it is 
a crime to attempt to form a conspiracy. This 
attempt to form a conspiracy is known as incitement. 
As soon as an individual invites another to join 
in the commission of a crime the first person has 
incited another and if the second person accepts 
the invitation and an agreement to commit a crime 
has been reached then both people will be 
conspiring. The difference between attempted crimes
(I) Gordon p 164
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and completed crimes is that in the former the actus 
reus of the crime attempted is not in fact brought 
into being, although other crimes may be fully 
committed in the course of the attempt. This overt 
act is evidence of intention and is required to 
constitute the attempt. The actus reus of an 
incitement to commit an offence is an invitation, 
or rather evidence of such an invitation. Further, 
in Scots law, the mens rea for an attempted crime 
is the same as that for the completed crime. (2)
2.123 English Law. At common law it is itself an offence 
to attempt to commit a statutory offence or to 
conspire to commit or to incite the commission of 
that statutory offence. These inchoate offences 
at common law may also be twice removed from the 
ultimate statutory offence as in the case of an 
incitement to conspire or an attempt to conspire 
to commit the statutory offence. Indeed in R v 
Chelmsford Justices Exp. J J Amos (3) the accused 
applied for an order of certiorari to quash a 
conviction of "attempting to incite" another to 
supply him with a controlled drug contrary to 
Section 18 of the 1965 Act. It was held, dismissing 
the application, that an "attempt to incite" was 
not an offence under Section 18 of the 1965 Act but 
since an attempt to incite to supply cannabis was an 
offence at common law all that was wrong was that
(2) Cawthorne v H M Advocate 1968 JC 32 per the 
Lord Justice General at p36
(3) [1973J Crim.LR 437
the incorrect label, namely the words "contrary 
to Section 18 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965", 
had been attached to the charge, that the name of 
the offence had never been in doubt and that the 
accused had not been prejudiced by the incorrect 
label. If this charge had been brought within 
the offence in Section 19 of the 1971 Act the matter 
would then have been correctly charged rather than 
at common law.
2.124 The requisites of a criminal attempt in English law 
are an intention to commit an indictable offence and 
the attempt normally requires an intention to commit 
the crime in question. Also, the requisite is that 
there is an overt act that the accused thinks 
furthers the intent and that is sufficiently 
proximate to the crime intended. That essentially 
means that the act must not be mere "preparation" 
although it must be said that the dividing line 
between "preparation" and attempt is a difficult 
one to draw. The requirement of intention results 
in part from the ordinary meaning of the word 
"attempt", and it was held by the Court of Appeal in 
R V Mohan (4) that attempt requires intention in 
the true sense, and mere knowledge of the probability 
or high probability or likelihood of the consequences 
is not sufficient. In English law one can attempt an 
offence of strict liability if it is indictable but
(4) [l97^ QBl
the attempt requires mens rea even though the 
offence attempted does not (5). The common law 
offence of incitement is committed when one person 
"counsels, procures or commands" another to commit 
a crime, whether or not the other actually commits 
it. The mental requirement of incitement is (6): 
"probably an intention to bring about the 
crime or (presumably) recklessness as to a 
circumstance included in the definition of 
the crime."
The authority for the mens rea of attempt is R v 
Whybron (7) where it was held that in every case 
of attempt there must be intention as regards all 
the material elements of the offence. Thus, it 
would seem to be accepted that a crime like murder 
which may be committed unintentionally cannot be 
committed unintentionally.
2.125" The 1971 Act does have no further peculiarity in 
relation to attempted crimes. In relation to the 
offence of attempted unlawful possession of a 
controlled drug the 1971 Act provides a specific 
defence in Section 5(4). The defence operates 
in this way: if the accused is proved to have 
attempted to get unlawful possession of a 
controlled drug he or she has a defence if he or 
she proves that either knowing or suspecting it to
(5) see Gardner v Akeroyd [1952] 2QB743
(6) Williams p385 although the author cites no 
authorities on the point
(7) (1951) 35 Cr.App.R 141
be a controlled drug, he or she attempted to take 
possession of it for the purpose of delivering it 
into the custody of a person lawfully entitled 
to it. This defence is without prejudice to any 
other defence which it is open to an accused to 
raise (8). The accused must prove the defence on 
a balance of probabilities (9).
Section 20; Assisting in or inducing commissions 
outside United Kingdom of offences punishable 
under a corresponding law.
2.126 The 1971 Act provides by Section 20:
"A person commits an offence if in the 
United Kingdom he assists in or induces the 
commission in any place outside the United 
Kingdom of an offence punishable under the 
provisions of a corresponding law in force 
in that place."
This offence contains provisions similar to those 
formerly provided by the 1965 Act by Section 13(2) 
"A person -
(d) who in the United Kingdom aids, abets, 
counsels or procures the commission in a 
place outside the United Kingdom of an 
offence punishable under the provisions 
of a corresponding law in force in that 
place, or does an act preparatory to, or
(8) Section 5(6)
(9) R V  Carr - Briant 94!^ KB607
in furtherance of, an act which if 
committed in the United Kingdom would 
constitute an offence against this Act; 
shall be guilty of an offence against this Act." 
It has to be said that the 'United Kingdom' means 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1): the matter is 
of some importance for generally criminal law is 
administered in jurisdictions determined by 
geographical boundaries and more generally those 
boundaries coincide with individual States. This 
is the principle the territoriality under 
international law. There would seem however to 
be a principle of international law which concedes 
in certain circumstances the extra-territorial 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by States (2).
In the case of The Lotus (3) the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (the predecessor of the 
present International Court of Justice) it was 
held that (4)
(1) Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act 1927 
Section 2(2)
(2) see J K Bentil "Extra-Territorial Application 
of the Misuse of Drug Legislation" 142 JPN 130 
and, generally, Law Comm. Report No.91 on 
territorial and extra territorial extent of 
criminal law in England and Wales
(3) (1927) PCIJ Ser.A. No.10
(4) ibid at p20
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"Though it is true that in all systems of 
law the principle of the territorial character 
of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally 
true that all or nearly all these systems of 
law extend their action to offences committed 
outside the territory of the State which 
adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary 
from State to State. The territoriality of 
criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute 
principle of international law and by no means 
coincides with territorial sovereignty,"
Indeed it might be said that this provision is 
necessary for many criminal activities now involve 
certain aspects of an international nature: it is 
trite that the illicit traffic of drugs on a 
large scale implies inter-State movement with 
assistance in one form or another in different 
States. The essence then of the offence contained 
in Section 20 is assisting or inducing in the 
United Kingdom an offence outwith the United Kingdom. 
Section 20 includes the phrase "assists in or 
induces" whereas Section 13(d) includes the term 
"aids, abets, counsels or procures". The latter 
is essentially art and part guilt in Scotland (5) 
and accessories in England (6) and it is submitted 
that the former phrase has the same meaning. But 
Section 20 contains only one offence rather than
(5) see Gordon pl35
(6) see Williams p287
two since "assists in or induces" describes one 
particular type of activity (aiding and abetting) 
which can occur in one of two ways (7). The 
difference between the two sections is noticeable 
in so far as the offence in the 1965 Act includes 
alternatives of doing "an act preparatory to, or 
in furtherance of" and those wider phrases, it is 
submitted, introduce an element of uncertainty.
These matters, and others, were considered in R v 
Vickers (8) in which the accused in 1973 had 
agreed, while in England and elsewhere, with another 
man that the accused would acquire a truck, would 
collect a number of speaker cabinets in London 
and transport them to Italy knowing that thereafter 
cannabis from a source unknown to the accused 
would be filled into the cabinets and shipped by 
other persons to the United States in contravention 
of the United States Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act 1970. Following 
conviction the accused appealed (9) on the ground 
that the Crown were required to prove assisting 
in illegal importation by showing acts directly 
concerned with the actual importation, e.g. 
preparing a bill of lading or loading the cannabis 
into a plane bound for New York. In short counsel
(7) Ware v Fox |J96^ 1WLR379 and Mallon v Allan 
Q964] 1QB385
(8) Q97fj 2AIIER945; (l97^ Crim.LR337
(9) The appeal also concerned a procedural point 
in relation to conviction
for the accused sought to say that, borrowing 
from the vocabulary of the law relating to attempts, 
the act must be more proximate to the illegal 
importation than was the case on the facts. In 
dismissing the appeal, Scarman LJ (as he then was) 
said ( 10);
"as a matter of everyday speech it could be 
said that what the appellant agreed to do 
was to assist in the commission of the offence 
under American law of illegally importing a 
prohibited drug into the United States of 
America." 
and later (11);
"In our view Parliament chose the plain English 
phrase "assists in the commission of" so as to 
leave the jury the opportunity of exercising 
a common sense judgment on the facts of a 
particular case."
Their Lordships applied Cozens v Rrutus (12), the 
authority for the principle that the meaning of 
plain English words is a question of fact, not. 
law, and rejected counsel’s submissions for a 
meaning that would be far narrower.
2.127 But counsel had supported his submission with two 
further arguments. Firstly, that, on the true 
construction of the Act as a whole, the offence of
( 10) ibid at p950
(11)ibid at p950
(12) [1972] 2AIIER 1297 per Lord Reid at pl299 and 
£1973] AC854 at p861
assisting in the commission of a foreign offence 
under a corresponding law is one of strict 
liability; the words creating the offence must, 
therefore, be construed narrowly. Their Lordships 
rejected this argument too, on the basis that they 
could find nothing in the provisions of the Act 
that compelled them to construe the offence under 
Section 20 of assisting as being one of strict 
liability (13):
"In ordinary English one who assists knows 
what he is doing and the purpose with which 
it is done."
Secondly, that there is a significant difference 
between Section 20 of the 1971 Act under which the 
accused was charged and the earlier offence under 
Section 13(d) of the 1965 Act and this related to 
the omission in Section 20 of the phrase "an act 
preparatory to, or in furtherance of" to be found 
in Section 13(d). Counsel conceded that his client 
would have fallen, on the facts of the case, within 
the Section 13(d) offence but his client could not 
have been brought within the more limited class of 
offence in Section 20. Counsel cited as authority 
R V Johnston (14) in which Orr LJ giving judgment 
commented that the legislature in 1971 must be taken 
to have deliberately omitted the words of the 1965
(13) R V Vickers ibid at p951
(14) unreported 22nd March 1974. Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division)
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Act which created the offence that are not to 
be found in the 1971 Act, Their Lordships accepted 
this dictum (15):
"We have no doubt that the omission was 
deliberate".
but they said that it did not follow that they were 
to place on the language of Section 20 a narrow 
construction which was, in their view, inconsistent 
with the meaning of the plain English words used by 
the Section (16). The second argument was rejected, 
as was the appeal.
2.128 The same court was given an opportunity to consider 
its views on Section 20 in R v Evans (17) when the 
accused appealed against conviction for assisting 
in the United Kingdom in the commission in Canada 
of an offence punishable under the provision of a 
corresponding law in Canada providing for the 
control and regulation in Canada of the import of 
drugs. The essential facts were that the accused 
had been approached in the United Kingdom and asked 
if he would be interested in carrying drugs from 
Europe to Canada and he agreed to do this. He was 
told to fly to Brussels which he did and was met 
there and given a suitcase and holdall in which he 
was shown where cannabis was hidden. He took the 
luggage to Montreal where he handed it to a man.
(15) R V Vickers ibid at p951
(16) see Cross at p43 and Unwin v Hansom [lB9lJ 
2QB115 per Lord Esher at pi 19
(17) (1976) 64 Cr.App.R 237 CA; [l977] Crim.LR223
Following conviction, the accused appealed inter 
alia on the ground that there was no evidence of 
actings by him in the United Kingdom that were 
capable of amounting to "assisting" in the commission 
of the offence. It was argued that his agreement 
to fly to Brussels to pick up the cannabis and 
his travelling to Heathrow Airport to do so were 
at the highest merely acts preparatory to assisting 
in the commission of the relevant foreign offence. 
Again, the court's attention was drawn to the 
distinction between the language of Section 20 of 
the 1971 Act and Section 13(2) of the 1965 Act.
In dismissing the appeal the court held that there 
was sufficient evidence of "assistance" to go to 
the jury to show that what was done was to make 
arrangements to provide for a human carrier of 
the prohibited drugs in that, having made his 
agreement with another, the accused went to 
Heathrow Airport and there picked up the ticket 
provided for him and flew to Brussels knowing 
that the purpose of his journey was the 
transportation of cannabis from Brussels to 
Montreal. Further R v Vickers supra was authority 
that the question as to whether the facts of a 
particular case show that an accused person had 
assisted in the United Kingdom in the commission 
of an offence punishable under the corresponding
law in any place outside the United Kingdom is 
a question of fact for the jury and that in the 
instant case the jury had decided the matter using 
their common-sense judgment.
2.129 It is submitted then that the combined effect of 
those two decisions is that any agreement in the 
United Kingdom to do acts abroad will amount to a 
conspiracy to commit the offence since it appears 
that going abroad is an act of assistance. Further, 
the concept of "assistance” now is so flexible in 
its interpretation as to bring under its general 
scope, all kinds of activities which may tend to 
have the effect of helping or facilitating the 
illegal production or trafficking in drugs across 
national frontiers. And it follows from this that 
any direct or indirect way in which activities of 
that kind are rendered possible or more possible
or easier would fall within the terms of Section 
20 of the 1971 Act. Counsel in the two reported 
cases may have argued for a narrow interpretation 
of Section 20 but in fact the actus reus of the 
offence is now very wide.
2.130 Section 20 contains the term "corresponding law" 
and this is defined in Section 36 of the 1917 Act 
as meaning;
"a law stated in a certificate purporting to 
be issued by or on behalf of the government 
of a country outside the United Kingdom to be
-  Z i Z  -
a law provided for the control and regulation 
in that country of the production, supply, use, 
export and import of drugs and other substances 
in accordance with the provisions of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed at New York 
on 30th March 1961 or a law providing for the 
control and regulation in that country of the 
production, supply, use, export and import of 
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs in 
pursuance of any treaty, convention or other 
agreement to which the government of that 
country and Her Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom are for the time being parties."
It would seem that a certificate containing such a 
statement of the law is conclusive proof that a law 
is a "corresponding law". This is a matter that 
concerned Lord Foot in the Third Reading in the 
Lords (18) as he believed that what the law was is 
essentially a matter for the judiciary and the 
accused would have great difficulty in refuting 
the contents of such a certificate. The Government 
had suggested that the accused would not be 
disadvantaged as the Crown still had to prove their 
case beyond reasonable doubt. Lord Foot suggested 
further that as a certificate would be prima facie 
evidence of its contents the prosecution would not 
need to call supporting witnesses, leaving the accused
(18) HL Vo 316 col. 1007: 25th March 1971
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to disprove the contents and thereby shift the 
burden of proof. Lord Wilberforce thought that 
Lord Foot attributed more significance to the 
certificate than it would have in practive. 
Nevertheless, the noble Lord pressed his Amendment 
and on a Division the Not-Contents had it and, 
accordingly, the Amendment was disagreed.
2.131 In practice the certificate containing such a 
statement does so in relation to either the law 
of a foreign country which provides for control 
of the production and other activities in that 
country of drugs in accordance with the Single 
Convention of 1961 or the law of a foreign country 
which provide for control in that country of 
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs in pursuance 
of any treaty to which the governments of both 
that country and of the United Kingdom are parties. 
In neither of the two reported cases is there any 
mention of objection having been taken to such 
certificates as were tendered there and the system 
would appear to work tolerably well.
2.132 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 
4 are -
(a) Summary 12 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 14 years or a fine, or both.
Section 23: Powers to search and obtain evidence.
2.133 The 1971 Act provides by Section 23 for powers to 
search and obtain evidence and, in particular, that:
"(1) A constable or other person authorised in 
that behalf - shall, for the purposes of the 
execution of this Act, have power to enter 
the premises of a person carrying on business 
as a producer or supplier of any controlled 
drugs and to demand the production of any 
controlled drugs and to demand the production 
of, and to inspect, any books or documents 
relating to dealings in any such drugs and 
to inspect any stocks of any such drugs."
In terms of Sub-section (2) if a constable has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that any person is 
in possession of a controlled drug in contravention 
of the 1971 Act or of any regulation made under 
that Act the constable may exercise certain powers 
to search that person and detain that person for 
the purpose of searching him and there are further 
powers in relation to searching, seizing and 
detaining evidence and vehicles. In terms of Sub­
section (3) certain warrants may be granted.
2.134 In terms of Subsection (4) -
"A person commits an offence if he -
(a) intentionally obstructs a person in the 
exercise of his powers under this 
Section; or
(b) conceals from a person acting in the 
exercise of his powers under Sub-section 
(1) above any such books, documents, 
stocks or drugs as are mentioned in that 
Sub-section; or
(c) without reasonable excuse (proof of 
which shall lie on him) fails to produce 
any such books or documents as are so 
mentioned where their production is 
demanded by a person in the exercise
of his powers under that Sub-section."
2.135 Intentional obstruction. There are four powers
which may be exercised and which may be intentionally 
obsctructed:
(a) without warrant, to search business premises 
for information and evidence: Section 23(1).
(pCrV
(b) without warrant, to searchy^uspected unlawful 
possession for controlled drugs: Section 23(2).
(c) with warrant, to search premises for drugs: 
Section 23(3)(a).
(d) with warrant, to search premises for documents: 
Section 23(3)(b).
This offence of obstructing is wider than other 
similar offences of obstructing police officers in 
the execution of their duty (1) in that it extends 
to "other persons authorised". Further, whereas the
(1) Police Act 1964 Section 51(3) and Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967 Section 44( 1 )(a)
offence in the Scots Act of 1967 applies to a 
constable acting in the execution of his duty, 
the offence of obstructing in the 197 1 Act applies 
where a constable or an authorised person is acting 
under the Sub-sections. Thus, to be guilty of this 
offence the obstructor must be aware that the 
person obstructed is exercising one of the four 
powers outlined above. This was the point at issue 
in Farrow v Tincliffe (2) where the accused and a 
girl friend were stopped by two police constables 
on suspicion that the accused had been selling 
cannabis oil and that the girl was carrying 
cigarette papers for use in smoking cannabis. The 
police constable carried out a superficial search 
but, wishing to search them thoroughly, asked the 
accused and the girl friend to go in the police car 
to the police station. On the way the accused 
threw or pretended to throw something out of the car 
window and told the girl to get out and run. The 
accused was charged with two counts of intentionally 
obstructing a person in the exercise of his powers 
under Section 23(2)(a) of the 1971 Act contrary to 
Section 23(4)(a) of the same Act. The accused 
argued that the police constables were not acting 
in the exercise of their power under Section 23(2)(a) 
because the section did not give the police power 
to take a person to search him but this was rejected
(2) 1^1976^ Crim.LR126
by the juries who convicted him. The accused 
appealed by case stated to the Divisional Court 
and it was held, dismissing the appeal, that 
Section 23(2)(a) of the 1971 Act which gave the 
police the right to search and detain a suspect 
for the purpose of searching him, was clearly 
intended to operate parallel to Section 24 which 
gave the police the right of arrest on suspicion 
of certain offences, so that the accused’s 
submission that the police constables ought to have 
arrested him before taking him away, failed. 
Further, if a male police constable wished a female 
suspect to be searched it was obviously right that 
he could take the suspect to a police station to 
be searched by a female police constable. The 
police constables were acting within the scope ' 
of their powers under Section 23(2)(a) and the 
accused’s convictions were upheld. But it has to 
be said that in Scotland obstruction means 
obstruction involving physical force and does not 
extend, for example, to giving false information 
to the police: Curiett v McKechnie (3) whereas in 
England and Wales obstruction includes doing 
anything which makes it more difficult to exercise 
police powers and this need not involve physical 
violence: Hinchcliffe v Sheldon (4).
(3) 1938 JC 176; see Gordon p819
(4) 1^195:^ 3AIIER406
2.136 Concealing etc. It is an offence to conceal 
books, documents, stocks or drugs from a person 
authorised to inspect such items under Section 
23(1); Section 23(4)(b). This particular offence 
arises from a positive act on the part of an 
individual, namely deliberately hiding the required 
item. But, it may be sufficient for an offence
to be made out by making false statements about 
the whereabouts of the relevant articles:
Police V Boyd (5) .
2.137 Failing to produce. It is an offence to fail to 
produce books or documents when their production 
is demanded by a person authorised to do so:
Section 23(4)(c). This section confers a right 
on a person to demand production and a duty on 
another person to comply with that demand. This 
offence - unlike that under Section 23(4)(b) - 
relates solely to books or documents and makes no 
reference to stocks or drugs. The failure or 
omission to produce which forms the basis of this 
offence must be without reasonable excuse. It is 
a matter for the accused to show on balance of 
probabilities that he has a reasonable excuse for 
his failure: R v Carr - Briant (6).
(5) 1^ 1969] NZLR 522
(6) ^1943] 1KB607; 1943 2AIIER156
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2,138 The punishment in terms of Section 25 and Schedule 
4 is -
(a) Summary 6 months or £400, or both
(b) Indictment 2 years or a fine, or both.
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Chapter 3 THE DEFENCES
3.01 Statutory defences. The first defence that an
accused person may put forward arises out of the 
nature of the offences. In general terms the 
1971 Act provided that certain activities are 
unlawful, and it provides further that doing that 
activity is an offence. It is further provided, 
in general terms, in relation to certain of these 
offences that the Secretary of State is empowered 
to make regulations which would permit these 
activities to be done when they would otherwise 
be illegal and would constitute an offence. For 
example, the Act provides by Section 6:
"(1) Subject to any regulations under Section 
7 of this Act for the time being in force, 
it shall not be lawful for a person to 
cultivate any plant of the genus Cannabis."
It may betj therefore, that in certain circumstances 
a person is charged with an offence against the 
1971 Act when in fact that person was at the 
relevant time duly authorised. If that is so then 
it would be a good defence in law and the accused 
would be entitled, if the defence is made out, to 
an acquittal. But, the question arises concerning 
the burden of proof on the prosecution: are they
required to show beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused person was not so authorised in his
—  —
activities? Must the prosecution negate the 
possibility of lawful authority? The answer, it 
is submitted, lies in R v Ewens (1) where the accused 
was charged with being in unauthorised possession 
of a scheduled substance contrary to Section 1(1) 
of the 1964 Act. In giving evidence the accused 
admitted possessing the particular tablets but said 
that as he had suffered from mental depression he 
had been given various tablets over a number of years 
and some of these he had kept. As for the tablets 
in the charge, he said that he had got them on 
prescription from a doctor but he could not remember 
whom or when. The accused was convicted but 
appealed, the question being whether the chairman 
correctly directed the jury on the burden of proof 
in relation to the charge. The chairman had told 
the jury that where the accused had adduced 
evidence on his own behalf, as he had done here, 
then if that evidence was accepted by the jury as 
true or reasonably near the truth then that created 
a doubt sufficient to acquit. The contention at 
appeal by the accused being that the chairman ought 
to have told the jury that they should not convict 
unless the Crown had satisfied them so that they 
felt sure that these drugs were not in possession 
of the accused in pursuance of the prescription of 
a qualified medical practitioner. In disposing of
(1) fl96^ 2AIIER 470
the matter Me 1ford Stevenson J said (2):
"It is tolerably plain that there must be 
many statutory prohibitions which would become 
incapable of enforcement if the prosecution had 
to embark on inquiries necessary to exclude 
the possibility of a defendant falling within 
a class of persons excepted by the Section 
when the defendant himself knows perfectly 
well whether he -Çalls within that class and has, 
or should have readily available to him, the 
means by which he could establish whether or 
not he is within the excepted class,"
And in giving judgment his Lordship referred (3) to 
R V Scott (4) in which a similar question arose 
under an order, made by virtue of the 1920 Act, 
which provided that no person should supply any 
of the specified drugs unless he was licensed by 
the Secretary of State to supply the drug. The 
point was taken at the close of the case for the 
prosecution that there was no evidence that the 
accused was an unauthorised person. Swift J held 
that, if the accused were licensed, it was a fact 
which was peculiarly within his knowledge and there 
was no hardship on him to prove it. He said (5) that
(2) ibid at p473
(3) ibid at p474
(4) (1921) 86 JP 69
(5) ibid at p70
— Z Z  J  —
"it might be very difficult or impossible 
for the prosecution satisfactorily to prove 
that he did not possess any one or other of 
the qualifications which might entitle him to 
deal with the drug, but the defendant could 
prove without the least difficulty that he had 
authority to do it."
This dictum was cited and accepted in R v Oliver
(6), not a drugs case, and that case was in turn 
applied in R v Ewens supra. In these circumstances 
it is submitted that the principle is equally 
applicable to the terms of the 1971 Act with the 
accused proving his case on balance of 
probabilities (7).
3.02 The second defence arised from Section 28 of the 
1971 Act which is a statutory defence and a type 
of defence increasingly used by the legislature 
to mitigate the harshness of statutory offences 
imposing strict liability (8). Although statutory 
defences vary in degrees of complication generally 
they impose on the accused the burden of proving 
that he has no mens rea and was not negligent. The 
effect is that once the prosecution have established 
a case the accused must show that he acted 
innocently. These provisions may have some advantage 
but many commentators see the defences as a deviation
(6) [1943] 2AIIER 800
(7) R V  Carr - Briant ^943] 1KB607; |j943] 2AIIER 
156
(8) further on this point see Smith & Hogan p98
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from the fundamental principle that the prosecution 
must prove the whole of their case in that where 
the prosecution have proved that the accused has 
committed the actus reus of a particular offence
then it is for the accused to prove that he
committed that actus reus innocently (9).
3.03 Section 28 contains a defence of proof of lack
of knowledge which applies to the offences in
Section 4(2) and (3), Section 5(2) and (3),
Section 6(2) and Section 9 of the 1971 Act. In
fact the section contains two different defences
and these will be considered separately even 
though the first will be seen to be subject to 
the second.
3.04 Section 28(2)
"Subject to sub-section (3) below, in any 
proceedings for an offence to which this 
section applies it shall be a defence for 
the accused to prove that he neither knew of 
nor suspected nor had reason to suspect the 
existence of some fact alleged by the 
prosecution which it is necessary for the 
prosecution to prove if he is to be 
convicted of the offence charged."
In discussing this matter it is submitted that 
there are two headings under which the defence
(9) this defence followed on suggestions in 
Warner j^ l9 6 ^  2AG256 and Sweet v Parsley 
jj970] AGI32
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has to be considered, that of the burden of 
proof on the accused and that of the substance 
of the defence. Burden of proof. In R v Colyer
(10) it was held that for a prosecution to succeed 
under Section 5(2) of the 1971 Act the prosecution 
had to prove not only that the accused had control 
of the substance charged but also that he knew he 
had it (11). The burden of these rested on the 
prosecution. Once these matters were proved it 
was then open to the accused to try to establish
a defence under Section 28, for instance, that 
while he knew he had the substance he was mistaken 
as to its nature. Under that section the burden 
of proof is on the accused and the section does 
not reduce the matters the prosecution had to 
prove before the Act, and still have to prove, 
nor alter the burden of proof in respect of them. 
It merely provides fresh defences not hitherto 
available. This was confirmed in R v Ashton- 
Rickhardt (12) where the accused was convicted of 
being in possession of cannabis resin. He had 
been stopped in relation to a road traffic offence 
and a search of his car uncovered a hand-rolled 
cigarette in the pocket of the driver’s door and
( 10) [1974] Crim.LR 243
(11) Warner ibid
(12) 1^ 197fj Crim.LR 424: this report uses cannabis 
and cannabis resin interchangeably but they 
are different: Section 37(1): also (1977)
65 Cr.App.R67
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subsequent analysis revealed there to be about 
200 milligrammes of cannabis resin. His defence 
was that he had no knowledge that the drug was in 
his car and that it must have been placed there 
by someone else. The trial judge directed the 
jury that the prosecution had to satisfy them that 
the accused had a controlled drug in his possession. 
After that it was up to the accused to satisfy 
them, on a balance of probabilities, that he did 
not know the drug was under his control. The 
accused appealed on the ground that the judge had 
misdirected the jury as to the meaning of possession 
in Section 5(2) and, further, that Section 28(2) 
of the 1971 Act does not require an accused to 
prove that he neither knew nor suspected nor had 
reason to suspect that he had custody of a 
controlled drug. The Court of Appeal, in allowing 
the appeal, held that the judge had failed to 
direct the jury that knowledge was an essential 
ingredient of possession (13) and that the burden 
of proving it remained with the prosecution. The 
Crown had submitted that possession in the 1971 Act 
bore a different meaning from that in the 1964 Act. 
If the legislature had intended to alter the meaning 
of possession, so as to exclude a mental element, 
one would have expected to find that intention 
more clearly expressed. Whatever the precise scope
(13) following Warner supra
— £.£. / —
of Section 28, its effect was to afford a defence 
where no defence had existed previously. Nothing 
in this section altered the burden of proof in 
respect of any element of the offence that the 
prosecution had to prove. It was not necessary, 
the court held, on this occasion to examine the 
limits of Section 28. Thus, we are not concerned 
here with the meaning of "possession" which the 
Court of Appeal clearly thought remained the same 
in the new Act as in the earlier ones. Rather,
R V Ashton-Rickhardt supra is authority for the 
proposition that the burden of proving the case 
beyond reasonable doubt rests on the Crown, as 
it always has, and nothing in Section 28 altered 
that burden. The Court of Appeal went further and 
said that the defence in Section 28 was one that 
had not existed prior to the 1971 Act. In 
practice this means that the Crown must prove 
knowing custody or control over a controlled drug 
beyond reasonable doubt in order to make out a 
prima facie case and when this is done the accused 
in order to secure acquittal must prove that some 
other requirements of the offence has not been met, 
The accused must prove this matter on balance of 
probabilities (14) and failure to do this means
that the intention to have possession of the 
controlled drug will be imputed to the accused by
(14) R V  Carr - Briant |^ 194 Q  KB 1
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the court. In the submissions to the court in 
R V  Ashton-Rickhardt supra the Crown argued that (15) 
"Section 28 removed from the shoulders of the 
Crown on to those of the accused the "burden of 
disproof" of knowledge that he had the "thing" 
in his possession".
This was a point that was raised obiter but not 
decided in R v Wright (15). However, the court 
rejected the argument in the instant case on the 
basis that, as indicated above, when construing 
Section 28 the defence was one that had not existed 
before and therefore it would be "very odd indeed" 
if at the same time as providing a new defence 
Section 28 also removed from the shoulders of the 
Crown the burden of proof of one of the essential 
elements of the offence as stated by the House of 
Lords in Warner supra. Thus in a prosecution for 
possession of a controlled drug the Crown still 
required to prove knowledge by the accused that 
he had control of the "thing" in question (17).
3.05 Thus, it would appear to be that the words in 
Section 28(2) "it shall be a defence" could be 
read either as making provision for a new defence, 
or, as putting the onus of proof on balance of 
probabilities on the accused. In terms of Section
(15) (1977) 65 Cr.App.R67 at p71. The point was 
also argued in McKenzie v Skeen unreported 
2nd August 1977 COCN A21/77
(16) ( 1976) 62 Cr.App.R169; 197^ Crim.LR248
(17) ibid at p72
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28( 0  the defence applies to six different 
offences in the 1971 Act but most comment has been 
focussed on offences of possession of controlled 
drugs. In R v Ashton-Rickhardt supra the Crown 
argued on appeal that the provision put the onus of 
proof on the accused but this was rejected by the 
court which preferred to say that the section made 
provision for a new defence. The matter has not 
come before the courts again for judicial considéra: 
:tion but there has been academic interest: in a 
recent article Ribeiro and Perry (18) suggest that 
there are at least eight distinct modes or 
situations of possession and that in each instance 
the precise elements in the offence to be proved 
by the prosecution or constituting an evidential 
burden on the defence will differ. Of these eight 
modes or situations of possession, the authors 
reject three as not amounting to possession-in-law, 
as they see it, and consider the remaining five.
Of these five, the first is "ideal" possession which, 
if it existed on the authors definitions, would 
raise no legal or analytical problems, and another 
concerns container cases which, under Warner supra, 
places an evidential burden only on the accused and 
not, as we are concerned with here, a legal burden:
(18) R Ribeiro and J Perry Possession and Section 28 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 |j 97^ Grim.LR90
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for these reasons the authors leave these two 
modes or situations of possession to one side also. 
The authors then show (19) that the ordinary 
requirements of law relating to what they define as 
strict possession, joint possession and possession 
by innocent agent require the prosecution to prove 
knowledge on the part of the accused. It follows 
then, they argue, that on the authority of R v 
Ashton-Rickhardt supra, "it shall be a defence" 
amounts to a new defence. Section 28(2) is 
incapable of application, a conclusion that is 
"unwelcomed and reluctantly reached". An 
interpretation was offered by Mathias (20): the 
author points out that Riberio and Perry's 
analysis of possession into eight modes or 
situations is correct in so far as each type is 
distinct in terms of circumstance, but he suggests 
that the fact that different circumstances may 
constitute possession does not require the conclusion 
that the nature of possession differs in each, 
though he concedes that the authors do not appear 
to go that far in their suggestions (21). Indeed, 
Mathias shows that the requirement of the offence 
of unlawful possession of a controlled drug is the 
same whether the circumstances are what the earlier 
authorities classify as "strict possession" or
(19) supra at p 104-5
(20) D Mathias "The Application of Section 28 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 to Possession." |j980^ 
Crim.LR689
(21) supra at p692-3
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"possession of a container’s contents". But,
Mathias also argues, and probably this is the more 
important submission, that it is no longer necessary 
for the prosecution to prove, in order to establish 
a prima facie case, that the accused knew that the 
thing was under his control. Here then, is the 
alternative argument that the words "it shall be a 
defence" puts the onus of proof on the accused. 
Mathias argues that to say other than this is to 
argue on an assumption as to the true construction 
of that particular provision for which the only 
support is the obscurity of the legislative intent. 
Mathias bases his arguiœnt on the "half-way house" 
authority of Lord Pearce in Warner supra. And there 
matters rest until either there is a policy decision 
at the highest level, the House of Lords, or 
Parliament expresses its intention more clearly in 
a statute.
3.06 The substance of defence. It is clear that what 
the accused has to prove is that:
"he neither knew of nor suspected nor had 
reason to suspect"
(and it is submitted that he must prove all of 
these things, the first two of which are subjective 
and the third objective)
"some fact alleged by the prosecution which it 
is necessary for the prosecution to prove if 
he is to be convicted of the offence charged."
-  Z J Z  -
The facts covered by the last requirement are 
essentially those that constitute the actus reus 
of the particular offence. In this connection to 
"know" has been held to include suspicion or 
wilful blindness. (22)
3.07 Section 28(3)
"Where in any proceedings for an offence to 
which this section applies it is necessary, 
if the accused is to be convicted of the 
offence charged, for the prosecution to prove 
that some substance or product involved in 
the alleged offence was the controlled drug 
which the prosecution alleges it to have been, 
and it is proved that the substance or product 
in question was that controlled drug, the 
accused -
(a) shall not be acquitted of the offence 
charged by reason only of proving that he 
neither knew nor suspected nor had reason 
to suspect that the substance or product 
in question was the particular controlled 
drug alleged; but
(b) shall be acquitted thereof -
(i) if he proves that he neither believed 
nor suspected nor had reason to suspect 
that the substance or product in question 
was a controlled drug; or
(22) see Glanville Williams The Criminal Law, The
General Part p57 and the authorities cited there 
and Textbook p84-87
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(ii) if he proves that he believed the
substance or product in question to 
be a controlled drug, or a controlled 
drug of a description, such that, if 
it had in fact been that controlled 
drug or a controlled drug of that 
description, he would not at the 
material time have been committing any 
offence to which this section applies."
(i) Section 38(3)(a): the effect of this sub-section 
is that it denies an accused person the possible 
defence that, where possession of a controlled drug 
is proved, he himself believed he had a different 
controlled drug from the one he had in fact. This 
sub-section has priority over the others in the 
section so that once it operates the other 
provisions cannot apply.
(ii) Section 28(3)(b)(i): the effect of this sub­
section is that when an accused person is prosecuted 
for possession and the Crown have established that 
the accused in fact had in his custody a controlled 
drug as alleged then the accused is allowed a
defence concerning his belief as to the nature of
the substance which turned out to be a controlled 
drug. The accused must be acquitted if he discharges 
the legal burden of proving that he neither believed,
nor suspected, nor had reason to suspect it to be a
controlled drug. It is submitted that this defence
- Z -
was intended by the legislature to deal with cases 
of strict possession and to alleviate the harshness 
of the courts in ignoring an accused person's 
genuine misapprehension as to the nature of the 
substance in his control. Further, proof of this 
strict possession, that is custody by the accused 
of an article in his full knowledge but with 
imprecise knowledge as to the nature of the article, 
does not mean an automatic conviction but rather it 
means that the accused must then discharge the legal 
burden of proving his lack of knowledge, suspicion 
or reason to suspect the true nature of the 
substance in his custody. This allows a defence 
for a person who was in the position of the accused 
in Searle v Randolph (23) who was convicted of 
possessing cannabis contrary to Section 13 of the 
1965 Act when he had thirty six cigarette ends in 
his custody although there was no evidence that 
the accused knew or had reason to believe that they 
contained any substance other than tobacco. The 
total cannabis amounted to three milligrammes I 
This case is to be contrasted with R v Marriott (24) 
were the accused was acquitted on appeal of 
possession of cannabis resin, this amounting to 
0.03 grains, contrary to Section 13 of the 1965 Act. 
The accused had been found to be in possession of a
(23) jj972] Crim.LR 779
(24) [l97l] 1WLR189; [l97l] lAIIER 595
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knife which analysis showed to have the particle 
of cannabis resin adhering to the tip of the blade 
but he said that he did not know of its presence. 
However, the court thought that if he knew that 
there was foreign matter on the blade then that 
was sufficient mens rea but the court doubted at 
the same time whether the law went that far!
(iii) Section 28(3)(b)(ii) ; the effect of this 
sub-section is to allow the accused a defence 
where he is found to be in possession of a 
certain controlled drug when he believes himself 
to be in possession of a different but particular 
controlled drug for which he is duly authorised.
The accused has a legal burden of proving this 
belief.
(iv) Section 28(4): the effect of this sub-section 
is to preserve for the accused the general 
defences in the criminal law, for example, infancy 
and duress.
3.08 An anomq,ly in the defences contained in Section 28 
arises out of an application of the whole section 
to those offences detailed in sub-section one. 
Section 6(2) makes it an offence to cultivate a 
plant of the genus Cannabis without authority 
but such a plant is not a controlled drug within 
the meaning of that phrase in terms of Section 
2(l)(a) of the 1971 Act. Further, in Sections 9(a) 
and (b) the offences are concerned with one 
particular controlled drug (prepared opium) and a
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belief on the part of the accused that he was 
acting in relation to some other controlled drug 
gives rise to a material mistake if he is believed 
In Section 9(c) the offence relates to opium and 
prepared opium and the principles of Section 28 
would seem not to apply.
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PART FOUR
Chapter 4 Conclusions
A. Criminal Responsibility
4.01 The cardinal principle of the common law in
criminal matters is that no act is punishable 
unless it is performed with a criminal mind and 
that requires that the state of mind is such that 
his actings are made criminal. The criminal 
liability of an accused person depends on whether 
he has committed the actus reus (that is, the 
legally blameworthy conduct) of a particular 
offence with the necessary mens rea (that is, the 
legally blameworthy state of mind). Generally, 
the principle of contemporaneity requires the actus 
reus and the mens rea to occur at the same point 
in time for the commission of a crime (1). But, 
the foregoing is trite in comparison to the remainder 
of a most complex subject and this is not the place 
for a complete review of the limits and content of 
that subject. What is required now, however, is 
some consideration of the principles of strict 
responsibility or strict liability (2). Whatever 
the common law may be, in modern times a doctrine 
has grown up that in certain classes of statutory
(1) but see G Marston Contemporaneity of Act and 
Intention (1970) 86LQR208 and A R White The 
Identity and Time of the Actus Reus |jl97^  Crim.LR148
(2) until recently strict responsibility or strict 
liability was known as absolute liability: see
Williams p905 echoing the Law Commission Working 
Paper Number 31 (page 2 footnote 2)
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offences an accused person could be convicted on 
proof by the prosecution of the actus reus only. 
These classes of statutory offences have come to be 
known as "public welfare offences" or "regulatory 
offences". One learned commentator has advanced 
two propositions in relation to the growth of the 
doctrine of mens rea. The first is that the 
development of mens rea represented the growing 
inference in the criminal law of ethical 
considerations of morality, contrasting with the 
earlier law which was more concerned with the 
nature and degree of harm done. The second is 
that the law was thereby improved (3). Notwith:
: standing, then, the cardinal principle of mens 
rea in criminal matters. Parliament has been 
prepared to use the sanction of the criminal law 
as a means of securing a well-ordered structure 
of social and economic conduct. And in an attempt 
to achieve this end the cardinal principle has been 
circumvented continuously. This, it is suggested, 
is a result of the condition of life arising from 
an industrialised society and of such momentous 
events as two world wars with their vast output of 
regulations creating new offences. But, the 
development of strict responsibility owes some of 
its origins to judicial decisions and, in England,
(3) Howard p4
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to the general policy adopted by successive Lords 
Chief Justice (4). This policy was reflected in 
the construction of the relevant statutory provisions 
of an offence- An Act of Parliament could explicitly 
alter the requisite mens rea for an offence or it 
could exclude certain defences or it could transfer 
the burden of proof from the prosecution to the 
defence. But, in many statutes Parliament is found 
to be silent on these particular matters and it 
then becomes necessary for the courts to interpret 
the statute by reference solely to the general 
principles of law. However, in recent legislation 
it is increasingly obvious that many of the offences 
classified as being of strict responsibility and 
are no less serious in their social consequences 
than those common law crimes which require proof 
by the prosecution of both an actus reus and a mens 
rea and any argument to the contrary, it is 
submitted, can be refuted by reference to the 
schedule of punishments relating to the 1971 Act, 
for example. Further, the vast number of offences 
of strict responsibility and the differing terms 
of each section of Acts creating such offences 
means that it is necessary to consider the actual 
terms of each offence in order to determine the
(4) For example Edwards at pxii writing in 1955 
said that the mood of the bench then was 
"manifestly suspicious of attempts to extend 
the field of strict responsibility in crime,"
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requirements of actus reus and mens rea. 
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to lay 
down any generally valid rules of interpretation (5) 
But, it may be said that the courts pay considerable 
attention to the wording of the section and also 
the gravity of the offence, the nature of the 
penalty and the object of the statute. By 
emphasising any one or combination of these 
criteria the court can hold that a particular 
offence does or does not require mens rea. The 
justification of the policy that the courts are 
pleased to adopt from time to time, and indeed 
the action of Parliament in circumventing the 
cardinal principle, are not matters than can 
properly be discussed in this work.
4.02 One point on which both supporters and
opponents of strict responsibility appear to be 
agreed is that the present position of the 
doctrine is unsatisfactory owing to its erratic 
incidence. One reason for this has been the 
great distinction drawn between crimes requiring 
mens rea and those being of strict responsibility 
so that judges faced with the decision in relation 
to a particular offence have been required to
(5) In the past judicial interpretation was in 
relation only to particular offences then 
before the court: only recently have general 
principles in relation to statutory offences 
evolved: see Edwards p244
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construe it as one or the other. What jurists 
have sought then is some new system which 
combines the merits claimed for strict 
responsibility and those of crimes requiring mens 
rea. The answer to the problem, it has been 
suggested, is the half-way house between mens rea 
and strict responsibility, and that is responsibility 
for negligence. This, it is argued, would 
operate to maintain the high standards of care 
which the regulatory offences seek to establish. 
Responsibility for negligence would be strengthened. 
by a shift in the burden of proof. The operation 
of this doctrine has been described in the 
following terms (6)
"If from the statutory words no requirement 
of mens rea could be gathered, the accused 
would be prima facie liable to conviction on 
proof by the prosecution of actus reus only. 
However, the accused should be allowed to 
exculpate himself by proving affirmatively 
that he was not negligent. The issue of 
negligence would be a question of fact to be 
decided according to the circumstances of 
each case."
The authors submit that such a doctrine could not 
possibly be less effective than strict 
responsibility as an instrument of law enforcement 
and might be more effective by eliminating injustice.
(6) Morris and Howard p201
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But this is not a theoretical modeltt^t the High 
Court of Australia has adhered with consistency 
to the principle that there should be no liability 
without fault, however■minor the offence. Thus, 
the rule is that where an offence does not require 
full mens rea, it is nevertheless normally a good 
defence for the accused to prove that he acted 
under a reasonable mistake of fact. The standard 
of proof to be attained by the accused in Australia 
is on the balance of probabilities only (7).
4.03 The Australian solution then is to allow the
accused a defence that he acted under an honest 
and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, 
if they existed, would make his act innocent. 
Although this solution has not been implemented 
in the United Kingdom it has been the subject of 
favourable judicial comment (8). There is, 
however, an alternative. This solution is that 
even where the words used to describe the prohibited 
conduct would not in any other context connote the 
necessity of any particular mental element they 
are nevertheless to be read as subject to the 
implication that a necessary element in the offence 
is the absence of a belief, held honestly and on
(7) see Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLB 536 
particularly at p540 and Smith and Hogan p97 
and C Howard Strict Responsibility in High Court 
of Australia (I960) 76 LQR 547
(8) Sweet v Parsley supra per Lord Reid at pl50 and 
Lord PearOLat pl58 but see Brett Strict 
Responsibility: Possible Solutions (1974)
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reasonable grounds, in the existence of facts which, 
if true, would make the act innocent (9). An 
important difference would be that the accused did 
not have a burden of proving such a defence, only of 
adducing evidence in support of his contention.
The Law Commission, in carrying out its responsibility 
for examining the general principles of the 
criminal law with a view to their eventual Codification 
has examined this matter. A working paper on the 
mental element in crime was prepared (10) and this 
formed the basis for discussion until the Report (11). 
The first recommendation contained in the Report was 
that there should be statutory provisions as to the 
meaning of intention, knowledge and recklessness, 
which provisions should apply unless expressly 
excluded. The second recommendation was that there 
should be certain statutory presumptions operating 
in the absence of express indications to the 
contrary, as to the extent to which offences should 
be taken to require a mental state on the part of 
the accused. The latter recommendation was that 
wherever in creating an offence Parliament made no 
provision making liability strict or making 
liability depend on the presence or absence of any 
particular state of mind or compliance with an
(9) Sweet v Parsley supra per Lord Diplock at pl63
(10) (1970) Working Paper No. 31
(11) (1978) Report on the Mental Element in Crime 
(No. 89)
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objective standard of conduct then, to the extent 
that no such provision is made, the offence should 
involve on the part of the accused, intention or 
recklessness in relation to any circumstance (12), 
Further, in future offences, where liability is 
subject to a defence or exemption, the accused 
should not be liable if he believed that any 
circumstance existed which, had it in fact existed, 
would have provided him with that defence or 
exemption. The burden of proving the accused's 
belief that the exempting circumstances existed 
is the same as the burden of proving that the 
circumstance itself existed (13). This position, 
it is submitted, is one essentially similar to 
that suggested by Lord Diplock (14). The Law 
Commission Report met with some hostile reaction 
and Professor Brian Hogan said that (15)
"There is nowhere in the Report a firm and 
clear statement of principle, nor is 
Parliament offered any guidance."
The basis of the learned professor's argument 
appears to be that the problem goes much further 
than the substitution of liability based on fault 
(including negligence) for strict liability 
though, at the very least, a man ought not to be
(12) (1978) Report ibid para 89
(13) (1978) Report supra para 91 and see clause 6 
of the draft Bill in Report
(14) see footnote 8 supra
(15) [1978] Crim.LR588 at p596
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accounted criminal if he has taken all reasonable 
care to conform to the law’s demands. It is, he 
says, pertinent to ask whether and when the 
imposition of criminal liability for merely 
negligent behaviour is proper and profitable.
And he finds the suggestion that the substitution 
of liability based on negligence for strict 
liability - the so-called half-way house - will 
solve the problem as "facile."
4.04 We have seen the division of the offences
contained in the 1971 Act and development of the 
case law in relation to each such offence. The 
legislature has provided for these offences but 
no attempt has been made to place these into 
similar or related categories of criminal 
responsibility. The 1971 Act classifies the 
offences in Sections 3 to 7 inclusive under the 
heading "Restrictions relating to controlled drugs 
etc.", the offences in Sections 3 and 9 under the 
heading "Miscellaneous offences involving 
controlled drugs etc." and the offences in Sections 
10 to 17 under "Powers of Secretary of State for 
preventing misuse of controlled drugs," The 1971 
Act also covers the offences in Sections 18, 19 and 
20 with "Miscellaneous offences and powers" and 
that in Section 27 with "Law enforcement and 
punishment of offences." Each offence therefore is
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to be judged in the light of its own terms, its 
own case law and the prevailing judicial policy.
It would appear from the earlier parts of this work 
that Parliament has been prepared to give some 
indication of the mental element required to be 
proved if certain offences in the 1971 Act are to 
reach the stage of conviction, but, it is submitted 
that overall the picture is fragmented and much is 
still uncertain. The assistance that has been 
given by Parliament has been minimal.
4.05 Where Parliament has made a major attempt to consider 
the mental element in statutory offences is in the 
introduction of Lord Pearce's suggestion in Warner
(16) to apply the half-way house" solution to Section 
28 of the 1971 Act. But even here the matter is 
confused for academic opinion and the judiciary 
have been shown to be divided on the desirability 
of this solution and even where it is considered 
to be desirable there is uncertainty as to whether 
the burden on the accused is to be an evidential 
or a legal one. The concept of the "half-way house" 
cannot, therefore, be said to be fully developed 
or to have been applied with any great enthusiasm. 
Indeed, we have seen that the courts have had 
suitable occasions on which to review and indeed 
implement the concept but for, presumably, policy
(16) [i969][ 2AC 256; ^ 968^ 2WLR1303 at pl345
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reasons have chosen not to do so. It may well be, 
of course, that in the absence of a clear lead from 
elsewhere the courts have chosen not to apply the 
solution despite the Australian precedents: 
certainly there has been a fundamental change in 
the law but this has not been expressed as clearly 
or decisively as it might have been and the courts 
have been described by some commentators as wrong 
in rejecting submissions that this is what should 
be done, and done in a decisive manner (17).
4.06 Accordingly, it is submitted that the 1971 Act 
shows clearly signs that the Parliamentary 
draftsman has attempted to give some sort of lead 
as to the mental element in statutory crime arising 
out of what the court has provided as guidance 
on earlier occasions. It is conceded that the 
judges frequently are at odds but then the 1971 
Act itself is fragmented. However, as the 197 1 
Act is a major criminal statute and in daily use 
a clear expression of the requirements is 
necessary. It is submitted that matters could well 
have been clarified and the status of the offences 
enhanced by drafting the Bill with the offences in 
the related groups with suitable headings, such as 
"strict responsibility" for the regulatory offences 
such as Sections 12 and 17, "strict responsibility 
with a degree of mens rea" for Section 23 and
(17) D M Mathias ibid at p693
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"offences requiring mens rea" for Section 5. 
Essentially the 1971 Act can be said to be in need 
of synthesis. This is not and cannot be said to 
be an academic exercise in "tidying-up" the statute 
book. The acts of, and the actions concerned with, 
drug-taking are viewed by Parliament as being of 
extreme seriousness and this is doubtless meant to 
reflect the nature of the social problem with which 
the legislature has had to concern itself.
Certainly, some offences in the 1971 Act can be 
described as regulatory or public welfare offences 
but, it has been argued (18), the severe penalties 
contained in the Act, such as 14 years in several 
offences, are such that they are anything but simply 
regulatory. It is submitted that in fairness to 
the accused where such penalties are in contemplation 
by the legislature, clear and unambiguous indications 
of the requirement of full mens rea are required. 
Further, if the failure to give such a clarity of 
meaning is accepted as a valid criticism then 
another point arises: in the vast increase of 
statutory offences in the last thirty years there 
has been a proliferation of statutory defences and 
if the legislature is to provide such defences, it 
is submitted that equally clear indications as to 
the nature of the burden imposed, if any, on the 
accused be given and, if this is to vary depending 
on the nature of certain circumstances then this too
(18) Cross and Jones at p332
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should be indicated.
B . Misuse of Drugs.
4.07 On initial question that seems as yet unanswered 
is why the long title of the 1971 Act should 
concern itself with "dangerous or otherwise 
harmful" drugs and yet the Sections of the Act 
provide for controlled drugs. What is the 
difference, if any? Are they intended to mean 
the same? The matter is unresolved. In the 
development of the law through the cases that have 
been discussed certain problems have arisen.
Firstly, we have seen that the argument of minimum 
quantity has developed. The English test of 
usability has developed and, although not accepted 
in Scotland, it appears to be there to stay, unless 
and until there is a policy decision or, more 
probably in the absence of Scots criminal appeals 
to an English court, legislation to the contrary.
It has been suggested by one writer that provision 
should be made for a prosecution only when the 
quantity is 100 milligrammes or more though there 
appears, in logic at least, no reason why this 
particular quantity should be founded on. This 
aspect of the law, it is submitted, is uncertain and 
unsatisfactory and there is need for some form of 
reconciliation between English and Scots decisions.
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Secondly, In the course of the progress of the Bill 
through Parliament one nember has been quoted as 
saying that the purpose of the legislation is to 
prevent the circulation of drugs. If this is 
correct, and the member has maintained a learned 
Interest in the subject matter, then it is submitted 
that greater emphasis should have been given to 
offenders in terms of Section 5(3); possession with 
intent to supply unlawfully. Doubtless Parliament 
sought here, as in other parts of the Act, to 
leave much to the courts who must be allowed 
discretion to ensure justice in accordance with the 
circumstances of widely varying cases before them. 
But, should not clearer meanings have been given 
in relation to the intention to supply? At the 
present the law on this point is uncertain 
following on the irreconcilable decisions of 
R V King (19) and R v Moore (20) and if a suitable 
occasion arises for principles to be established 
then it is a matter of considerable importance 
that this should be done. The law can only be 
properly implemented when the intention of Parliament 
is settled.
4.08 There would appear, furthermore, to be some
inconsistency in the gradation of controlled drugs. 
There is no indication within the Act as to why 
certain drugs are placed in one classification in
(19) [i978] Crim.LR228
(20) [l979]| Crim.LR789
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preference to others but this is what Parliament 
has done. We have seen in the cases how confusion 
had developed in relation to "cannabinol" and 
"cannabinol derivatives" in class A and "cannabis 
and cannabis resin" in class B. No reasons are to 
be found in the Act as to why Parliament regards 
them differently and applies varying penalties.
It may be that the drugs in class A are regarded 
as more "dangerous or otherwise harmful" than those 
in the other classes but there is no expression of 
this view. It is possible, however, that Parliament 
refrained from indicating why the controlled drugs 
are so divided in order to avoid interminabüu 
arguments as to the scientific basis of these 
assertions. It would also seem that so far as 
the offences are concerned. Parliament has devoted 
considerably more of its attention to some drugs 
rather than others. There may well be good 
historical reasons for this; opium has concerned 
Britain in various economic and social contexts 
since the late 18th century (21) whereas what is 
commonly known as LSD was first synthesised in 
1938 but only noted for its psychic properties 
in 1943 (22). But it is submitted that the 
attention paid to opium in terms of Section 9 is 
excessive, or at least it was an error not to give
(21) see for example Jack Beeching The Chinese 
Opium Wars (1975)
(22) Peter Laurie Drugs, Medical, Psychological 
and Social Facts at pl07
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comparable treatment to all offences. It was also 
an error to fail or omit to make provisions in 
relation to drug parapWfAalia for all drugs and 
not simply opium. If, for example, the possession 
of syringes for non-medical purposes is not 
illegal then that in itself assists in the 
circulation of drugs. It is also submitted that 
in failing to make greater provision for the 
offences of importing and exporting controlled 
drugs the 1971 Act is ill-balanced. The supply of 
many controlled drugs in the United Kingdom is 
only maintained by the importation of drugs from 
abroad because of the nature and origin of the 
drugs and consequently Parliament ought to have 
provided especially for those offences in the 1971 
Act. The same can be said for the offence of 
exporting controlled drugs, especially as the 
highly complex chemical processes require expert 
knowledge and specialist equipment that only an 
advanced country such as Britain has in short 
compass (23).
C . Future developments.
4.09 Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is a tribute 
to the draftsman of the 1971 Act that no new 
legislation in relation to drugs in general appears 
to be demanded. Many of the criticisms relate to
(23) a point made in R Lee and C Pratt 
Operation Julie (1978)
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points which have developed subsequent to the 
passing of the 1971 Act. However, the principal 
criticism relates not so much to controlled drugs 
but to the criminal law in general. It is 
submitted that what is required is legislation to 
establish more clearly the position of the mental 
element in statutory offences. The likelihood 
that such legislation will be forthcoming is 
reduced by the lack of Parliamentary time, the 
complicated nature of the subject matter, political 
expediency, a desire to leave "lawyer’s law" to 
the courts and the great variety of offences that 
such general principles would apply to. Such 
legislation was considered, as we have seen, by 
the Law Commission and a draft Bill prepared which 
on becoming an Act would affect all future 
legislation in that strict responsibility could 
only be imposed by the conscious choice of 
Parliament and that the offence would be labelled 
as one carrying liability without fault. Be that 
as it may, it seems likely that some time in the 
future the legislature will be required to consider 
the mental element in statutory offences. The 
problem is complicated by the widely-varying opinions 
of eminent jurists but this much is certain: while 
statutes in the past have concerned themselves with 
providing for offences of a trivial nature.
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increasingly crimes are being established that 
by common consensus have a foundation in an 
important moral wrong. It is important, 
therefore, that the entire matter of the mental 
element in crime is reviewed continuously by all 
lawyers so that when finally called on by 
Parliament, agreed advice can be given.
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